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Locating the Idea of Heresy in Literary Criticism 
In a recent essay for Civilization, Roger Shattuck laments what he sees as the 
devaluation and corruption ofliterature in academic studies: After listing a long series of 
grievances with his profession, Shattuck calls for a "forum . . . in which literature will take 
precedence over politics, ideology, social agendas and theory. No one would exclude 
those concerns from literary studies. But they should not run the show" (72). To that end, 
Shattuck and several other literary critics have formed the Association of Literary Scholars 
and Critics (Shattuck presides as president), an organization that seeks to create a dialogue 
in which "Literature would have no rivals" (72). The Association has gained quick 
popularity with 1,400 members and could boast 300 participants in its first national 
meeting in September 1995 ("Treating" A22). That gathering had only a handful of 
sessions for the reading of papers, but generated a sense of enthusiasm and purpose. 
Leaders admit, however, they must clearly define the goals of the Association and organize 
a forum for job opportunities, a major attraction of belonging to the Modern Language 
Association (A22). Shattuck and others intend to confront head-on the profession's 
largest organization, a group Shattuck claims has fallen to "a well-concerted radical 
caucus" (71). 
The reaction to Shattuck and his new group has been swift and decisive. Sander L. 
Gilman, current president of the MLA, sees the recent formation of the Association as the 




of the latest trends in scholarship were once on the cutting edge of literary rebellion . . . 
Now a new revolution is under way" ("Treating" A22). Gilman's not so subtle insinuation 
is that literary criticism has passed certain malcontents by in the last few years. Jay Parini 
receives the entire back page of the Chronicle of Higher Education to voice his reactions. 
Parini calls Shattuck's Civilization article "disturbing" and "wrong-headed" (A52). 
Defending current trends in criticism, he claims that "Nobody needs an 'ism' to appreciate 
or study literature, and no theorist has ever suggested as much. But Mr. Shattuck, like 
many others in the new association, thinks somebody is saying this" (A52). After 
acknowledging that some critics use theory poorly, he writes, "The desire to return to a 
prelapsarian kingdom where ignorance was bliss and ideological bias was strong but 
unvoiced, is bewildering" (A52). Notice the perception that critics of Shattuck's ilk remain 
out of touch with reality and long for a day when their type of criticism ruled the stage. 
Neither Gilman nor Parini gives the least amount of credence to what Shattuck and others 
say is wrong with the profession; in their minds the real issue has to do with a desire to 
wrestle control away :from current scholars because Shattuck and his followers have fallen 
out of positions of influence in the institution. 
So has a permanent schism opened up in literary studies and will we now see 
criticism head down two divergent paths? Probably not immediately. The plurality of 
voices in criticism makes any claims for a "well-concerted radical caucus" hard to support, 
and the MLA simply controls too much money and power to feel any serious threat to its 
position. Nevertheless, a significant number of prominent critics, among them Shattuck, 
Denis Donoghue, and Paul Fussell, have determined that to make their voices heard they 
must step outside the usual apparatus of their institution. In religious terms, many critics 
have decided to establish their own house of worship with an alternative critical liturgy; we 
may be witnessing the dawning of a new literary denomination. 
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This type of separation always occurs at the end of an institutional struggle; 1 new 
denominations, associations, and ruling bodies form, and extending the religious 
comparison to discover the roots of this battle may serve us well. Literary critics often see 
themselves as a sort of cultural priesthood, protecting literature and art from the ravages of 
time and the unredeemed.2 Douglas Bush, for example, took New Critics to task in 1959: 
"My creed is of no account to anyone except me, but, so far as I am aware, it rests on the 
conception of poetry which reigned for some 2,500 years, through the greatest periods of 
literature" (21).3 Bush remained the Good Soldier of the faith, defending and supporting 
the long tradition of literature from the beginning of Western Civilization. Today he would 
find himself fending off attacks from within the walls of literary criticism itself, a 
development most established critics of the first three decades of this century responded to 
with a mixture of surprise and horror . 
But rancor and challenges within literary criticism · happened because the institution 
of literary criticism had something worth fighting for in the first half of the twentieth 
century. During this time, working in a university as a literary critic became a profession, 
a profession that offered a secure salary, book deals, and a certain amount of prestige, 
especially within intellectual circles. No longer did people merely sit around coffee houses 
and discuss the merits of literature or write reviews for newspapers on the subject at their 
leisure. Nor did criticism remain a sort of sidelight for writers of fiction and poetry: an 
opportunity to comment on the literature of the day (including one's own), a chance to set 
forth and proscribe one's aesthetic principles, and maybe the opportunity to make some 
extra money in the process. 4 
Once academia captured the practice of criticism, however, it became a discipline 
with structure, hierarchy, and methods of training. One no longer dabbled in criticism; one 
worked as a Critic. We should find it only natural then that the institution of criticism finds 
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itself operating under the same dynamics as other clearly defined and rigorous disciplines. 5 
One of those dynamics involves the process by which a faction within the institution 
challenges the authority and power of the ruling majority, a process which leads itself to 
the previously mentioned religious parallel: many sociologists and rhetoricians in the last 
several years have discovered that much discourse involving power struggles within an 
institution mirrors the debates over heresy and orthodoxy in religious disputes. Heresy 
takes on a political dimension in these discourses; the definition, identification, and 
expulsion of heresy become strategies of institutional control over perceived challenges to 
its power. The heretical party uses the occasion to challenge the assumptions the 
institution rules by and seeks to shift the locus of power by claiming its ideology can save 
and better administer the group. 
I want to examine the ways in which the ideas of heresy and orthodoxy play 
themselves out in literary criticism, and this study will begin with a sociological approach 
to literary criticism as a recognizable institution with a well-defined power structure. I find 
such an approach legitimate and needed because too often literary critics view themselves 
. as above the fray of normal societal pressures, as if the usual methods of examining 
institutions cannot find application to them because of some kind of objective superiority. 
But such idealism proves false; like any community, literary critics act and react in ways 
similar to any other specialized society. The study of how critics and criticism respond to 
structures and challenges can provide a better understanding of behavior within the 
discipline. 
This study will limit itself to exploring the ways in which heresy becomes a strategy 
for certain critics using the methodologies of different schools of critical theory. In that 
sense, what comes under scrutiny involves only one facet of the society of English studies. 
By focusing on the rhetoric of heresy in literary criticism, the opportunity exists to 
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carefully demonstrate how heresy operates in the dominant mode of expression within the 
field: published interpretation and criticism. 6 Looking at heresy in this way allows for a 
thorough examination of the topic while suggesting far-reaching implications for the entire 
institution. 
This is not to suggest that all critics indulge in heresy or that criticism is the only 
means by which members of the institution express themselves. Teaching, presenting·at 
conferences, administering programs, and many other duties comprise the life of the 
English scholar. But the fact remains, rightly or wrongly, that publication looms as the 
driving determinant of success and position in the institution. It would seem only 
reasonable then to isolate this practice and study it more closely. But doing so does not 
mean to suggest that all rhetroic is heretical and therefore monolithic, or that no other 
activities make up the life of the institution. 
The discipline of sociology furnishes a model helpful to a discussion of perceived 
heresy within an institution. Lester R. Kurtz presents an excellent study of heresy during 
the Modernist crisis in the Catholic church in his article "The Politics of Heresy" and his 
book on the same subject, The Politics of Heresy: The Modernist Crisis in Roman 
Catholicism. Kurtz thinks of heresy in terms of rhetorical responses to threats to 
institutional structure and contends that attempts to purge heresy serve to maintain power 
relationships within that subculture. The result consists of what Thomas M. Lessl calls the 
managing of"intemal deviance" (''Heresy"l9). Lessl's own application ofKurtz's model to 
the dispute between evolution and creationism, an academic controversy, provides a 
potent example of how the ruling elite of a community strives to squelch all challenges to 
its power, whether they prove real or imagined. 
Kurtz outlines in his works five dominant characteristics of the orthodox reaction 
to alleged heresy: 1) the identification of heresy which results in a crisis within the 
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institution; 2) a struggle over authority; 3) the building of solidarity to remove the heresy; 
4) the defining of "orthodoxy" through boundary-work; and 5) a ritual through which 
pressures upon the institution are relieved. The first characteristic concerns the perception 
of heresy, which brings about a crisis, with the heretics coming from within the 
community: "Heretics are within the circle, or within the institution; consequently, they are 
close enough to be threatening but distant enough to be considered in error" ("Politics" 
1087). Kurtz notes that "In Catholic tradition, a heretic is a baptized, professing Catholic," 
and therefore the "heretic is a 'deviant insider"' (Politics 3-4). While attacks from outside 
the group require answering, they do not pose the same threat from members inside the 
institution because they disrupt more completely and even have the capacity to ascend to 
positions of power, thus altering the direction and purpose of the community. Kurtz 
explains that "only when criticism and challenge come from within, only when it claims to 
be orthodox, does the institution grow alarmed" ("Politics" 1096). 
Lessl provides a relevant illustration. The first appearance of creationism in the 
1920s caused little concern for scientists because it grew from outside the ranks in the 
fundamentalist religious community. Scientists shrugged off such a threat as a 
conservative reaction to modernism, and their cause found public vindication in the 1925 
Scopes trial. However, when a small group of scientists within the community began 
forming their own journals and organizations to advocate creationism in the 1960s, 
scientists viewed the developments with great alarm because creationism intruded upon 
science in a search for authority (Lessl 19). As a result, Lessl believes the "discussion has 
focused on the deviance of the creation scientists who, having all the accrediting insignia of 
science, audaciously violate its conventions and become, in effect, a heretical threat to the 
scientific establishment" (19). Heresy provokes such strong reactions because "criticism 
from within a social organization may be more intellectually offensive than external 
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criticism" (Politics 11). 
A contention over authority commences when heresy begins, and Kurtz identifies 
this as the second characteristic of internal deviance. Lessl grants that the orthodox may 
see the crisis as the defense of truth, but the dispute may also "be regarded as a political 
struggle" ("Heresy" 21). Kai T. Erickson demonstrates that the antinomian heresy in 
Massachusetts had its beginnings in Anne Hutchinson's parlor long before the local clergy 
took notice, because until she declared their inability to interpret scripture, they had no 
reason to view her as a threat to their authority and power. Lessl observes that this 
brought about the "transformation of Hutchinson's deviant doctrines into a challenge to 
ecclesiastical authority" and made the clergy anxious to remove her from the church, 
though "the doctrines she espoused were widely known long before she was prosecuted as 
a heretic" (''Heresy" 21 ). Kurtz argues that expelling heretics "reinforces systems of 
dominance" ("Politics" 1086), and there occurs no reason to assert that dominance unless 
the orthodox see their a1.,1thority, not just their beliefs, called into question. 
Heresy's third characteristic involves the building of solidarity among the members 
of an institution. Lessl writes that "Heresy is two-sided, [sic] it at once threatens the 
institution by introducing and propagating error but also causes the institution's members 
to draw together in a community of responsibility devoted to extinguishing the fires of 
deviance" (''Heresy" 21). Heresy demands the cooperation of the segments of the group 
for the continued survival of orthodoxy. Lewis A Coser recognizes that "renegadism 
signifies and symbolizes a desertion of those standards of the group considered vital to its 
well-being, if not its actual existence" (69). The creationist heresy in science, "benefits 
institutional science to the extent that it brings together scientists who are ordinarily 
isolated within their specialization and produces among them a renewed social 
consciousness" (Lessl, ''Heresy" 21). One of the interesting by-products of this solidarity 
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involves a new sort of opportunity for publication: the defense of orthodoxy and the 
castigation of the heretic. Lessl points out that "the publication of anticreationsit books 
has become almost a subindustry for scientists" (''Heresy" 24). The orthodox often spend 
more time maintaining power than going about the business of the institution. 
Boundary-work constitutes the fourth dimension of heresy. The orthodox must 
establish what exactly orthodoxy consists of in order to keep the heretics at bay and in 
clear relief from the true believers. Defining limits often involves a negative process: "the 
boundaries of what is true and acceptable are marked out through a systematic 
identification of what is false and unacceptable" (Kurtz, "Politics" 1085). Boundary-work 
must take place because as Kurtz notes, heresy is "claimed by its proponents to be truly 
orthodox" (''Politics" I 088). Often an institution operates without giving much thought to 
what philosophy actually underlies its method and purpose. Heresy provides a set of 
values and propositions to reject, and in that rejection orthodoxy can better define itself 7 
Last of all, heresy serves as a ritual activity "through which anxieties attendant to 
orthodoxy are relieved" (Lessl, ''Heresy" 22). Heretics, according to Kurtz, become easy 
and available scapegoats for all the pressures put upon an institution ("Politics" 1097). In 
the case of the modernist controversy among Catholics, "modernists came to represent all 
that was wrong with the modern world" ("Politics" 1094). Unable to control forces 
exerting a strain from outside the group, the orthodox hunted down and purged the 
internal deviance as a stress-relieving alternative. Heretics can even carry blame "for 
externally located causes of tension" (Lessl, ''Heresy" 22). The orthodox solace 
themselves in the belief that the expulsion of heretics from within the institution will 
somehow solve all the extra-institutional problems confronting the group. In the case of 
evolutionists versus creationists, Lessl believes the creationists become "the most 
immediate and concrete representatives of outward evil," when in fact the real threat to 
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scientists exists in "popular and political ambivalence" (''Heresy" 24). 
To Kurtz's model should be added Max Weber's ideas on the nature of sacred texts, 
for these ideas apply fruitfully to the dialogue surrounding literary criticism. Weber makes 
a helpful distinction between texts and the interpretation of them: "Canonical Scriptures 
contain the Revelations and traditions themselves, whereas dogmas are priestly 
interpretation of their meanings" (458). In Weber's formula, literary works would stand as 
canonical scripture with the criticism surrounding them constituting dogma. One of the 
great howls often heard among critics is that the opposition commits the error of 
dogmatism. 8 But according to Weber, dogma results from the interpretation of any 
canonical text. 
One possible formulation then of the controversy among literary critics requires 
imagining the factions as warring literary priests. With the canon set, a battle ensues over 
whose interpretation, whose dogma, will prevail, and as a result this interpretive struggle 
helps determine which group will gain control of the community.9 The irony rests in the 
strange way heresy gets defined over the course of this struggle. For I would add an 
important addition to Kurtz's model as it applies to literary criticism: unlike any other 
institution, literary discourse rewards heretical expression as it questions and very often 
condemns orthodox rhetoric. Heresy becomes a strategy to gain· a voice and power in 
written literary interpretation. Literary critics seek to avoid the tag "orthodox 
interpretation" at all costs in their careers. One way for critics to carve a place for 
themselves in literary criticism involves creating an image of themselves as iconoclasts at 
war with the texts they interpret and reformers of the culture that produces those texts. 
Heresy for heresy's sake produces a constant barrage of criticism that strives to obliterate 
all commentary that went before it, very often subsuming the text under study along with 
it. Literary texts are no longer sites for interpretation, but rather "sites of contention," 
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opportunities not to extract and amplify meaning, but occasions for critics to espouse the 
latest heresy, very often with tenuous connections to the text being engaged. As Hayden 
White comments on criticism in general, "The critic no longer knows exactly why he is 
doing what he does or how he does it; yet he cannot stop. He is in the grip of a vis 
interpretativa, the compulsive power of which impels the critic to reflect more on criticism 
than on 'reading"' (267). This describes perfectly the consuming impulses of heresy. 
An example from recent criticism will help to illustrate. A popular topic of the last 
five years in literary studies involves colonialism, postcolonialism, and empire. The urge to 
attack texts in light of their response ( or most often their lack of one) to colonial and 
imperial questions now consumes a great amount of print in journals and panels at 
literature conferences. 10 Certainly a book that. should immediately come to the forefront of 
such discussions is Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness. No book of the early twentieth 
century better captures the depravity and moral vacuum of colonial endeavors than 
Conrad's. While Marlow unravels his tale down the Congo, western civilization itself 
comes unraveled, culminating in Kurtz's final pitiful croak of despair, "The horror, the 
horror." In a climate of multicultural studies and marginalized literatures, no text seems to 
anticipate and condemn the excesses of empire better than Darkness. 
But a problem immediately confronts today's heretical literary critic. People have 
already intimated that Heart o/Darkness contains much of what fills colonial 
interpretations of texts. 11 And the one thing a heretical critic· must not do is give the least 
appearance of trucking with the orthodox. So what might appear as a great opportunity 
for new historians and cultural materialists to exercise heretical strategies and expose all 
the brutalities of colonialism becomes instead an overwhelming dilemma merely because 
someone else has hinted at it before. 
So what does a prominent critic of imperialism like Edward W. Said do with 
Conrad? In Culture and Imperialism Said tackles Darkness and reaches this most 
remarkable conclusion: 
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They [Marlow and Kurtz] ( and of course Conrad) are ahead of their time in 
understanding that what they call 'the darkness' has an autonomy of its own, 
and can reinvade and reclaim what imperialism has taken for its own. But 
Marlow and Kurtz are also creatures of their time and cannot take the next 
step, which would be to recognize that what they saw, disablingly and 
disparagingly, as a non-European 'darkness' was in fact a non-European 
world resisting imperialism so as one day to regain sovereignty and 
independence, and not, as Conrad reductively says, to reestablish the 
darkness. Conrad's tragic limitation is that even though he could see clearly 
that on one level imperialism was essentially pure dominance and land-
grabbing, he could not then conclude that imperialism had to end so that 
'natives' could lead lives free from European domination. As a creature of 
his time, Conrad could not grant the natives their freedom, despite his 
severe critique of the imperialism that enslaved them. (30) 
Said could write a handbook on the politics of heresy. With noticeable ease he . 
acknowledges the observations of the past ("They ... are ahead of their time in 
understanding what they call 'the darkness' has an autonomy of its own"), but he must 
quickly reach a decision. Said cannot repudiate the critics of the past in this particular case 
because to do so would involve a repudiation of his own form of heresy. I use the word 
"heresy" here in the sense of innovation. The idea of innovation for its own sake remains 
one of the standard definitions of heresy in theological discussions and best captures the 
essence of heresy in literary criticism. 12 
Other critics have noticed Conrad's dark ruminations,on empir~ ~d's special 
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province, so he cannot dismiss them; instead he dismisses Conrad himself simply because 
Heart of Darkness fails to "grant the natives their freedom." Being too much "of his time" 
comprises the horrible trespass Conrad stands guilty of in Said's eyes. In other words, says 
Said, because Conrad's text draws too close to my heresy concerning empire to the point 
other critics have noted its possibilities, I must become yet more heretical and demand a 
political expression from Conrad he remains forever incapable of uttering. Said concludes 
by turning his conclusions into a moral certitude: "The cultural and ideological evidence 
that Conrad was wrong in his Eurocentric way is both impressive and rich" (30). Indeed, 
Said holds not only Conrad to the rigors ofhis heresy, he condellllls all writers of the 
colonial period who do not tow his ideological line: "One of the difficult truths I 
discovered in working on this book is how very few of the British or French artists whom I 
admire took issue with the notion of 'subject' or 'inferior' races so prevalent among officials 
who practiced those ideas as a matter of course in ruling India or Algiers" (xiv). Said 
constantly takes writers to task for not engaging the heresy he has built his career upon. 
One can only say these authors commit a Sin of Omission; fail to criticize empire 
adequately, says S~d, and the writer fails as an artist. 
Heresy for heresy's sake, innovation that delights only in its own voice, always 
paints the critic into such comers. Said's rhetoric at times would like to embrace Conrad's 
achievement--he never questions Conrad's inclusion in the canon or that he writes great 
literature--but his heretical purpose will not allow him to do so. Instead of extending what 
smacks too much of an orthodox argument, Said must destroy and level everything and 
rebuild a new heretical stance upon the ruins. The result brings into being a rather half-
hearted condemnation of a work containing tremendous power and vision, a work that 
placed in its proper context calls into question many of the assumptions underlying empire 
and European power. 
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This fate often befalls works in the canon; after all, the ultimate heresy involves 
removing a canonical work from its entrenched position. But this occurs through a long 
process of heretical discourse until finally, the text exhausted, critics innovate it into 
exhaustion. This layering of heresy, the sedimentary formation of rhetoric, often removes 
a critic so far from the text that no real engagement transpires. We get criticism about 
criticism; journal articles become ever longer as the heretical critic seeks to lay waste to all 
that has gone before to expound yet another "innovation." Or worse yet, in what I see as 
a distressing characteristic of more and more writing, the critic has nothing more to say 
than that everyone else has got it all wrong. 13 Such an approach, a Heresy of Negation, 
must ultimately collapse under its own destructive impulse, threatening to consume all 
literature with it. 
Indeed, we can see a crisis in literary criticism occurring. Barbara Hemstein Smith, 
former president of the MLA, writes in Profession that she welcomes the "radical 
destabilization of the domain ofliterary studies" because the discipline "will be effectively 
and undeniably undone." She goes on to claim that "'literary theory' will be seen as having 
operated not as an agent of an ultimate disintegration but, rather, as the most fertile site of 
an interim destiny" (2-3). But as Avrom Fleishman points out, Hemstein Smith offers 
nothing to fill this destabilization ofliterary studies except "the savor of change" 
("Condition" 813 ). 
The real issue behind the "radical destabilization" ofliterary criticism again can be 
traced back to the idea of heresy. Heresy for its own sake must constantly find new areas 
of interest to consume as old texts and approaches lose their heretical opportunities. One 
can only say something completely different about a given text for so long. So we see a 
heightened awareness of more obscure texts by canonical writers (witness the explosion of 
comment on Shakespeare's Titus Andronicus)14 or an insistence that marginalized or "lost" 
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writers come to the forefront to correct old abuses stemming from cultural elitism. 15 
Heresy is a monster that critics can never satiate, and what better place to innovate than at 
a site where no one has ever said anything before? Finally, in the process we dispense with 
any notion of "literature" at all because we exponentially increase the boundaries within 
which heresy can thrive and comment. As the director of undergraduate studies at 
Syracuse put it, "What you read is not now as important as how you read it" (Langiulli 
5).16 
What all this suggests should alarm the most confide.nt practitioner of literary 
criticism. The Rhetoric of Inclusion does not have an ideological or philosophical basis; 
instead, the drive to ever-widen the boundaries of literary studies involves an effort to 
establish new areas of power within criticism. Heretical discourse has no interest in the 
text it engages. The critic merely uses the opportunity the text provides to shout a heresy 
the critic hopes will be heard and acknowledged widely enough to allow an entrenchment 
in the machinery of reward the profession dispenses ( tenure, grants, and the like). 
The risks involved in such an attitude cannot be underestimated. First, literary 
critics find themselves in grave danger of relinquishing control over their own discipline. 
Students now flock to hear Robert Coles, a psychologist, lecture on literature at Harvard 
because he uses texts to comment on the human condition and how we might respond to 
them. Many philosophy departments have increasingly turned to novels and other 
imaginative literature to ponder the questions of existence because their own discipline 
long ago fell into the disputes about language and meaning that now plague literary 
studies. 17 As some critics insist on chasing the golden bough of heresy, other disciplines 
happily seize upon the rich contents of literature as a means of providing access to difficult 
concepts and propositions their own efforts cannot express as well or as artfully. 
Such literary criticism, in its quest for new forms of heretical expression, often 
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appropriates the methodology and ideas of other disciplines. While interdisciplinary study 
often yields more holistic conclusions, the perception often arises that literary studies have 
so spent themselves on innovation that they must constantly borrow from outside sources. 
I asked a respected historian once what he thought of New Historicism in literature, and he 
simply laughed and said historians had been doing "New History" since the turn of the 
century. Literary critics often appear a step behind other disciplines, simply imitating the 
work of other fields. This seems especially true of American critics who often look to 
Europe for theoretical assumptions and ideas. Many French critics complain that 
Americans indulge in theory they left behind years ago. 18 Rather than using other 
disciplines as tools to generate original and creative work in literary studies, too many 
critics appropriate the structures of other fields to espouse a new heresy in purely imitative 
terms. Sometimes these attempts prove tenuous; sometimes they prove laughable. 19 
The constant drive for innovation also makes for an educational process that 
rewards the passing fad over the solid foundation. The endless search for the next 
theoretical rising star makes for a patchwork of knowledge and a haphazard grounding in 
the contexts from which literature arises. As Fleishman sees it, "A shared conception of 
English as a body of knowledge, changing but coherent and comparable to those of other 
fields, has fallen by the wayside, when it has not been scorned as an ideological fiction" 
("Condition" 815). This loss of a center from which to work, this inability to define what 
literature offers us and how it can be interpreted certainly stands as the gravest 
consequence of heresy for heresy's sake. 
What I am suggesting is that for quite some time many literary critics have been 
indulging in criticism that has nothing to do with literary studies and everything to do with 
gaining power in literary criticism. Heresy revolves around either: I) An effort by 
members within the institution to re-define the basis of orthodoxy, believing the 
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community will be best served by such change or, 2) A political struggle within the group 
to control the means by which orthodoxy gets administered. The difficulty within literary 
studies occurs because the devices of power and purpose are the same: criticism. Critics 
have never found an effective means to wrestle over institutional questions so they do so 
through criticism, the same instrument by which they wish to disseminate the boundaries of 
orthodoxy and make clear their purpose. Once orthodoxy becomes anathema, heretical 
criticism has nothing left to do but seek increasingly outrageous stances that offer 
opportunities to win places of influence in literary studies. But heresy cannot continue to 
thrive in an atmosphere where it has no sense of orthodoxy to question or reform. Nor can 
it struggle to re-establish an orthodox set of assumptions for the community to uphold and 
rally around when orthodox expression has lost all meaning. 20 Such institutions generally 
die, having killed their very reason for existence. 
Orthodoxy as a formulation from which community begins does not contain an 
inherent repressiveness. The myth in much criticism that all structures seek to oppress and 
exclude denies the fundamental construction of any functioning community. 21 Literary 
critics themselves draw boundaries. Otherwise freshman essays on Milton would appear 
alongside Stanley Fish, and the millions of dollars the MLA makes from their handbooks 
would be abandoned for a documentation system based on personal integrity. Every 
institution must have a purpose, a clearly defined set of goals, an orthodox vision, that 
allows it to perpetuate itself and foster the good of the community. Literary criticism, by 
denying that vision and creating a set of theoretical schools that not only undermine but 
virtually destroy the possibility of a scholarly community, threatens to annihilate itself in 
the name of heretical freedom. 
What purpose, what type of orthodoxy, should literary criticism support? I in no 
way support a return to anything as do some critics who appear more nostalgic than 
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anything else. One of the complaints by young scholars at the Association of Literary 
Scholars and Critics meeting concerned the dominance of New Critical readings at most 
sessions ("Treating" A22). New Criticism, Structuralism, and Deconstruction are all 
heresies that have come and gone, replaced by new innovations in a never-ending cycle. 
These impulses long for nothing more than a return to the time when a particular critic's 
heresy reigned supreme in literary interpreataion. Nor do I wish to demand a monolithic 
approach to literature. Institutions that allow no diversity, no challenge to orthodoxy, 
become as stagnant as those that trumpet heresy for its own sake. Both lead to a 
preoccupation with power and lead away from a responsible cultivation of purpose. 
I want to suggest a few, tentative steps toward an orthodox exterior in which a 
plurality of critical voices might reside comfortably. Simply put, the basis for steering 
literary studies away from heretical posturing and back to a coherent mission involves 
keeping before all endeavors the idea of fostering community in the critical institution. 
Without a sense of group identity, without the ability to direct critical energies toward the 
success of a defined, prospering community, literary criticism will inevitably disintegrate 
into a tool for the wielding of political dominance. 
In the following discussion, after identifying the rhetoric of heresy in several 
theoretical schools, I will develop the idea of community in literary studies. Let me say 
here that community must occur at every level of the institution: teachers must foster a 
sense of belonging in the classroom as students learn to read and engage texts; graduate 
students must sense a call to a community of well-educated, competent scholars who look 
to the long-term achievements of research instead of the latest passing critical fad. But 
none of these achievements will become possible until criticism seeks to clarify and enrich 
all kinds of reading and writing projects, especially concerning the texts the community 
deems most important to its development. Finally, literary studies must project to people 
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outside the institution that our discipline has much to offer and strives to deliver a body of 
research and criticism that benefits all facets of society, both academic and general. 
Before any communal stocktaking can take place, however, criticism must 
recapture the essence of its mission: the study and interpretation of literature. How we 
define literature must of necessity always remain in flux, but critics must come to terms 
with the fact that certain texts demand attention in any cultural setting. The barrage 
against any concept of Literature, the erasure of the author, the cries of protest about 
oppressive structure become the heretic's way of lazily extending the boundaries of what 
texts can merit attention under the heading "literary criticism." Certainly literatures suffer 
marginalization, and individual authors get lost in the shuffle of cultural assumptions and 
discrimination, but the job of the critic should be to restore those texts that deserve 
inclusion in the discourse ofliterary studies and to weed out the rest. 
The text seems a logical place to embark ·on the creation of a center for literary 
studies. The integrity and voice of its contents must not be manipulated or cast aside in 
favor of critical heresy meant to further some political or personal agenda inside the 
community. Theory should be seen as a tool to help understand the text and not a hammer 
to create a space for power within the institution. While the political implications of texts 
both in their historical context and today should not suffer neglect, criticism has no 
business engaging in institutional politics. One of the basic assumptions of this study is 
that texts have something to say, and the critic must learn to listen. Certain boundaries 
exist and within them particular texts can say and do many things. The greater the 
achievement of the text, the greater the richness of its voice and depth of its resonance. 
But the critic should learn to admit when the text proves incapable of uttering what she 
wants to hear, or the whisper remains too faint for readers to decipher adequately. And the 
community should react vehemently when it realizes the primacy of the text undergoes 
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abuse for the sake of innovation and heretical musings~ the diminution and manipulation of 
the text mean the diminution and manipulation ofliterary cricism. 
Placing the text at the center ofliterary studies and within a construction of 
community allows for the diversity that any healthy group demands. Wayne C. Booth 
explores the boundaries that must be placed upon that plurality in Critical Understanding. 
He offers three basic assumptions that must rule literary criticism for both community and 
plurality to survive within the critical debates of texts. As starting points, they allow critics 
the chance to better define and analyze the strategies of heresy. Although the concept, 
definition, and practical application of community will be enlarged upon throughout this 
study, Booth provides an excellent place to begin the process of discovering a center from 
which to proceed. Plurality for Booth requires vitality, justice, and understanding. 
Vitality insures the constant exchange of ideas and critical positions: 
The question must always be, under this criterion, does this critical 
statement in fact increase the likelihood of further critical life? Or does it 
leave its author complacent, while his adversaries, sensing danger, are 
tempted to retaliate blindly, lashing out in wounded fury? (221) 
The idea of vitality allows for a great diversity of voices speaking on texts, but they cannot 
seek to isolate and cut off other apporaches. Booth asks whether any critic under scrutiny 
offers "to vitalize only yourself or me as well," and "are you offering life to a community of 
readers" (22)? Heresy within literary criticism moves to silence other voices to gain a 
position of authority over the text and other critics. As Booth notes, "Much polysemic 
criticism seems to offer a strange and destructive new contra-cogito 'I invent new readings, 
therefore you, the author, are not" (222). Heresy undermines vitality by engaging in a 
"search for ways to impose what I already know" (223). This imposition does not allow 
for others to reply to the heresy or seek to discover new meanings from the text. Booth 
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compares such criticism to a "medieval jousting--a zero-sum game in which my rise 
depends on your fall" (222). Heresy as a strategy for power squelches vitality by always 
putting the rise of the critic practicing it before all other considerations of community or 
genuine critical debate. 
Justice comprises the second necessary component for plurality in criticism. Booth 
sees justice as being "violated whenever any critic is granted less than his due" (223). 
Justice derives from considering not only what a text means but what critics owe it (224). 
Part of that responsibility to the text involves its autonomy and unique expression. When 
texts become mere occasions to assert power, as is the strategy of heresy, "there is nothing 
to prevent us from reducing all varieties of meaning to a single meaning" (225). The 
impulse of heresy in literary criticism reduces texts to a single meaning by violating others' 
right to justice, to a fair representation, as the heretical critic ignores the demands of the 
text in favor of espousing an interpretation meant to achieve power. If all the heretical 
critic wishes to achieve is dominance in the discourse, then any text will do and no text will 
receive the justice due to it. 
The final component of maintaining community and plurality is understanding. 
Booth recognizes that much criticism "is not concerned with the possibility of 
understanding at all, but with its desirability" (231 ). It is precisely the desirability of 
understanding that the heretical critic wishes to always undermine, because in doing so the 
heretic opens up the possibility of ever greater liberties being taken with the text and 
interpretation. Understanding must by neccessity place boundaries upon interpretation: 
That's precisely what the effort of human understandig is based on: the 
assumption that one code will dominate over another in such a way as to 
establish superiority, in a given setting, of some readings over some other 
readings. (232) 
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But such dominance threatens the heretical enterprise; if one reading leads to greater 
understanding than another, then the heretical critic loses the opportunity to dismiss such a 
a reading on the basis of orthodox oppression or the impossibility of the text "signifying" 
any meaning adequately. Heresy must always fight against understanding to enable the 
infinite progression of heretical readings and interpretations that allow critics to isolate 
their discourse from all others. 
All three of these ideas, (or tests as Booth refers to them), working together 
provide an excellent starting point to illuminate and curb the proliferation of heresy in 
literary criticism. Instead of seeking to deny vitality, justice, and understanding for the 
sake of heretical power, criticism must tum toward these concepts along with community 
to enrich and insure the health of literary studies. Booth notes that "The Babel of critical 
voices is transformed at the moment when each critic decides that his survival depends not 
on shouting down all the others but on granting them a just hearing" (232). This "shouting 
down" provides an apt description of the strategy of heresy in criticism. Heresy must 
strive to negate other voices so the heretical pronouncement of the critic gains authority 
over all others. 
The final consideration of heresy at this point involves accountability. What 
happens as the result of innovation for the sake of innovation in literary criticism? What 
consequences derive from the heretical strategy? Is all to be abandoned for the sake of 
achieving power within literary discourse? That becomes the ultimate question of the 
discussion of heresy and community in this study. And while beginning with a sociological 
view of heresy, the question of accountability, community, and value in the critical 
enterprise leads to a metaphysical problem. Does more exist in literary criticism than the 
Will to Power and the drive to attain individual autonomy and control over the texts that 
critics study? I would answer that question with an overwhelming yes, and this study will 
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seek to discover a basis for a new idea of criticism based upon the ideas of community and 
an orthodox center for literary studies. 
By now I have most certainly incited enough protest and cries of disbelief to make 
even the most stalwart reader cringe. Nevertheless, I hope to accomplish several things in 
this study. First and foremost, by examining several theoretical schools I want to illustrate 
that a frequent impulse filling scholarly journals has nothing to do with literature or literary 
studies but everything to do with heretical pronouncements meant to gain access and 
control over criticism. Critics need to realize the abuse of heresy and seek to remedy the 
excess of political gamesmanship that proliferates under the guise of criticism. By bearing 
in mind Booth's criteria for plurality, the abuses of heresy against community become 
evident. Next, I propose to work toward a definition of community that I think would 
alleviate many of the pressures and chaos within literary studies. Finally, I want to use that 
definition to offer a type of criticism that employs the theory under consideration in a way 
that promotes both the primacy of the text and the fostering of community. By such 
modeling, this study can move beyond the normal complaints about the problems and 
crises of criticism and offer an alternative which I think could go far in moving the 
practice ofliterary studies in an expansive and purposeful new direction. 
Rather than trying to locate heresy in all of literary criticism, I have narrowed my 
study to Shakespeare and Milton studies. Two good reasons exist for such a choice. First, 
Shakespeare and Milton remain so solidly entrenched in the canon that it becomes 
relatively easy to focus on what is said about them rather than canonical debates of 
whether they should be read at all. Second, the plurality of voices commenting on such 
enormous figures allows for a wide range of theories with which to engage. We can 
identify heresy in a wide variety of theoretical schools while still keeping our focus on only 
two figures and their works. 
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I will begin by looking at the formulation of heresy as a strategy for power in 
Milton's Paradise Lost. I begin there because the figure of Satan clearly defines how 
heretical interpretation can be used an agency for domination and how community runs 
counter those impulses. I will then look at the genesis of heresy in the institution by 
examining the Critic/Scholar debate in Milton studies. In this debate occur all the elements 
of Lester Kurtz's model. The idea of orthodoxy as a of a center from which criticism 
proceeds quickly gets rejected in favor of heresy to gain influence in the institution, the 
unique characteristic of heresy as a strategy in literary criticism. The next chapter will 
study performance criticism in Shakespearean studies and use the heresy found there as an 
occasion to formulate a definition of community which will serve as a starting place for the 
rest of the work. Subsequent chapters focus on heretical arguments in certain theoretical 
debates followed by criticism employing that particulartheory and a definition of 
community. Completing the study is a more extended discussion on the idea of community 
as it applies to criticism and literary studies. 
Such a study as this will engender much skepticism, but for too long literary critics 
have proven unable to cast an inquiring eye upon themselves. Given the recent political 
correctness debates with detractors outside the institution, an even greater reluctance has 
developed to confront honestly the weaknesses and abuses in literary studies as they now 
stand. The voices of heresy drown the voices of reason and common sense all too often, 
and many simply enter the innovative fray apprehensive they will lose power or security in 
. departments and the field at large. I have no nostalgic impulses; no longing for some 
"golden era" of criticism informs my thinking. The fact exists that when literary criticism 
indulges in heresy for its own sake it loses a sense of purpose and vision that can hold the 
enterprise together. This study wants to point out the process by which we have arrived at 
such a state and formulate a modest suggestion about how we might begin to reconstruct 
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our community and orthodox center. 
Chapter 1 
Satan: 
The First Heretic 
What is at stake in the practice of heresy as a strategy to gain control over an 
intepretative situation and a community of interpreters? While this study will look at the 
dynamics of heresy in literary criticism, a beginning point for thinking about heresy and its 
consequences offers itself in the character of Satan in Paradise Lost. Milton creates in 
Satan a force of rebellion who is above all things heretical, as outlined in the introduction, 
in his attempts to overthrow heaven and establish autonomy. Satan uses interpretation as a 
weapon to undermine the community which he sees as shackling the interests of his 
individuality and freedom. 
What Milton subscribes as a remedy to Satanic revolt is not simply the fixed and 
unchanging ways of God. God's dealings with both the angelic hosts and Adam and Eve 
organize themselves around the concept of community and relationships. For Milton, the 
ground of community must derive from the transcendent presence of God in all affairs. 
And because Truth is to be found in a person, not a quantifiable object, relationship 
describes the apprehension of that presence. Martin Buber describes this presence as the 
"center" necessary for all community to exist: "The real essence of community is 
undoubtedly to be found in the--manifest or hidden--fact that it has a center" 
("Comment"89). Buber sees this as the first cause of all manifestations of community: "It 
is not the periphery, the community, that come first, but the radii, the common quality of 
relation with the Centre. This alone guarantees the authentic existence of the community" 
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(/ and Thou 115). Here the sociological description of a community is replaced by 
identifying the metaphyscial grounding of any community. Without considering that 
grounding, all conversation about community ceases because community itself loses the 
center that makes it possible. And the heretical impulse as a strategy for power destroys 
that center as demonstrated by Milton in the character of Satan. 
The revolt of Satan and the remedy of community also strike at the fundamental 
question of interpretation and existence. Do individual· power and autonomy best describe 
the state of existence or does the organization of community around a center reflect the 
reality of being? For Milton that answer is a resounding vote for community and the 
rebellion of Satan threatens the basis for community to exist both in heaven and on earth. 
That Milton chooses heretical interpretation as Satan's chief tactic in his war against God 
demonstrates how central the act of intepretating the world in all its facets was for Milton. 
Everyone must interpret, and the nature of that interpretation, whether for individual 
control or communal well-being, determines the possibility for the survival of all human 
endeavors. 
Milton would perhaps find himself scandalized, however, to note how much more 
critical attention has been paid to the character of Satan in Paradise Lost than God or 
Christ ever receive. Or would he really? The answer to that question, of course, has much 
to do with the way one perceives Satan and how vital a role in the epic one subscribes to 
him. Critics have long argued over the "success" of Satan in many different terms: as 
dramatic creation, as adversary, as object of scorn, as hero, as source of temptation and 
evil. And despite all the divergent voices, the reactions to Satan basically lead in two 
primary directions: Satan as Hero or Satan as Ass. 1 
The description of Satan as Ass originates in C.S. Lewis's A Preface to Paradise 
Lost in which he maintains that while readers can appreciate Milton's depiction of Satan in 
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an artistic sense, in the end, "mere Christianity commits every Christian to believing that 
'the Devil is (in the long run) an ass111 (93). Upon this foundation much criticism follows: 
Milton does a masterful job of portraying evil in the character of Satan, but in the end his 
readers must recognize that evil and reject it. The reasons and formulations of evil may 
vary, but the conclusion is inescapable: Satan represents a stance the reader must abhor. 
In many ways Satan as Ass equates to Milton as Success. The poet's ability to bring 
readers to a recognition of Satan's inherent evil and corrupting voice in Eden permits those 
same readers to choose a different path than Adam and Eve and ultimately to understand 
the ways of God. 
Seen in this light, much of the commentary on Satan as Ass revolves around 
Milton's ability to make the reader apprehend Satan as a figure to detest and to see him as 
the source of misery in the poem. This approach also creates a context for the most 
powerful application of the reader's position in Paradise Lost, Stanley Fish's Surprised by 
Sin. Rather than a book that merely makes startling and outrageous claims, Surprised can 
be seen as firmly in the line of Lewis's Satan as Ass. Only in Fish's scenario, readers come 
to the recognition of Satan's evilness by first coming to terms with their own falleness. By 
identifying readers with Satan, by seeing him as somehow heroic, powerful, or wronged, 
Milton turns a mirror upon the audience to assert that such feelings link them with Satan 
and place them out of favor with God. Fish still regards Satan as a character to reject; . 
Surprised by Sin's brilliance resides in recognizing the manner in which Milton leads his 
audience to that understanding. The very inability to read correctly and see Satan for what 
he is demonstrates the insidious nature of his power and the reader's need to escape it. 
Milton would have critics believe Satan is Hero to make the revelation that Satan is Ass all 
the more irresistible. 
Taking a somewhat different approach, Balachandra Rajan explores this topic in 
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regard to readers of Milton's day in Paradise Lost and the Seventeenth Century Reader. 2 
Rajan traces the reaction of Milton's contemporaries to Satan as one of terror, the very 
emotion Milton seeks in the poem (94-95). Milton's language, argues Rajan, would have 
registered with his readers to hold Satan in contempt (95). But Rajan also understands 
that Milton must tackle Satan poetically as well as morally, and therefore to keep the 
tension in the epic, "the weight of the poetry is ... thrown in on Satan's side" (96). This 
strategy has the effect of equalizing "in our imaginations the relative magnitude of the 
contending forces" (96). While Milton succeeds in leading the seventeenth-century reader 
to revile Satan, he does not adequately offer an alternative: "The failure lies not in the 
depiction of Satan but in that of the heavenly values which should subdue him" (106). 
Christ's victory in the poem "remains a moral rather than a poetic victory" ( 107). Milton 
triumphs in making Satan an Ass but fails to clearly make Christ the Hero in terms of 
poetic· strength. 
It takes only a very small leap indeed to move from Christ failing to triumph 
completely in the poem to declaring Satan as Hero. Once again an inverse seems to hold 
true: Satan as Hero means Milton as Failure. The main source of this failure derives from 
Milton creating a Satan too sympathetic to his own inclinations and those of his readers. 
As early as 1930, E.M.W. Tillyard laments that "I do not see how one can avoid admitting 
that Milton did in part ally himself with Satan, that unwittingly he was lead away by the 
creature of his own imagination" (Milton 277). Tillyard makes this point in the delightfully 
entitled portion of his book Milton, "Unconscious Meaning" in Paradise Lost. For 
Tillyard and others after him, Satan "gets away" from Milton and the result creates a 
"Satan [that] is a more powerful figure than the Son" (278). Paradise Lost becomes a 
book with pessimistic overtones as Milton fails to have God and Christianity triumph over 
a Satan too powerful to control. Again the source of this inadequacy derives from Milton's 
identification with Satan: "There is only one figure in Paradise Lost whose strength is 
shown through conflict and endurance. This is Satan, and it is through him that Milton's 
own heroic energy is most powerfully shown" (Milton 278).3 
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AJA Waldock also firmly posits Satan as hero, but sees Milton's failure as much 
more extensive. The true base for Satan's hold over the poem occurs due "to Milton's . 
inexperience in the assessment of narrative problems" (5). Paradise Lost must keep the 
reader's interest, so Milton cannot "spoil Satan too soon, spoil therefore the story, spoil the 
poem" (72).4 This narrative dilemma causes Milton to invest too much plausibility into 
Satan's rebellion: "Milton succeeded in suggesting a rather greater degree of provocation 
for it, and therefore of reasonableness in it, than he ever intended" (74). Like Tillyard, 
Waldock sees Satan getting away from Milton, and both critics believe the poet must find a 
remedy to this problem. Satan becomes too interesting, so Milton has to intrude and tell 
readers not to admire Satan. Through "using this method of allegation Milton can produce 
a trump card whenever he wishes" (81). This process, however, ruptures the poem and 
destroys its artistic and creative integrity (78). Besides which, Milton cannot control Satan 
in this manner because demonstration always triumphs over allegation (78). Milton 
demonstrates Satanic power, then tries to allege its impotency; "Satan, in short, does not 
degenerate: he is degraded' (83). The loss of control over Satan signals for Waldock a 
loss of control over the entire poem. 5 
The question certainly arises then as to whether Satan as Hero and Milton as 
Successful might exist peacefully together. For the Romantics, of course, this union 
works, because as Rajan writes, the Romantics attack the "question of what the poem is by 
suggesting that there is a poem other than the official poem on which the real nature of 
Milton's accomplishment is to be found" ("Paradise Lost" 106).6 Rajan solves the 
problem of Satan as Hero, not by positing another "hidden" poem but by arguing for 
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another genre present in the poem other than epic. Paradise Lost becomes tragedy and 
epic, "a mixed-genre poem with a different protagonist for each of its primary genres" 
("Paradise Lost" 107). Rajan offers a most plausible compromise here between Satan and 
Milton's achievement in Paradise Lost. Rather than viewing Satan as a character in charge 
of a play, Rajan allows Satan his heroic qualities by giving him his own genre to rule over. 
In the end, Christ emerges triumphant in the epic mode of the poem, the mode which 
justifies the ways of God to man. 
Whatever a critic's approach to Satan in Paradise Lost, 7 all critics and readers 
judge Satan and Milton's depiction of him. Invariably, the critic uses the Son or God the 
Father as the measuring rod by which Satan finds defeat or usurps the heroic energy of the 
poem. Satan as Hero overcomes the forces and rhetoric of heaven despite Milton's best 
efforts, or Satan as Ass wilts under the power and authority of God's benevolent plan for 
the universe. Either Satan diminishes throughout the poem as he strays farther from the 
Son's example of sacrifice and love, or Satan overwhelms the attributes of God through the 
sheer force of his will and independence. Always the measurement for success or failure 
derives from the Son or God as the challenges to his heroic status. 
An example of this critical tendency appears in John Steadman's "The Idea of Satan 
as the Hero of Paradise Lost." Trying to find a union of Satanic heroism and Miltonic 
success, Steadman argues that Satan be seen as the "image of an eidolon, a pseudo-hero" 
(254). Steadman then traces Milton's sources for his portrayal of Satan, including 
Machiavellian and classical resonances. 8 Steadman recognizes that the "Satanic image is 
not simply an illusion but a perversion of true heroism" (255). Steadman, like most critics 
before him, locates this true heroism in the person of the Son in the poem. So the qualities 
readers admire in Satan in fact demonstrate a misunderstanding of what constitutes 
heroism, the correct definition of which appears in the portrayal of the Son in Paradise 
Lost. Steadman takes Satan's alleged heroic power, measures it against the Son, just as 
Milton does in the poem, and finds it sorely lacking. 
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Pondering the idea of Satan as Hero in Paradise Lost instead of the Son or God 
has produced a rich and distinguished body of criticism; much of the "problem" of Satan in 
the poem, however, derives from an essentially unjust and unwarranted comparison. Satan 
is not heroic and therefore not in contention with the Son, but rather heretical.9 More 
precisely, the contention is over the interpretation of the Son and what the Son's presence 
means in terms of the community of heaven. As the first heretic, Satan displays all the 
characteristics of heresy outlined for this study, but even more important, Satan makes a 
move for interpretative autonomy that mirrors the strategies of heretical literary critics 
today. In the search for autonomy, Satan threatens, disrupts, and finally divorces himself 
from the community he pretends to defend with his heretical pronouncements. In addition, 
Satan uses his interpretative powers to cause the fall of Adam and Eve and puts in peril the 
community of earth. Satan as Heretic creates a seductive rhetoric that moves attention 
away from collective responsibility and toward a false sense of independence and freedom, 
an independence and freedom readily misapprehended as heroic. In the end, Milton 
powerfully asserts the isolation that results from heretical stances which seek nothing but 
interpretative power and control for their own sake detached from any sense of communal 
welfare. 
The orthodox utterance about the nature of Christ and his power marks the place 
to begin examining Satan as Heretic. For it is that declaration that forms the basis for the 
center that creates the community of Heaven. In Book V of Paradise Lost, God calls 
together the hosts of heaven to declare his Son co-equal with Him: 
your Head I him appoint; 
And by my Self have sworn to him shall bow 
All knees in Heav'n, and shall confess him Lord: 
United as one individual Soul 
For ever happy: him who disobeys 
Mee disobeys, breaks union, and that day 
Cast out from God and blessed vision, falls 
Into utter darkness, deep ingulft, his place 
Ordain'd without redemption, without end. (5.606-15) 
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Here God makes clear the nature of the Son's authority (equal with His own) and makes 
just as clear the conditions under which those who wish to stay within the community of 
heaven must abide along with the penalty for disobedience. God thinks throughout the 
passage in a collective sense: obedience produces "one individual Soul" and disobedience 
"breaks union." Nowhere does God couch the power of the Son in terms of individuality 
meant to arbitrarily assert itself The Son's presence in heaven merely extends the 
authority of God, an authority which orders, enables, and ensures a harmonious 
community. God and the Son form the center which makes community possible in heaven. 
What really seems to rankle Satan beyond having his position challenged is the 
ability of God to change so easily the nature of the structure of heaven simply by naming it 
so. Satan does not crave the power of creativity so much as the power to interpret what 
creation means. God (in Satan's mind) calls the Son supreme and that act of interpretation 
about His nature causes all of heaven to acquiesce. Satan therefore tells Beelzebub that 
"new Laws thou see'st impos'd" upon them (5.679). The key word in the line becomes 
"impos'd" as Satan cannot see the Son's ascendancy as anything more than an interpretative 
choice that denies Satan the position he conversely interprets as rightfully his. Satan will 
grant God the power of creating, but he will not relinquish what he imagines as his 
autonomous right to determine what creation means. Heaven, for Satan, is in the eye of 
the beholder, or better still, in the interpretation of the individual. God has "impos'd" an 
interpretation on all of heaven that usurps Satan's ability to retain control over his 
individual freedom and authority. Already Satan thinks of interpretation in terms of 
individual power and control and not as a means to further enrich the community. 
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Satan becomes heretical, not heroic, in order to correct what he claims is an abuse 
of interpretative authority. Like all great heretics, Satan appeals to his followers by 
claiming their rights have been violated and their freedom trampled; he must stand up and 
expose the injustice that threatens the life and quality of heaven. He does so by offering an 
alternative interpretation of the Son: 
Will ye submit your necks, and choose to bend 
The supple knee? ye will not, if I trust 
To know ye right, or if ye know yourselves 
Natives and Sons ofHeav'n possest before 
By none, and if not equal all, yet free, 
Equally free; for Orders and Degrees 
Jar not with liberty, but well consist. 
Who can in reason then or right assume 
His equals, if in power and splendor less, 
In freedom equal? or can introduce 
Law Edict on us, who without law 
Err not? much less for this to be our Lord, 
And look for adoration to th' abuse 
Of those Imperial Titles which assert 
Our being ordain'd to govern, not to serve? (5.787-802). 
In order to convince his hosts to rebel, Satan must convince them that God's interpretation 
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of the Son means not community but slavery to an unqualified ruler. Satan cleverly 
addresses his followers as "Natives and Sons" of heaven to imply clearly that everyone is 
"God's son"--everyone has just as much right to autonomy as the sovereign being forced 
upon them. Again Satan returns to the idea of law to perpetuate his case against God as 
the force that imposes a meaning upon them which leads to their loss of freedom and 
equality. As this study will point out in other instances, the heretical voice in the 
community always claims to have the best interests of the group at heart in a move to 
establish itself as the voice of power and control. Satan must destroy the orthodox 
position of the Son's role in order to achieve the dominance of his own heresy. 
Dominance best defines how Satan regards interpretative power. He never thin.lc.s 
in terms of how the position of the Son will influence the community or of what 
interpretation will bring about the most good for heaven. Instead, interpretation simply 
equates with the opportunity to control all those who do not have the ability to determine 
the Son's role. Nowhere does Satan ever compare himself with the Son; he only disputes 
who has the authority to decide what the Son means. As such, Milton never really 
compels readers to make a choice between Satan or the Son as hero; rather, Milton asks 
readers to decide whether interpretation means prosperity for the community or individual 
power. 
In Book 5, Milton counters Satan's heretical challenge with Abdiel. Not only does 
Abdiel uphold the orthodox view of the Son, but he understands that this position has the 
interests of the community in mind: 
Yet by experience taught we know how good, 
And of our good, and of our dignity 
How provident he is, how far from thought 
To make us less, bent rather to exalt 
Our happy state under one Head more near 
United. (5.826-31) 
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God's exalting of the Son has nothing to do with exerting power; God simply desires the 
best for all of heaven and what might cause all to be "more near united." Abdi el 
formulates the conditions under which the commumty can thrive. The Son's authority 
marks the boundary-line of what is necessary for the continuance of heaven as a 
harmonious world in which all can find contentment. No reason exists to resent this 
demarcation as God does not seek to restrict those in heaven but rather protect them and 
their freedom to exist as independent creatures. For Abdiel, God, and by extension, the 
Son, ask for no more than what has to occur for heaven to exist as heaven. The center 
cannot be destroyed or all community will be destroyed along with it. 
One can imagine Satan holding his hands over his ears during Abdiel's defense of 
the orthodox interpretation of the nature of the Son and the structure of heaven. 
Particularly rankling for Satan has to be Abdiel's insistence that God's creative power gives 
Him the right to prescribe the best course for that creation. Satan must now confront what 
before did not trouble him, God's authority as creator and center, not simply interpreter, of 
creation. Heresy must work backwards to steadily break all ties to any authority outside of 
itself, to any connection with a community which might impose boundaries on heretical 
utterance. The heretical voice of Satan insists on his autonomy to the point of self-
creation: 
That we were form'd then say'st thou? and the work 
Of secondary hands, by task transferr'd 
From Father to his Son? strange point and new! 
Doctrine which we would know whence learnt: who saw 
When this creation was? remember'st thou 
Thy making, while the Maker gave being? 
We know no time when we were not as now; 
Know none before us, self-begot, self-rais'd 
By our own quick'ning power. (5.853-61) 
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The use of the word "Doctrine" indicates Satan's consistent strategy to see all boundaries 
in the community as mere interpretations which seek to enslave him. "Facts" do not 
support God's creation of the angelic hosts, only God's interpretation, his doctrine, of how 
heaven came into being. Again he asserts his rank as one of the "Ethereal Sons" (5.863) to 
highlight the Son's promotion as an act of interpretive suppression. All are sons in heaven, 
self-created, and as such all have the power and right to determine their authority and place 
in heaven. Satan's heresy becomes ever more isolating in order to maintain its separation 
from all other claims of control or responsibility. 
Inevitably Satan must put this interpretation to the test, and so he rebels against 
God. If that rebellion is viewed as a heretical attack upon the community for dominance 
and control, then Satan's efforts make much more sense. Because if Satan's interpretation 
of heaven is correct, if all are sons and all self-begot, then Satan stands a remarkably fair 
chance of winning his revolution for interpretative freedom. Of col,lrse, he is wrong; he 
mistakes the Son's actual authority, his necessary governance over heaven to ensure its 
perpetuation, as a mere disagreement over interpretation. His demands for unlimited 
heretical thought or utterance, for heresy for its own sake, for innovation to always 
outflank any other bid for power, cannot co-exist with the idea of community. Satan fails 
and undergoes expulsion from heaven for desiring the power of interpretation devoid of all 
responsibility or regard for the communal boundaries that make it possible. 
After his fall, Satan consistently refuses to grant that his interpretation of the Son 
contains any error. God wins only through brute force: "Whom reason hath equall'd, force 
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hath made supreme/Above his equals" (1.248-49). Satan's interpretation would have won 
over the community if God did not have "Thunder" to make him more powerful. Never in 
the poem does Satan realize his heresy negates the community he would rule over. By 
holding up his interpretative control as the only good, he shatters all possibility of a center 
that would make any community tenable. His heresy seeks nothing but itself Satan 
betrays himself by exalting his mind's ability to "make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell ofHeav'n" 
(1.255). The heretical impulse in Satan constantly desires the ability to transform things 
into what they are not through interpretive will; he rushes to get outside the boundaries 
that make anything discrete. And the only way to gain interpretive control over fellowship 
and community, requires characterizing it as slavery, oppression, and bondage so that the 
heretic's position appears liberating. 
The context in which Satan's heretical arguments get initially aired is, of course, in 
the council of the fallen angels at the beginning of Paradise Lost. As they discuss what to 
do in the aftermath of their fall, Mammon tries to convince his fellow conspirators to think 
no more of doing battle against God. He attempts to create a heaven out of hell through 
interpretive prowess: 
How oft amidst 
Thick clouds and dark doth Heav'n's all-ruling Sire 
Choose to reside, his Glory unobscur'd, 
And with the Majesty of darkness round 
Covers his Throne; from whence deep thunders roar 
Must'ring thir rage, and Heav'n resembles Hell? 
As he our darkness, cannot we his Light 
Imitate when we please? This Desert soil 
Wants not her hidden lustre, Gems and Gold; 
Nor want we skill or art, from whence to raise 
Magnificence; and what can Heav'n show more? (2.263-73) 
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Mammon interprets both hell and heaven in terms which cast a positive spin upon their 
position; they need only put themselves to the task, and they can transform their world into 
a reasonable imitation of the heaven they have lost. Mammon attempts to use his 
interpretation as a means of establishing an alternative community that thrives according to 
materialistic dictates. The act of interpretation, of saying this means this, Mammon 
believes brings any situation into being. 
Beelzebub, speaking for Satan, rejects Mammon's interpretation by demonstrating a 
remarkable understanding that their heretical position disqualifies them from any thought 
of community, whether created through their own volition or through reconciliation with 
God. The very act of embracing heresy for power and control moves the heretic away 
from the center that make any community possible. War or peace become equally futile 
positions because both indicate that the end result might lead to the re-establishment of 
what they knew before, and their heresy prevents that utterly. Beelzebub makes clear that 
the only option available involves extending the isolation of their heresy to a new 
community more prone to subversion. Beelzebub mentions earth as a possible place to 
spread their interpretative power: 
Thither let us bend all our thoughts to learn 
What creatures there inhabit, of what mould, 
Or substance, how endu'd, and what thir Power, 
And where thir weakness, how attempted best, 
By force or subtlety (2.354-58) 
Satan has, of course, calculated everything here, from Beelzebub's speech to the 
profitability of "force or subtlety." Satan now understands that his attempts at force can 
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only be thwarted; his power lies in the ability of convincing others that his heresy offers a 
more attractive alternative than God as the center for community which results in a 
relationship with the divine and others. Even though the angels have fallen with him, Satan 
must continue to control the discourse of hell to insure his power and autonomy over all 
acts of interpretation and over all new possible sites of heretical subversion. 
Satan has no intention of practicing the equality he so eloquently champions in 
heaven; he will go alone to earth because to maintain his heretical power he can never 
share authority. To retain his potency, Satan must keep his heretical interpretations solely 
for his own use. His long speech in Book 2 about the dangers of chaos and the world he 
seeks (310-429) serves only to insure his dominance over the only place he can extend his 
powers of heresy. The followers of Satan never realize they exercise no influence or 
power over the rebellion against heaven or the subversion of earth; Satan speaks the 
hereti<;al words in both places, and they merely suffer the consequences of his utterance, 
once by getting thrown out of heaven, secondly by being turned into serpents. Satan wants 
a community of heretics no more than he wants to remain in the community of the 
orthodox; both would involve relinquishing the interpretive autonomy that drives him to 
hell and forces him to remain there. Paradise Lost continually depicts Satan in isolation, 
cut off from any form of relationship or communityby his insistence on heretical power. 
Satan's journey marks the continuance of his search for heretical power and 
control. Unsatisfied by the heresy that causes his expulsion from heaven with a third of the 
angels, Satan now seeks a place to indulge his interpretative autonomy and again disrupt 
the community that God has established. His efforts constitute a battle to gain a heretical 
victory over God's boundaries and to undo the center required for fellowship throughout 
creation. Satan wishes to prove that his heresy has more relevance and allure than God's 
vision of harmonic relationships centered upon community, that individual power, not 
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collective fellowship, dominate existence. Said another way, will Adam and Eve's impulse 
for interpretive autonomy defeat God's decree that one kind of knowledge must be 
sacrificed to remain in proper relationship with deity, nature, and each other? 
Although Satan makes his desire for heretical power clear throughout the poem, 
the lingering pull of community appears from time to time. As Satan prepares to tempt 
Adam and Eve, he reflects for a moment on the paradise they inhabit and on them: 
0 Hell! what do mine eyes with grief behold, 
Into our room of bliss thus high advanc't 
Creatures of other mould, earth-born perhaps, 
Not Spirits, yet to heav'nly Spirits bright 
Little inferior; whom my thoughts pursue 
With wonder, and could love, so lively shines 
In them Divine resemblance, and such grace 
The hand that form'd them on thir shape hath pour'd. (4.358-65) 
The attraction of the community which makes such beauty and contentment possible 
causes a momentary grief for Satan, a grief so profound that he even muses on the 
possibility ofloving Adam and Eve. But such love would require the release of the 
heretical autonomy that guides all of his judgments, so he must reject it completely. Adam 
and Eve become nothing more than two new candidates for the isolating heresy Satan 
champions as freedom and true equality with God. Even more than Adam and Eve's fall, 
Satan desires the ruin of the conditions that make the productive, stable, and contented 
world of Paradise thrive because that world challenges the misery Satan possesses in 
exchange for complete heretical control over interpretation. The proof that what he has 
chosen is very meager indeed tortures him, so he moves to disrupt and shatter it. 
In his temptation of Eve, Satan emphasizes that placing any limits on interpretation 
means a diminishment of freedom and individual authority. Interestingly, Eve's initial 
reaction at being led to the Tree of Knowledge demonstrates the conditions put upon 
interpretation within a community: 
Serpent, we might have spar'd our coming hither, 
Fruitless to mee, though Fruit be here to excess, 
The credit of whose virtue rest with thee, 
Wondrous indeed, if cause of such effects. 
But of the Tree we may not taste nor touch; 
God so commanded, and left that Command 
Sole Daughter of his voice; the rest, we live 
Law to ourselves, our Reason is our Law. (9.647-54) 
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Eve clearly understands the boundaries and center which make the Garden's community 
possible. As Dayton Haskin has argued in Milton's Burden <?.f Interpretation, the very 
state of humanity requires having to interpret the world repeatedly in order to understand 
what it means and how to react to it. As the first humans, Adam and Eve indulge in 
interpretation at every level of their existence: in deciding how to tend to the garden, in 
naming plants and animals, in responding to each other's needs. But in order to enjoy all 
that Paradise has to offer they must limit their interpretation when it comes to God's 
command not to eat from the Tree. The Tree denotes the demarcation of where 
interpretation for the good of the community ends and heresy for the sake of individual 
power begins. Eve correctly rejects any possibility of understanding the Tree differently 
than what God has said about it. 
Satan brushes aside her objections, however, by suggesting that she has interpreted 
God erroneously, that her refusal to eat has nothing to do with obedience but instead 
derives from a mistake over meaning in God's words. Satan quickly offers an alternative 
interpretation that will bestow on Eve all the power and freedom she so richly deserves: 
he knows that in the day 
Ye eat thereof, your Eyes that seem so clear, 
Yet are but dim, shall petfectly be then 
Op'n'd and clear'd, and ye shall be as Gods, 
Knowing both Good and Evil as they know. 
That ye should be as Gods, since I as Man, 
Internal Man, is but proportion meet, 
I of brute human, yee of human Gods. 
So ye shall die perhaps, by putting off 
Human, to put on Gods, death to be wisht, 
Though threat'n'd, which no worse than this can bring. (9. 705-15) 
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Satan always defines any limit on interpretive power as a lack, and Eve lacks mightily by 
being denied the knowledge of Good and Evil. The clever tum on the word "death" as 
simply putting off one form for another really captures the essence of Satanic heresy. By 
tempting Eve to transform herself into something new, Satan pushes Eve outside the 
boundaries of community and into heretical isolation. From there she can interpret 
whatever and however she pleases, but she cannot enjoy the benefits of community and the 
diverse interpretive opportunities she partakes in there, opportunities that impact others, 
not just herself Satan offers Eve the chance to become a Goddess in a vacuum; stepping 
outside the center of community leaves a voice interpreting into a void, just as Satan does. 
This chance for interpretive autonomy proves too attractive to Eve, and she 
launches a heretical expression of her own to justify the act of eating from the Tree: 
For us alone 
Was death invented? or to us deni'd 
This intellectual food, for beasts reserv'd? 
* * * 
What fear I then, rather what know to fear 
Under this ignorance of Good and Evil, 
Of God or Death, of Law or Penalty? 
Here grows the Cure of all, the Fruit Divine, 
Fair to the Eye, inviting to the Taste, 
Of virtue to make wise 
(9. 766-68, 774-78) 
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Eve interprets just like Satan here; the inability to taste and know and interpret creates a 
lack that limits true freedom and power. Once Eve no longer thinks of the prohibition as 
the boundary of community, she interprets God's command as a restriction on her personal 
right to know and to make meaning. She eats from the Tree to assert her authority beyond 
simply hearing what God says. Instead, she interprets what He means in any way she 
deems fit. Satan's victory projects Eve outside the Edenic community which has been the 
source of all her contentment in the poem. 
Unlike Satan, Eve, however, quickly realizes that heretical power in isolation 
means nothing to her. She briefly ponders a course like Satan's, wondering if she should 
retain all power unto herself, apart from Adam and ultimately God, in true heretical 
fashion: 
shall I to him make known 
As yet my change, and give him to partake 
Full happiness with mee, or rather not. 
But keep the odds of Knowledge in my power 
Without Copartner? (9. 817-21) 
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These lines actually echo much of what Satan has said and done throughout the poem. 
Eve momentarily becomes seduced by the control heretical power bestows and recognizes 
she cannot share that power and remain autonomous. At once she gives up the notion and 
opts again for the pleasures of community: 
Confirm'd then I resolve, 
Adam shall share with me in bliss or woe: 
So dear I love him, that with him all deaths · 
I could endure, without him live no life. (9.830-33) 
Eve, in remarkable contrast to Satan, finds the isolation of heresy intolerable and can think 
of interpretation only in terms of sharing and community. The ability to interpret means 
nothing without the support of community to validate and uphold the interpretation. Satan 
loses control over Paradise mere moments after his victory; Eve's choice to share with 
Adam from the Tree re-establishes the condition of community albeit in a fallen and 
lessened state. Even without God's forgiveness, Eve seeks the community that gives true 
purpose and meaning to all her interpretive acts. Her misguided effort to include Adam in 
the fall utterly destroys the heretical process Satan tries to establish on earth. 
It is worth repeating that Eve seeks community and understands that only in 
sharing with Adam can she overcome the burdens of the fall. Satan in contrast fails to 
understand the extent of forgiveness through the misinterpretation of the Son which begins 
his heresy. The Son's promised sacrifice produces a hope which allows community to be 
re-established, and his death and resurrection will spiritually re-establish the conditions of 
fellowship before the fall. Satan never understands the power of community to create a 
center which allows interpretation and fellowship. Books 11 and 12 can essentially be 
seen as Milton's attempt to demonstrate how that community will withstand the temptation 
of Satan to isolate itself for the sake of heretical power and autonomy. 
Satan as Heretic highlights the seductive qualities of the Satanic quest for 
autonomy, for the right to interpret what anything means in any way possible, while also 
forcefully acknowledging that heresy for its own sake will destroy the boundaries of 
community that make interpretation worthwhile and purposeful. Satan can indeed 
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interpret whatever he likes, but Milton forces readers to ask what Satan finally gains in this 
autonomy. The hissing that fills hell after the fall of Adam and Eve, the cacophony of 
voices isolated and spouting interpretation which leads to nothing, cannot impress most 
readers. In return for the opportunities of sharing and having a communal purpose, 
community insists upon a center for interpretation. This center delivers the right to 
achieve a purpose and create a narrative about family, society, and relationship. As Eve 
recognizes only seconds after eating from the Tree, heresy also exacts a price. In exchange 
for complete heretical autonomy, the individual forfeits the circle of community and the 
support of those within it interpreting for reasons beyond their own power and control. 
Everywhere Satan turns is hell because ultimately everywhere the heretic turns is within the 
narrow confines of isolation and vaunted interpretive power. Hell means absence: of God, 
of community, of others, and of possibility. The heretical impulse for its own sake 
produces an absence of everything but the drone of the heretic's voice shouting "I am free" 
to fill the emptiness. 
Satan offers a powerful warning of the destructive impulses of heresy for the 
accumulation of control and autonomy. While such impulses do not make heretical literary 
critics satanic, Milton demonstrates through Satan the options posed by interpretative 
choices and argues forcefully that heretical interpretation, divorced from a center that 
forms community, cannot ultimately sustain itself or the community it undermines. 
Milton's justification of the ways of God to men comes down to a proposition: 
relationships which emanate from a clearly defined center comprise the very essence of 
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meaningful interpretation and existence. 
Chapter 2 
Milton, the Critics, and the Scholars: 
The Battle Commences 
The example of Milton's Satan as a heretical strategist who aims to gain power 
through interpretive autonomy leads rather naturally to a recognition of heresy within 
literary criticism as a critical battle ensues over his creations. Oddly enough, Milton, the 
great recorder of the dangers of heresy has never been a stranger to accusations of heresy 
himself From his own time until now, the ideology and doctrine surrounding Milton's 
work have always garnered a substantial amount of attention. Do we perceive Milton as 
the great justifier of the ways of God to man, or as the radical political activist willing to 
support and defend regicide at the cost of his own sight? Do we champion the author of 
Aeropagitica or condemn the man who often appears as an elitist? Milton seems full of 
dichotomies and contradictions, and one of the unusual facets of his reputation remains the 
ability of nearly any critic to discover heresy or orthodoxy in Milton's work, depending on 
what one ultimately wants to discover. 1 And often the critic finds both, a possibility which 
hearkens back to Johnson's division of Milton into poet and man. Unlike any other giant 
of English literature, Milton exists.in constant flux, forever awaiting the next attack upon 
his work and ideas. We certainly never deny Milton his greatness, but neither do we ever 
quite make up our minds about him in much the same way we feel ambivalent about a 
mysterious character in a novel; do we feel attracted to the character's seeming goodness 
or the nastiness that we somehow recognize lurking just beneath the surface? 
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The relative ease of building a strong case either way concerning Milton's heresy or 
orthodoxy tends to make Miltonists frightfully staunch in their critical positions at times. 
"The true Miltonist," points out M. K. Starkman, "is a militant man and totally involved, 
head and heart" (209). The heresy debate for Miltonists elicits the same passion that 
questions over authorship of the Gospels produce for biblical scholars. We see the zenith 
of this militancy on display during·the battle between the Critics and Scholars2 beginning in 
the late twenties and lasting until the end of the fifties. 3 And heresy encompasses much 
more than simple adherence to the traditional tenets of Christianity; Milton's style, his place 
in the canon, his politics, his influence, and his genius all come into question during the 
struggle. A simple glance at the criticism of the time often creates the impression that a 
desperate war simply to keep Milton in the curriculum takes place. 
As discussed in the introduction, the search for heresy in an institution often becomes a 
political struggle between warring factions. While I wish to examine the charges and 
counter-charges brought against Milton during a thirty year period, I also want to notice 
how this battle quickly falls into line with Lester Kurtz's model for heresy and orthodoxy 
within a structured organization since the debate over Milton quickly grows into an 
argument over what constitutes literary critical heresy and orthodoxy--rhetoric which 
reflects the search for control over criticism. Thus the emerging dialogue over heresy 
occurs at several fascinating levels. Ironically, Milton remains the controversialist through 
all time; he sparks a challenge to the established methods of traditional historical 
scholarship. In the case of Milton, we can discover when actual criticism meant to further 
the study of Milton and his texts occurs and when criticism has different intentions in mind, 
namely the defining of critical heresy and the quest to maintain certain bases of power 
within the circle of literary critics. 
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An examination of this debate in Milton studies uncovers the presence of all five of 
Kurtz's characteristics of the orthodox reaction to alleged heresy. There is first an 
identification of heresy and a resulting crisis within the institution. A struggle over 
authority and the building of solidarity to remove the heresy follow. Through boundary 
work there is a defining of orthodoxy and finally a ritual through which pressures upon the 
institution are relieved. As early as 1920, T. S. Eliot writes in "The Perfect Critic" that "it 
is to be expected that the critic and the creative artist should frequently be the same 
person" (16). But research indicates that Scholars take little heed of Eliot because he 
exists outside the critical institution as a poet whose reputation remains in doubt. 4 Only 
when Eliot's influence grows, especially when other academic critics begin following his 
lead and attacking Milton and orthodox methodology? do the Scholars perceive the threat 
as being an internal one and grow uneasy. One need only examine the furor after F. R. 
Leavis attempts to validate Eliot's conclusions about Milton to notice the remarkable shift 
in importance Scholars place on the debate; the criticism moves within the ranks and 
becomes heresy. 5 
Eliot also serves to highlight the point of a contention over authority. Several critics in 
the twenties call Milton's orthodoxy into question, among them Denis Saurat. Saurat 
claims "Milton's God is far from the God of popular belief or even orthodox theology," and 
that Milton delights in "the destruction of orthodox ideas" (113-14). Yet such statements 
meet with toleration because Saurat remains firmly in the camp of historical scholarship.6 
Indeed, C. S. Lewis, who vigorously opposes Saurat's conclusions, lauds the methodology 
employed by Saurat and sees it as an advancement of the historical approach. 7 However, 
when T. S. Eliot and others begin attacking Milton, and more important the methodology 
and legitimacy of the Scholar's interpretations, the battle is joined. After all, to employ 
historical scholarship in the pursuit of Milton's ideology is one thing, but to assail Milton's 
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place in the canon and declare prior criticism of Milton as the "orthodox eulogy," as Leavis 
does in Revaluation, is quite another ( 46). Debate over Milton quickly shifts to a debate 
over who deserves the designation of authentic critic, and the Scholars quickly recognize 
not only that Milton needs defending, but that their authority over literary criticism 
demands attention as well. And like any institution they react quickly and vehemently. 
Later we will examine the shape that reaction takes, but for now we should simply note 
that the Scholars see a heretical faction growing in their ranks and move to stop it because 
such a group forms a challenge to their own authority. 
The building of solidarity plays a very positive role for a group like literary critics who 
often toil in isolation and sometimes fail to identify with other members of their 
community. During the Critic/Scholar quarrel the solidarity demonstrated in journals and 
books borders on fanatical, and the unity shows through on both sides. An article that 
starts as a discussion of Milton very often transforms itself into a cheerleading session for 
whatever faction the writer supports. One does not quote a source; one either commends 
or heaps abuse upon it. 
The most intriguing example of this bandwagon support occurs in the work ofE.M.W. 
Tillyard. In 1930 Tillyard publishes Milton, and he devotes his final chapter to a defense of 
the Scholars' ideas and conclusions in regard to Milton. Tillyard recognizes that "the idea 
that Milton's theology is outworn and that his views on life have no modem relevance is 
still very widespread" (363), but the chapter argues instead that Milton's ideas remain "as 
applicable to-day [sic] as in the Seventeenth Century" (365). The connection between the 
relevance of Milton and the Scholar's approach needs no overt development in Tillyard's 
mind. Throughout the book he employs the term "critic" to refer to any literary 
interpreter. This may appear as a small matter, but it gains huge significance when we 
compare Milton with Tillyard's 1951 collection of essays, Studies in Milton. Here the 
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author refuses to even acknowledge the existence of the Critics or their assertions. Only 
once does he refer to Eliot, and that quote derives from the poet's "recantation" lecture. 
But most fascinating of all, Tillyard will not even use the word "critic" in any meaningful 
way in his writing. Instead he chooses the word "scholar" in an obvious display of where 
his loyalties lie. Throughout the book he extols the virtues of the Scholar's methodology: 
"Scholars, naturally, in piecing together the pattern of Milton's thought, have used the total 
body of his work: verse and prose alike" (137). Over and over again Tillyard leaves no 
doubt that the Scholars retain the correct technique and interpretations about Milton. 
Critics do not even deserve mention. This exclusion constitutes nothing less than an 
enormous show of disdain for the Critics and an effort to champion the cause of the 
Scholars in 1951. 
Critics cheer for their position as well. Leavis continually encourages others with his 
same outlook and even works to enlist new recruits. In "Mr. Eliot and Milton," Leavis 
suddenly digresses to commend A.J.A. Waldock's book, Paradise Lost and Its Critics, as 
"by far the best book on Milton I have read" (15). So everyone will know Waldock agrees 
with the Critics either implicitly or explicitly, Leavis informs us that the book "is a more 
damaging criticism than Professor Waldock himself recognizes" (16). Waldock operates 
as one of us, says Leavis, whether he knows it or not. The focus of many articles quickly 
turns from Milton to methodology and critical attachment, as when M.K. Starkman 
mysteriously condemns a book by Kathleen Nott he considers "militant polemic" (224), but 
supports his own diatribe against the forces of heresy as he defines it ( which will be 
examined later). The solidarity heresy engenders may be its most important facet~ 
generally after the initial panic and shouting, the group discovers a new focus and vigor 
and purpose and very often a means of including the contentious party. All of these factors 
eventually appear as the Critics and Scholars debate continues. 
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Boundary-work often involves a negative process: Critics spend much time infomiing 
us what errors the Scholars commit and Scholars return the favor. Often an institution 
operates without giving much thought to what philosophy actually underlies its method 
and purpose. Boundaries must be drawn to bring that philosophy into focus for the group. 
At the 1951 meeting of the Modem Language Association, both sides of the Critic/Scholar 
issue present papers supposedly outlining their positions. A.S.P. Woodhouse represents 
the Scholars and Cleanth Brooks the Critics. 8 Both men have difficulty defining their 
approaches. Woodhouse admits that "historical students of literature have tended to work 
by a silent instinct of accumulation like the bee," but he will "try to set down a few points 
towards the formation of such a theory" ( 103 3 ), a feat he fails to accomplish, offering a 
less than elucidating defense of orthodoxy. Brooks, too, has problems expressing 
succinctly the view of New Criticism. Both succeed at pointing out the faults of the other. 
Brooks complains that Scholars such as C.S. Lewis "utterly misunderstands [sic] the true 
nature of the opposition to Milton" (1046). Woodhouse dismisses the tendency of the 
Critics to overlook important historical evidence when it does not suit their purposes. 
Both sides throughout the war find it easier to define themselves in terms of what they are 
not rather than in terms of what they actually are, much in the manner Kurtz describes. 
Heresy provides a set of values and propositions to reject and in that rejection orthodoxy 
can better define itself 
An excellent current example of the ritual activity of heresy can be seen in the highly 
polemical nature of recent criticism attempting to fend off attacks of Political Correctness 
from outside the institution. 9 A perceived deviant insider becomes easy prey when the real 
frustration lies outside the community. In a similiar fashion in the Milton debate, Scholars 
find in the Critics an inward malady to expel when in fact the issues go much deeper than 
simple critical heresy. Modem society undergoes tremendous change and fragmentation 
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during the era, and many scholars feel literature itself under siege. Articles often moan the 
. loss of a stable, classic culture, and Scholars especially sense the gap between literature 
and its ability to influence or interest the public widening. 10 Scholars witness the world 
they know and cherish crumbling, and the Critics serve as a convenient internal deviance 
upon which they can project their frustrations. The image of barbarians destroying the 
citadel of learning and culture recurs over and over in orthodox attacks on heresy, 
reminding us of Douglas Bush's claims that his theories concerning poetry have "reigned 
for 2,500 years, through the greatest periods ofliterature" (21 ), and the Critics threaten to 
dismantle all of them. He fears that the approach of Critics "is not likely to make converts 
from the world at large, and literature and the humanistic tradition surely need converts 
now more than ever before" (21). Bush's.use of the word "converts" in relation to the 
battle within literary criticism again echoes the religious dimensions cast on the situation. 
Defining and expelling heresy becomes a ritual to right all that the Scholars see wrong in 
the world. Gerald Graff recognizes that it appeals to certain critics "to think of themselves 
as last-ditch defenders of civilization against the invasion of barbarian relativists and 
terrorists" (Beyond 5). 
Robert Martin Adams develops this theme with vengeance in Iko11:Joh11 Milton and the 
Modem Critics, a book which quickly develops into a mournful ballad on the loss of the 
standards upheld by Scholars. Critics are dirty, unprofessional meddlers who have no 
authority to propagate their shoddy interpretations and "Byzantine ingenuities" (34). 
Adams thinks the critical approach of Don C. Allen "would make hash out of almost all the 
poetry written by John Milton, or for that matter by most English poets" (33). The book 
portrays the Critics as crude unruly men who threaten to tear down all the beauty of not 
only Milton, but literature in general, and it argues they must be stopped. Rather 
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ironically, Critics such as Leavis and Brooks will often make the same claim against the 
Scholars, complaining that they have ruined Art by reducing it to a sterile science of facts. 
Max Weber's ideas on the nature of sacred texts apply fruitfully to the Milton 
controversy. Both sides of the Critic/Scholar controversy complain that the opposition 
commits the error of dogmatism. Weber argues that "canonical sacred collections became 
officially closed against secular or religiously undesirable additions as a consequence of a 
struggle between various competing groups and prophecies for the control of the 
community" ( 459). Milton's place in the canon never faces any real challenge; the Council 
has already closed the collection so to speak. Unlike today, when the works present in the 
literary canon undergo much debate, Milton's place remains secure, although one might 
contend Eliot tries to assail Milton and Leavis thinks he succeeds, especially in light of 
Leavis's use of the term "dislodgement" in Revaluation. Thinking of Eliot's remarks in 
terms of a battle over influence on the canon, however, offers a better gloss on the 
situation. 
The Critic/Scholar controversy may be seen as a war between factions of literary 
priests. A battle rages over whose dogma will prevail, and as a result this struggle helps 
predict which group will gain control of the interpretation surrounding Milton's work. The 
Critic/Scholar debate, however, marks as well the beginning of the move away from 
Kurtz's model to the addition I have. formulated: heresy becomes any "dogmatic" utterance 
concerning Milton, any "orthodox" stance a side takes to further a cause, whether it be 
critical, religious, political, or sodal. 11 The true literary critic in any area of study breathes 
the purified air of objective interpretation without the taint of any special agenda or hidden 
motive. Such a vision, however, cannot hold; any attempt to extract meaning from a text 
brings about the formulation of dogma. Any view privileges itself over another. 12 The 
conflict arises when the community will not allow a plurality of dogma, and that occurs 
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during the Critic/Scholar debate. Here the censoring of Booth's idea of vitality begins, 
and along with it the notions of justice and understanding. Both sides seek to isolate and 
dismiss the claims of the other in increasingly stringent positions. The real tragedy that 
arises from the Critic/Scholar debate involves the constant insistence thereafter for 
heretical interpretations. Orthodoxy gets cast as a detrimental force undermining criticism. 
Literary studies fail to re-define an orthodox position and instead pursue heresy as a 
powerful and meaningful option for obtaining power in criticism. 
The natural question to ask about these developments is why Milton becomes the focal 
point of a heresy dialogue. Defined and frankly nasty fights have emerged in Milton 
criticism over the years. 13 Despite his firm place in the canon, Milton's ideology and 
public persona elicit ambiguous reactions, and as Tillyard points out 
you cannot ignore [Milton], any more than you can ignore Alexander the Great, 
or Cromwell, or Napoleon. He is too extraordinary a person to shut out from 
our notice; and he is perhaps the only man of this type who has translated the 
mental urge into literature and not into action. (Milton 368) 
The Critics seize upon ambivalence and Milton's dominating personality and use them to 
their advantage. Even when Eliot makes a so-called "recantation" on Milton, he admits 
that he carries an "antipathy towards Milton the man" ("Milton II" 168). Eliot then 
summarizes the uneasiness surrounding any evaluation of Milton: "ofno other poet is it so 
difficult to consider the poetry simply as poetry, without our theological and political 
disposition, conscious and unconscious, inherited or acquired, making an unlawful entry" 
(168). Scholars themselves often disagree about Milton's politics and theology; the Critics 
take the argument a step further and begin to question the poetry as well, indeed question 
the whole system that gives Milton such prominence within the canon. But the seeds of 
discontent are always present with Milton; it takes very little encouragement to fan the fire, 
and one can easily forget the distinction between man and art in the heat of exchange. 
Milton offers the perfect chance to draw the lines in the critical sands. Critics quickly 
move from a suspicion of Milton to a suspicion of the kind of people and methods that 
would support him, and the pursuit of heresy begins in earnest. 
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Some primary salvos in the Scholar/Critic skirmish find their way into journals in the 
late twenties and early thirties, but the real war begins with Eliot's comments on Milton in 
1936. Eliot wastes no time having at Milton: "the serious charges to be made against him 
are in respect of the deterioration--the peculiar kind of deterioration--to which he 
subjected the language" ("Milton I" 156). The mischief caused by Milton appears endless: 
"Milton writes English like a dead language" (159); "he may still be considered as having 
done damage to the English language from which it has not wholly recovered" (164); "His 
language is ... artificial and conventionaf' (158); and "Milton's poetry could only be an 
influence for the worse, upon any poet whatsoever" (157). Eliot single-handedly ruptures 
the line of influence exerted by Milton, hints that any poetry that imitates Milton probably 
lacks merit, and basically claims that if anyone desires to write relevant modem poetry, 
Milton will most certainly have to be shed. Eliot cannot ignore Milton; the position he 
takes in "Tradition and the Individual Talent" makes that impossible. Instead, Milton 
requires direct confrontation; he requires chastising and pushing aside because Eliot 
chooses to follow another line of the tradition, most notably Donne, and the Scholars place 
Milton far above Donne in the canon. The Scholars, therefore, will have to be reckoned 
with as well. 
Eliot lays the groundwork for the assault on the orthodox viewpoint: 
There is a large class of persons, including some who appear in print as 
critics, who regard any censure upon a 'great' poet as a breach of the peace, 
as an act of wanton iconoclasm, or even hoodlumism. The kind of 
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derogatory criticism that I have to make upon Milton is not intended for 
such persons, who cannot understand that it is more important, in some 
vital respects, to be a good poet than to be a great poet; and of what I have 
to say I consider that the only jury of judgement is that of the ablest 
poetical practitioners ofmy own time. ("Milton 1"157) 
Eliot's language suggests certain people in literary criticism "cannot understand" his 
interpretation of Milton and in fact suppress any dissenting points of view in the name of 
peace. But his best rhetorical move involves the exclusion of everyone but the "ablest 
poetical practitioners" from judging him. Eliot denies vitality by refusing to listen to 
certain positions and squelches justice by not giving Scholars and Milton a proper hearing 
through a narrow definition of who can actually practice criticism. But for Eliot, Scholars, 
in their reactionary stance and support of Milton, have disqualified themselves from 
participation in modern criticism; they remain out of touch, like Milton's language, with the 
realities of contemporary art and methodology. Eliot clearly throws down a challenge to 
the autonomy he believes Scholars try to exercise over canonical texts. Rather than 
grapple with them, he simply excludes them as relics of the past clinging to the incorrect 
tradition needed for the creation of poetry in the modern era. Milton's poetry is a bad 
influence; Scholars champion Milton; Scholars are bad critics. 
One limitation ofKurtz's model concerns the lack of comment on heretical techniques 
used against orthodoxy. Heretics appear to use many of the same rhetorical devices in 
their condemnations the orthodox use against them. The most evident of these involves a 
protest that orthodoxy has somehow lost touch with present reality and concerns. The 
standard dogma can no longer cope with pressures a new age brings to bear upon it. The 
Milton debate reflects these protests when Eliot calls for a new language, claims Scholars 
cannot understand his approach, and portrays orthodox criticism as exhausted. If a change 
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does not transpire, the institution runs the danger of falling into decline. Critics 
throughout the debate complain literature has fallen out of favor with the public because 
the Scholars' stranglehold on the texts has alienated everyone but them; they must save the 
community and make literature relevant again to the masses. Thus Leavis condemns the 
Scholars' belief that 
qualities like Milton's represent a higher kind of unity. [This] goes with the 
kind of intellectual bent that produced Humanism~-that takes satisfaction in 
inertly orthodox generalities, and is impressed by invocations of Order from 
minds that have no glimmer of intelligence about contemporary literature and 
could not safely risk even elementary particular appreciation. (Revaluation 61) 
Not only do Scholars have no authority to speak on current literature, but their cries for an 
ordered universe reveal a decrepit attitude as well. Cleanth Brooks paints a picture of the 
Scholar as an archaic remnant of the past, 14 and O'Connor refers to "archaelogical 
scholarship" out of touch with the present (361). This ancient regime, removed from the 
realities of modern life, must pass away so literature can regain its vitality. As Kurtz puts 
it, "heretics usually believe themselves to have the interest of the sacred institution and 
tradition at heart" ("Politics" 1089). 
Leavis continues these strategies with a fanatical zeal. He immediately appropriates 
Eliot's criticism of Milton and uses it as an opportunity to chide the orthodox. He 
practices the rhetoric of a triumphant political party in Revaluation: "The work has been 
done, the re-orientation effected: the heresies often years ago are orthodoxy" (10). The 
boldness ofLeavis's position throughout his book are astounding. He decrees the decline 
of Milton with complete confidence: "Milton's dislodgement, in the past decade, after his 
two centuries of predominance, was effected with remarkably little fuss" (42). Better yet, 
we no longer have to chant the "orthodox eulogy" (46). Not only does Milton stifle us, 
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but so do the Scholars who support him. Leavis calls reading Paradise Lost "the 
monotony of the ritual" (44), an echo of the Scholars' eulogy. Milton grows into symbol; 
he represents all that is wrong in poetry and his work represents the remnant of a spent 
orthodoxy. Leavis proclaims that Eliot has rescued poetry and made it powerful and 
meaningful again, and in the course of doing so has also exposed the horrible Scholars who 
helped perpetuate such a ruined system. 
Scholars waste no time responding to this threat. C.S. Lewis identifies precisely the 
challenge to the Scholar's authority Eliot represents: "a recent remark of Mr. Eliot poses 
for us at the outset the fundamental question whether we (mere critics) have any right to 
talk about Milton at all" (9). Eliot's rhetoric does not simply question Milton; it calls into 
question the whole enterprise of literary criticism and who has the right to interpret literary 
texts. Lewis quickly dismisses the idea that only the poet can judge poetry: "For who can 
endure a doctrine which would allow only the dentists to say whether our teeth were 
aching, only cobblers to say whether our shoes hurt us, and only governments to tell us 
whether we were being well governed" (11)? Likewise, Herbert Grierson includes Eliot in 
his study of Milton but summarily brushes him aside. The important development, 
however, remains--well-respected Scholars perceive the necessity of responding to Eliot in 
some manner because much more than an interpretation regarding Milton hangs in the 
balance. 
A strange characteristic of the Scholars' response revolves around an attack on more 
than simply Eliot and his band of followers. The philosophy among the Scholars runs 
something like this: 11 As long as we are going to identify the heresy of the Critics, let us 
root out all the deviance existing among the ranks. 11 Feelings of resentment among the 
orthodox at what they perceive as the destruction of their critical method cause a finger-
pointing upheaval. The example of Arnold Williams' entry into the fray highlights the 
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unusual mixture of what the Scholars believe to be heretical elements in literary criticism. 
Williams argues that the heresy involving Milton involves the intrusion of conservative 
ideology into literary criticism. "It is not strange," writes Williams, "that critics of Milton 
should read into their criticism their own religious, social, and political attitudes" (90). 
Perhaps not unusual but certainly heretical: 
Conservative and radical have alike a right to criticize from their points of 
view. But the reader of criticism should know what is happening. He 
should not be permitted to regard as the results of scientific and objective 
scholarship something which is only a private reaction. (91) 
In other words, expressing opinions is fine_ as long as it is not confused with "real" 
criticism. The use of the terms "scientific and objective" in describing scholarship makes 
clear the notion that orthodox (in the sense of true or authentic) critics exist above the 
sphere of political or religious influence. The heretic commits the sin of dogmatism, of 
allowing personal systems of belief to interfere with the critical process, of using an author 
as the means of pushing another, usually detrimental, agenda. 
Williams naturally brands Eliot a heretic immediately. He asserts that "a close perusal 
of Eliot's remarks over a period of years shows that his basic criticism of Milton is 
ideological and that only because Eliot's principles of criticism proceed from his theological 
and political conservatism does Milton violate them" (92). Discovering the basis of Eliot's 
dislike of Milton proves easy for Williams: "It is not marvelous that one who assumes the 
correctness of Catholicism and traditionalism should condemn a poet who embodies the 
contradictory isms" (94); and Williams also complains of Eliot's dogmatic approach to 
criticism: "Are we to suppose that only one kind of theology exists? And if so, is it by any 
chance the via media of Anglo-Catholicism" (92)? While the abuse Williams heaps on 
Eliot might seem inevitable, the next heretics he names can surprise one. Not only does 
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Eliot fail to meet the standards of true criticism, but so do Grierson and Tillyard, figures 
hardly to be thought of as renegades. Indeed, we have seen that they attack Eliot and the 
Critics, yet they perpetrate heresy according to Williams. Their dogmatism consists of a 
conservative pessimism that they try to foist on Milton. Williams argues that as a result of 
Grierson and Tillyard's disappointment with events in 17th-Century England, they assume · 
Milton had to be disillusioned too (94). The sarcasm Williams displays toward Grierson 
because of his alleged unhistorical technique almost makes one uncomfortable. He ends by 
stating: 
Critics of conservative leanings suppose that had they been in Milton's place 
they would have come out of the ordeal pessimists. Alternatively, these 
critics see as pessimistic a scheme of religion and politics certainly 
understood by Milton as optimistic. Their attempt to distort the meaning of 
Paradise Lost into something its creator never intended and into which no 
spirit sympathetic to his would ever suspect is one with the attempt of Eliot 
to exclude Milton from the main stream of English poetry. Both come from 
a misunderstanding of the essentially radical character of John Milton. ( 106) 
Williams betrays himself here at the end. His pronouncements contain dogmatic utterances 
as well regardless of whether he arrived at his conclusions "objectively" or not. Eliot, 
Grierson, and Tillyard all hold ideas about Milton different from Williams and that 
deviance cannot be tolerated on both a critical and political level. The intrusion of societal 
realities into literary matters ultimately troubles Scholars the most. What they deem the 
"purity" of their type of criticism increasingly comes under attack and appears more and 
more untenable in the modem era; Scholars like Williams even berate members of their 
own leaning who let unpopular interpretations creep into their work. 
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The Scholars generally reserve their remarks for Eliot until the 1940s. Then both 
Lea vis and Eliot renew the battle. In 194 7 Eliot makes what some believe a reversal in his 
attitude toward Milton. The essay Eliot presents, however, continues the same line of 
thought only in a different direction. Eliot writes of Milton, "His work illustrates no 
general principles of good writing; the only principles of writing that it illustrates are such 
as are valid only for Milton himself to observe" (176). This hardly constitutes a ringing 
endorsement of Milton and becomes even less of one when we remember Eliot demands 
modem poetry evoke the tradition. If no one can look to Milton for inspiration, he will 
exist in isolation and his greatness will be a solitary and empty one. But why does Eliot 
bother calling Milton great at all? Eliot apparently does not want to stray too far from the 
canon and commit the errors he sees in Milton, so as a critic he has to find a way to 
endorse Milton while at the same time negating any influence he might have on 
contemporary poetry. "Milton II" accomplishes both these objectives quite well. 
The continued subtle denunciation of Scholars, however, does not change a bit. Eliot 
says that "The Scholar is more concerned with the understanding of the masterpiece in the 
environment of its author: with the world in which that author lived, the temper of his age, 
his intellectual formation, the books which he had read, and the influences which had 
moulded him" (166). Such a view contrasts with the critic/poet who "is concerned less 
with the author than with the poem; and with the poem in relation to his own age. He 
asks; Of what use is the poetry of this poet to poets writing today? Is it, or can it become, 
a living force in English poetry still unwritten" (166). The sly contrast between the two 
styles of criticism bears inspection. Scholars create biographical footnotes about authors 
while Critics involve themselves with Art, adding vitality to present and future poetry. 
Eliot paints the picture of an aloof academic researcher who has nothing to say or 
contribute to the present other than archaic trivialities only other Scholars will read. Their 
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place and power have been usurped by the Critics. Again Eliot refuses to offer justice to 
the Scholars' work by simply labeling them as obsolete. 
Leavis quickly responds to Eliot in "Mr. Eliot and Milton" for two reasons. First, he 
wants to destroy the Scholars' approach to poetry once and for all, and second he wants to 
make sure everyone understands that Eliot still does not like Milton. Leavis works hard in 
the essay to keep Eliot firmly in his camp .. He uses parenthetical statements to assure us of 
what Eliot really meant: "the weakness noted by Eliot (though he won't call it flatly that)" 
(14), and "the man who uses words in this way has (as Mr. Eliot virtually says) no 'grasp of 
ideas"' (18). Leavis understands, if Eliot does not, the need to keep a consistent critical 
stance or run the risk of ridicule from Scholars who can back up their claims about Critics 
having no real foundation to build upon. The incident serves to illustrate the difficulty 
heretics have in maintaining solidarity. Many rebellious members of an institution enjoy 
any position as long as it deviates from the establishment; in that sense they do not qualify 
as true heretics who try to correct what they believe to be error. There will always be 
people at the fringe of any movement who simply like the idea of being "radical." While 
Eliot does not fall into such a category, Leavis fears others will believe he does, and such 
a perception could undermine their genuine efforts, 
Leavis launches his most vicious attack on the Scholars in the same essay. When it 
comes to poetry, Scholars cannot even demonstrate the "elementary conditions of talking 
to the point" (2). Scholars would not know good poetry if they saw it (3). Scholars also 
lack the "responses of a trained sensibility to the work of the poet" (3). Leavis follows the 
same reasoning as Eliot, only in a vehement manner. If you want to know the trivial habits 
of the poet, ask the Scholar; if you want to know about the poetry and its relevance to 
your world, ask the Critic. Leavis claims Milton cannot sustain analytic or discursive 
thinking, and 
64 
That is why the ardours and ingenuities of the scholars who interpret 
Paradise Lost in terms ofa supposed consistency of theological intention 
are so absurd, and it is so deplorable that literary students should be 
required to take that kind of thing seriously, believe that it has anything to 
do with intelligent literary criticism, and devote any large part of their time 
to the solemn study of Milton's 'thought.' (19) 
Even students must be protected from this insidious form of criticism. Leavis battles for 
control of the recruits who will eventually take over leadership of literary criticism. Whose 
dogma will be taught? Leavis accuses the Scholars of supporting a bad poet, therefore 
losing all authority to lead and set policy within the university. There can be no doubt as 
to the cause of poetic decline: 
poetry must express itself in a concern for the present function of criticism; 
for it is the weakness of that function during the last twenty years that has 
permitted the most elementary and essential discriminations to pass 
unregarded, and the lessons to be ignored or unperceived. (30) 
Reject the Scholars, follow me, study Eliot, and poetry will regain the contemporary 
relevance it has lost, cries Leavis. But the Scholars would not relinquish their power so 
easily. 
The basic shape of the Scholars' response to heresy involves the undermining of its 
methodology; the Critics lack any solid foundation to their study, display bad scholarship 
and let personal opinion (dogma) creep into their interpretations. The Scholars always 
portray themselves as the critical ideal--objective, scientific, and without dogma or 
propaganda in their criticism. The Critics continue portraying the Scholars as out of touch 
with reality and only interested in the mundane details of history. They have nothing to say 
about art and its relevance. Heresy becomes defined in terms of orthodoxy; any allegiance 
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to a system or personal belief gets branded as bad criticism, a charge which still holds true 
today. To be tagged the follower of some "orthodox" school of thought means a lack of 
critical skill and acumen. 
Developing the Scholars' argument, Douglas Bush writes that "the new criticism has 
shown the defects of its virtues, that its approach to poetry tends to be narrow and 
dogmatic and also erratic" (14). Challenging the authority of Critics, he wonders if "the 
new criticism always rests on a basis of solid knowledge" (15). In a rather elitist remark, 
Bush states that the Critic's rejection of scholarship puts "himself under the handicaps of 
the man in the street" (16). And in a fine turn of the debate, Bush accuses the Critics of 
being the aloof and out of touch members of the group; their criticism appeals only "to an 
inner circle of initiates"; finally, "cultural divisions have been accepted as unbridgeable, ... 
poets and critics have decided to write for one another" (20-21). Finally, Bush worries 
that the Critics "have been doing all they could to create a moral vacuum" (21). Andrew 
A. King suggests that one of the strategies of the orthodox is to "cry anarchy" (128). 
Doing so accomplishes "more than to brand the activities of the challengers as merely 
criminal and sinister. As destroyers of society they strike at everyone" (129). In a 
ritualistic way Bush can blame the Critics for the general breakdown of values and morals 
he witnesses outside the institution, a breakdown he is powerless to stop. Woodhouse also 
calls the methodology of Critics into question and firmly asserts that Scholars are the true 
holders of critical truth and the faction within the group who should control the 
interpretation of Milton's texts. 
The Critics heap abuse on the Scholars at the same pace. O'Connor contends Scholars 
avoid the real problems confronting society and poetry and that "The techniques of the 
critical process are ignored for the standard cliches and illustrations of the literary 
historians" (361). Throughout, O'Connor employs the term "orthodoxy" derisively. John 
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Peter begins by telling us as a simple professor he has no real interest in the debate but by 
the end declares a ringing victory for the Critics. The main problem revolves around the 
Scholars making any adequate rebuttal ofLeavis: "When I regret the lack of a meticulous 
and specific consideration of Dr. Leavis's case from the other side I am not, then, I believe, 
demanding from his opponents mote than would seem to be required of them already by 
the nature of disputation itseJf' (14). Translation: Critics debate logically by the rules of 
criticism and Scholars do not. Peter even intimates that if the Critics gave up the dispute, 
it would be far less horrible than the suppression of information the Scholars practice: "to 
withhold from the students opinions that might conflict with those of a teacher whose 
regard for Milton bordered on adulation, is much more serious, and even a little sinister" 
(14). Over and over appear the same charges of clinging to a bankrupt tradition, one 
removed from the interests of actual existence. 
The real champion of Critics, Cleanth Brooks, draws a picture of the archaic Scholar: 
"the scholar's abiding danger is that he will abandon poetry altogether in his preoccupation 
with individual peculiarities and the accidents of history, finally ending up with a sort of 
biographical and historical total recall" (3). Brooks responds to Bush: "Naturally, 
Professor Bush fixes upon T.S. Eliot as the Satan who has drawn off the third part of the 
host ofHeaven (or at least a third part of the graduate students) from their proper 
allegiance" ( 4). But Brooks's real denunciation involves, again, the dogmatic and 
propagandistic nature of the Scholars: 
it is not enough to prove that Milton is a great humanist and that our 
own besotted age needs Milton's moralistic vigor. Or to prove that 
Milton is a great Christian, and that to modem paganism even a 
Christian has something of value to say. The pressing issues have to do 
with Milton as an artist, and the attack essentially has to do with the 
nature of his art. ("Milton and Critical Re-estimates" 1046) 
The message rings clear; we concern ourselves with the true work of the critic and 
Scholars propagate orthodox doctrine. Orthodoxy has become the position to avoid in 
critical debates. 
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The battle reaches its climax in M.K. Starkman, who basically declares everyone a 
heretic but himself. He wonders if the craze for Milton is "an entirely uncritical zeal that 
motivated all these changes [the move to defend Milton against criticism], a zeal to do 
God's work, even if unpleasant" (211). Those who support Milton do so "to promote faith 
in Christ via faith in Milton, and that faith in Milton has been only a secondary condition" 
(224). Therefore, "The quarrel over Milton in our century, which began on critical 
grounds, has been resolved on religious ones. And this is dogma" (222). Quite a surprise. 
But the Critics do not escape the wrath of Starkman either: "[A]s Eliot and his school 
distorted Milton for their orthodoxy's sake, the New Critics ... distorted him for their 
Art's sake" (217). Art becomes just another form of dogma, and the Critics only use 
Milton to push their critical method. Starkman eventually gets around to blasting all 
critics, so that only he remains a true member of the community. Starkman's ranting 
demonstrates how far Milton criticism strays from being about Milton and how instead it 
becomes a weapon in the struggle for control of criticism. 
This survey of the rhetoric of heresy will end with C.S. Lewis because he appears to 
understand fully the stakes in the Critic/Scholar controversy. Lewis defends orthodoxy in 
the traditional manner, not to retain control of the group but to maintain a value system 
against decay. Lewis sees in the challenge of the Critics the beginning of subjective 
criticism in all its forms and the loss of any sort of transcendent reference in all of society. 
He expresses those concerns in his Preface to Paradise Lost: 
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The older poetry, by continually insisting on certain Stock themes ... was 
performing a service not only of moral and civil, but even of biological, 
importance .... [P]oetry was formerly one of the chief means whereby 
each new generation learned, not to copy, but by copying to make, the 
good Stock response. Since poetry has been abandoned that office has not 
bettered . . . . We need most urgently to recover the lost poetic art of 
enriching a response without making it eccentric, and of being normal 
without being wlgar. Meanwhile--until that recovery is made--such poetry 
as Milton's is more than ever necessary to us. (57) 
While Lewis sometimes forces Milton into the mold of orthodoxy, he does so because 
Milton exists as his best option in the fight. And Lewis has no problem admitting Milton 
subscribes to some heretical beliefs: "Heretical elements exist in it [Paradise Lost], but are 
only discoverable by search: any criticism which forces them into the foreground is 
mistaken, and ignores the fact that this poem was accepted as orthodox by many 
generations of acute readers well grounded in theology" (86). For Lewis, Milton offers a 
serise oforder and meaning in a world coming apart at the seams, and he understands 
perfectly where literature and criticism will end up without some sort of transcendent 
structure. For Lewis, a center that forms the basis of any understanding or community 
must involve a set of stable, transcendent values. Poetry has already begun to decay: "The 
idea of a poetry which exists only for the poet--a poetry which the public rather overhears 
than hears--is a foolish novelty in criticism. There is nothing specially admirable in talking 
to oneself' (54). Ultimately most Scholars feel the same pressures as Lewis; one can even 
make the argument that Critics also sense a crisis in society and literature and seek to 
remedy it. But most Scholars cannot separate the spiritual crisis from the crisis in 
authority they see in the Critics, and as a result use heresy as a political instrument which 
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undermines their efforts at tackling the bigger issues confronting them. Scholars may win 
the battle with the Critics, but they lose the war; criticism becomes everything they hope it 
will not. The drive to retain control of the institution of literary criticism outweighs the 
desire to address the philosophical crises inherent in the modem age. 
Whether one agrees with Lewis's orthodox formulation does not matter; the fact 
. remains that he attempts to project some goals and a purpose for criticism and literature. 
His would be one of the last voices calling for literary critics to rally around an orthodox 
center. The idea of New Critics representing the radical, destabilizing voice in criticism 
can only strike us as amusing today. Kurtz knows that eventually a powerful enough 
heresy will become the orthodoxy the next generation rages against. Critics today are 
forever rallying against what they see as the abuses, shortcomings, and stagnation of New 
Criticism the way Scholars did in reply to the Critics. Much of the rhetoric is identical. 
In the end, both Critics and Scholars invest much time in the rhetoric of heresy, often 
to the detriment of the criticism they wish to protect from corruption. But once New 
Criticism invokes the ingenious tactic of casting orthodoxy as the position to expel at all 
costs, they create a precedent that many critics seeking power in literary criticism 
thereafter employ. Heresy for heresy's sake will take literary criticism down a path that 
encourages innovation for no other reason than it supplies a compelling means of acquiring 
power within discourse. Such an approach will engender strange results and exotic 
formulations. It will also point out how little innovation has to do with literary criticism 
and how much it instead has to do with literary power. 
Chapter 3 
The Heresy of the Performance: 
Community and Literature 
The Critic/Scholar controversy in literary criticism set precedents that subsequent 
heretical critics would follow as a strategy for gaining a voice and power in literary 
interpretation. The identification of orthodoxy as limiting and undesirable in criticism, the 
drive to innovate for innovation's sake, and the attempt to negate other voices in the critical 
debate have become the hallmarks of the heretical style. All of these characteristics strangle 
vitality, justice, and understanding as outlined by Booth, and the emergence of heresy in 
criticism marks a significant threat to plurality and community. 
Innovation, however, tends to create a unique heretical expression for every theory and 
field within literary studies. This chapter will explore the relationship between text and 
performance in Shakespeare studies and discuss the ways heretical critics on both sides of 
the debate seek to gain authority over the discourse. The interesting devolopment in this 
struggle occurs in the way each side atttempts to completely shut out the conclusions of the 
other; not only do textual critics refute the claims of performance critics, they call into 
question the very approach that leads to their interpretations. Likewise, performance critics 
claim using text to engage Shakespeare contains a fundamental error, and subsequent 
discourse using that means must be rejected. 
After sampling the heretical moves on both sides of the debate, the chapter will look at 
community as a means of escaping the heretical stalemate that takes place as both heretical 
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camps destroy any possiblity of vitality or understanding by dismissing the methodology and 
therefore interpretations of the other. These first steps toward community beyond Booth's 
criteria for plurality will form the basis for eliminating the destructive impulses of heresy in 
literary criticis~. Heresy diminishes the health of criticism by moving to elimanate other, 
competing voices in the critical debate; the fostering of community curbs those tendencies 
by offering an atmosphere of free exchange of views that do not have to silence other 
interpretations to gain a hearing and place in literary criticism. 
While literary critics sometimes fail to take into account the performance aspect of 
Shakespeare's plays and privilege the text over a dramatic interpretation, performance 
criticism has increased in recent times and poses important questions. 1 What for instance is 
a "perfect performance?" Should readers dismiss the importance of performance when 
studying, and more importantly interpreting, Shakespeare? Such questions raise issues 
which strike at a fundamental dilemma in Shakespeare scholarship today: should readers 
privilege the text over performance in interpretation2 or instead champion performance as 
the only means of discovering anything about Shakespeare's plays?3 Beneath these 
questions lies an even more disturbing problem: can literary critics actually create a space of 
authority that enables readers to interpret Shakespeare, or for that matter, any drama? The 
avoidance of such uncertainty may reflect an apprehension of arriving at a suitable 
resolution. 
These problems also provide a fertile ground for the work of heresy to blossom. 
Performance and its relation to Shakespeare studies make for a fascinating mutation of the 
heresy/orthodoxy debate. For in pitting the text against the performance, critics have not 
just a struggle over what interpretation will conquer, but also a contention over how to 
begin interpretation of Shakespeare. Is one mode of approach "right" and the other "wrong" 
when engaging Shakespeare's work? Should the text have priority over performance? The 
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answers have tremendous repercussions for the cause of heresy and the balance of power in 
Shakespeare studies. 
An initial question begins the discussion: must readers witness a perfect performance to 
interpret Shakespeare at the level of enactment?4 Such a notion embodies a fascinating set 
of assumptions concerning interpretation. First, there is the demand for "perfection," an 
injunction which confronts many difficulties inherent in live theater. What if the actors fail 
to deliver their lines in a convincing or comprehensible manner? What if budget does not 
allow for suitable costuming or scenery? Does a director's attempt to mo_demize the play for 
accessibility compromise its accuracy? Does the performance strive to re-create Elizabethan 
stage practices or pursue some other standard? All of these variables can and do reduce 
Shakespearean play-texts to something less than their desired, intended, or potential effect. 
This sort of imperfection does indeed stifle interpretation and may even thwart judging a 
play's effect upon a given audience. 
This call for perfection, however, seeks much more than the prevention of "bad" 
performances of Shakespeare's plays. The real issue involving the idea of perfection in 
performance concerns stability. 5 Some literary critics cannot conceive· of structuring an 
interpretation upon the volatile event of a live performance. No continuity would exist to 
test and validate such an interpretation even within the scope of two performances of the 
same run of a play. Too many possibilities for discrepancy would exist, putting any claims 
of meaning into jeopardy. The very business of interpretation requires this sort of stability; 
in order to test an interpretation, other critics must have access to the same work, in the 
same state, upon which conclusions depend. Certainly one of the quickest ways to discredit 
or undermine interpretation lies in claiming the critic possesses an "incorrect" or corrupted 
form of the work such as a bowdlerized text or even a forgery. It is not hard to imagine the 
objections that can arise out of an interpretation of a once-occurring live performance; 
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modem readers have no opportunity to respond and object since the work no longer remains 
available. The interpretation transmits no real meaning since the performance no longer 
exists to be watched and appreciated in light of that interpretation. Any interpretation 
collapses once the object under scrutiny no longer remains available for others to apprehend. 
But another subtle assumption operates under the idea of ever achieving a perfect 
performance. Since performance delivers an unstable, and therefore undesirable, space for 
interpretation, the critic must tum elsewhere to encounter Shakespeare's art. And where 
else can the critic tum but back to the text? Performance's seeming imperfection and 
inability to offer a ground for interpretation clear the way for the text to emerge triumphant 
in the battle for interpretive dominance. Somehow the text possesses a "perfection" the 
performance does not. Critics generally see the text as complete, stable, able to remain 
constant over the wars of meaning waged upon it. And even in the case of Shakespeare, 
someone who very often may not have even produced what readers might think of as a 
written play, they still see the text as accurate and reliable, able to divulge its meanings, 
intentions, signs, irony, and otherness with very little difficulty. While the opportunity to 
oversimplify exists here, debate does sometimes rage around variant texts and new 
constructions;6 for the most part many critics give scant thought to the validity of the text 
poured over to discover meaning and interpretation. 
And from where does the primacy of the text as the center for interpretation derive? I 
would argue that the novel creates this impulse. The novel demands a text for its existence. 
Poetry was sung and transmitted orally long before being published, and drama existed in 
performance. But the novel from its inception required a text, and as the novel rose in 
prominence within literature, so did the text as a place where meaning takes place. We have 
reached the point now in history where for the literary critic art means text. The critic 
usurps other art forms and textualizes them. And more insidious, the greater resemblance 
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that text bears to what critics conceive as novelistic, the greater attention that text gamers. 
The script of Shakespeare, an intermediate form meant to become something else 
(performance), has been novelized to make it worthy of interpretation. More and more 
Shakespeare's plays are read like novels, not dramas, with almost no thought to how they 
would exist in performance or how the words we encounter in the text might be delivered 
from the stage. Much criticism sets forth claims all but impossible to realize in 
performance, 7 therefore impossible to reconcile with the fact that Shakespeare wrote drama 
for the theater. But this does not matter; meaning exists in the text and one can employ the 
methods of novelistic interpretation to extract that meaning. 
The very act of textualizing creates an isolation that produces danger for any institution. 
Literary critics may seek to erase all connections of power and control over the text and 
posit authority with themselves. In other words, critics can continually create more space 
for an ever widening range of heresy.to occur. When thinking ofliterary criticism in this 
way, one may see the events of the last thirty years as almost inevitable. Lest the author 
exert any influence over her creation, she is dispensed with along with any notion of intent 
that might curb the interpreter's musings. But even the words of the text itself can prove too 
constricting, so some critics concentrate instead on the spaces, margins, and whiteness of 
the page. The impulse of heresy re-writes its object of inquiry so that anything might be 
uttered in the name of interpretation. 
In one sense, railing on about such things does no good. The reality of the situation 
nearly demands Shakespeare be textualized because the general population's access to 
performance remains so limited. It would be foolish to ban Shakespeare from every place 
but the theater. The plays in print at least offer an avenue for contact with the general public 
and scholars alike that might not happen otherwise. Such a reality creates a tremendous 
tension; critics cannot avoid what they see as their resonsibility to interpret a play as text 
75 
once that option becomes available. The problem arises when critics abandon all other ways 
of thinking about Shakespeare other than as text or pseudo-novel or an occasion to produce 
a new heresy and gain position in the critical debate. 
There remains one final thing to consider about the notion of a perfect performance. 
Perfect by whose standards? Certainly the literary critic must feel at least adequately 
equipped to determine such perfectio~ but what set of criteria does the critic use to judge 
performance? One could argue to return simply to the text. The performance for most 
critics does nothing but present a certain interpretation of the text to the audience. Its merit 
rests completely in this fact. And since no one interprets texts better than the literary critic, 
performance gets reduced to an acted-out, approximate interpretive discourse. To put it 
another way, for the most part textual critics interpret the performance's interpretation of the 
text according to their interpretation of that same text. The performance again is rendered 
obsolete. It is much easier to read an interpretation than to waste hours watching it 
performed. The performance never gains the space as an act-unto-itself to consider and 
interpret. Textual critics continually return to the text to ascertain all value about 
Shakespeare. So ultimately all ideas of perfection reside in the critic, the interpreter, and 
those ideas always originate from the text. 
Tremendous pressures also result from the idea of performance. For to allow a 
performance to exist authentically as performance, the critic must relinquish a certain 
amount of interpretive authority--unless of course, the critic wishes to direct, produce, and 
act every part. The performance remains a communal act of enactment. Therefore the critic 
must continually push performance back within the boundaries of the text. This decision 
manifests itself as a move on the part of the critic to label performances as "wrong" or 
inadequate when they fail to parallel a critic's interpretation of the text. Textual 
interpretation is about control: over meaning, over emphasis, and over importance. 
76 
Performance is about participation: a communal act of completing the play and creating 
meaning that is the property of the community involved. Power disperses in performance to 
the extent that any attempt at control proves fruitless. 
So the issue of a perfect performance ultimately revolves around interpretive control, 
which is about power, which leads to a recognition that performance assembles itself around 
community, not power, and must therefore be subdued by the literary critic or re-fashioned 
to bring performance under the critic's dominion; heresy in literary criticism cannot tolerate 
community or the dispersal of power away from the critic's autonomy over the text. Critics 
therefore seek to force the meaning of performance back into some interpretation of the text 
(although in other ways some critics attempt to accomplish control over performance). 
Looking at the way the text/performance battle rages and the limitations of these approaches 
can demonstrate how performance can escape the question of power and control and can 
instead focus on community. Such a move certainly places the critic in danger, but the 
results make those dangers worth hazarding. 
The shape of the text/performance dilemma takes several forms, but the major 
approaches to the problem may be described as follows: an insistence that the text and 
performance are mutually exclusive, with neither informing the other; an attempt to 
demonstrate how either text or performance can inform the other, with one holding primacy 
as a vehicle of interpretation; a move toward some kind of synthesis between the two that 
produces another sort of interpretive space. In the end, though, nearly all formulations 
return to the text or into a textualization of the performance to gain control and access to a 
certain type of interpretive act. 
Certainly the most obvious of these approaches simply claims the text to be central to 
any sort of interpretation of Shakespeare's plays. New Criticism provides the impulse for 
the supremacy of text, and as W.B. Worthen points out, "New Criticism necessarily 
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discredited stage performance--as well as criticism speaking 'in theatrical terms'--as extrinsic 
to a play's literary design" (443). Interestingly, even though Worthen recognizes the 
dimension of performance, he basically returns to New Critical conceptions, beginning his 
article on performance theory with a quote by G. Wilson Knight: 
The proper thing to do about a play's dramatic quality is to produce it, to act on 
it, to attend performances; but the penetration of its deeper meanings is a 
different matter, and such a study, though the commentator should certainly be 
dramatically aware, and even wary, will not itself speak in theatrical terms. (vi) 
Worthen writes nothing that would convince his readers that he does not agree completely 
with Knight. This article constructs an argument most textual critics adhere to; while paying 
homage to the performance and its possibilities, they immediately dismiss performance as a 
place where true interpretation can take place. At the end of his essay, Worthen argues that 
performance "is not an unconstrained means of realizing the text but a practice related to 
other modes of cultural transmission, signification, and interpretation" (450). In other 
words, performance remains too messy and includes too many variables ("other modes") to 
ever trust its meaning. The critic engaging the text free from cultural and group restraints 
provides real interpretation. And for all the recent discourse on cultural significance and 
context and restoring the text to its time, most critics still believe they engage the text in a 
manner others cannot, and therefore arrive at a form of "truth" about the text. The critic 
and his heresy always remain supreme no matter the approach or supposed ground-breaking 
theory employed. 
The textual critics find their greatest expression in Harry Berger's "Text Against 
Performance," an essay that nearly all performance theorists engage and attempt to 
discredit. Berger simply claims that Shakespeare himself demonstrates a "textual 
antitheatrical" propensity that argues "against the stage centered approach" (51). But 
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Berger's most telling statement occurs when he explains that the text "gives us a control 
over meaning which performance in the theatrical space and time denies us" (51). Berger 
offers an argument about control that appears absolutely necessary for interpretation and 
meaning to take place. The "us" in the passage refers to critics, and Berger seizes that 
control by privileging the text and demeaning performance as somehow chaotic and perhaps 
as a result even dangerous. But the danger only affects the critic who may lose authority 
over Shakespeare in the communal act of performance. Berger does consider performance 
again in his recent book Imaginary Audition, but places the theatrical experience in the mind 
of the reader and sees actual performance as too constraining to arrive at purposeful 
interpretation. 
The most forceful and direct refutation of Berger occurs in H.R. Coursen's recent 
Shakespearean Performance as Interpretation, in which he simply states that "A 
Shakespearean script exists only in performance. Period" (15). Coursen elaborates: "The 
script is not sitting there in its perfection. It is awaiting a new interpretation, one that may 
be assisted by the act ofreading but which must emerge in production" (43). Coursen 
touches on a key point in performance theory: somehow Shakespeare's texts lack fulfillment 
until they find their way to the stage. Performance for Coursen "completes" the play; by 
focusing only on the text, one focuses on a partial work of art, an act akin to interpreting a 
block of marble before the sculptor takes a chisel to it. J.L. Styan defines the text as "only a 
plan for drama, and is equivalent at best to the scenario of a film or the choreography of a 
ballet, never the film or dance itself' (92). By not bearing these factors in mind, critics read 
Shakespeare's texts, according to John Russell Brown, as "most peculiar novels" 
(Discovering 2). 
The limits of the text as interpretive ground are crucial to understanding performance 
theory and its resultant approach. 8 No performance theorist denies the text exists, only that 
79 
it functions as something other than the normal area for exploration by the critic. As Styan 
puts it, even though "a play text is written in words ... they are not the same sort of words 
we find in novels and newspapers. They are a code which waits to be projected and 
deciphered" (92). This deciphering unfolds in performance. Again commenting on the 
limits of the play text, Brown argues in Shakespeare's Plays in Performance that "there are 
many other elements in a drama that must be appreciated--those which are not so easily 
reached through the printed page--and the very words themselves can be fully known only if 
they are considered in their dramatic context" (10). Coursen believes the text must undergo 
an "extratextual" process because "it is precisely through such extratextuality that we learn 
what the script might be saying" (33). Performance offers that extratextual element the play. 
requires. 
Performance theorists understand that textual critics might posit the idea of enactment as 
nothing more than undefinable emotion: "the magic of theater" takes over and makes 
Shakespeare real to us. Thomas Cartelli understands Berger's argument against 
performance by locating the place the critic occupies in performance: "Berger commits 
himself to the study of Shakespearean play-texts from the vantage point of resistance, a 
position from which engagement must always seem suspect and self-mystifying, indeed, 
must always seem like submission to a spell" (10). The critic, says the performance theorist, 
cannot step outside the work in the way he can with a text. Playgoers must participate in 
the act of creation and that place within the work makes them uncomfortable when it comes 
to interpretation because such a location threatens stability. Barbara Hodgson notes that 
performance 
acknowledges, in its every aspect, its ephemeral nature. Such an 
acknowledgment is truer to history--both critical history and performance 
history--than attempting to create a text that will not be disturbed by time. For 
disturbance--one might also call it transformation--is just what Shakespeare's 
texts are all about. (65) 
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The critic must be present at this transformation to divine the true nature of Shakespeare's 
texts. No longer can critics occupy a seat of authority outside the work as they can do when 
encountering texts; they must instead move inside and participate which puts them in a very 
vulnerable position, open to being interpreted instead of interpreting. 
The importance of the position of the critic with respect to interpretation cannot be 
underestimated. Richard Levin understands perfectly the authority that derives from 
standing outside the text to determine meaning. He demonstrates how the textual critic 
believes "every major play presents an apparent or outer meaning, intended for those clods 
of ordinary intelligence in theaters, which is always wrong, and a real or inner meaning, 
intended for the wiser few in their libraries, which always seems to correspond to his own 
beliefs" (547). But even though difficulties exist, Levin still privileges the text because in 
performance theory no suitable means can be found to "determine which performance .... 
[I]t would have to mean any performance" (548). Such instability would lead to interpretive 
chaos and too much subjectivity as critics view different performances of differing quality. 
Heretical textual critics simply cannot come to terms with the inside nature of performance 
theory. Interpretation has always been in many respects an outside activity, albeit a rather 
exclusive club of outsiders. As Levin makes clear, certain critics formulate that there are 
those who can stand outside in order to see· inside a text, and there are those who cannot 
("clods of ordinary intelligence"). Stepping outside to gaze inside denotes a reach for power 
over the text. The heretic cannot stand inside the work and at the same time encompass and 
control it. 
Demanding that the critic move in regards to Shakespeare, however, constitutes a power 
move of its own, a heretical strategy about position more than interpretation. By telling 
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textual critics they have been occupying the wrong space, performance theorists seize 
control of the discourse surrounding Shakespeare. Textual critics can write all they want; 
their conclusions emanate from the incorrect seat of authority, a claim which has profound 
consequences. A great body of criticism has at the least been declared irrelevant, if not 
totally wrong. The heretical performance theorist has cleared an enormous space of 
authority from which to speak, not having to confront or overcome the accumulation of 
hundreds of years of competing voices of power. This shift in the location of the discourse 
proves a brilliant move of usurpation. Heretical performance theorists claim they do so for 
the good of Shakespeare, to correct "incorrect" interpretation damaging to a true 
understanding of Shakespeare's art and accomplishments, but the fact still remains that a 
new position of control over Shakespeare, a new heretical voice has been established, or is 
trying to establish itself 
This trend might not disturb critics; indeed it might even prove a refreshing way to 
change the nature of interpretation, if performance theory as applied by heretical critics did 
actually move within the play and participate in its creation. But the truth of the situation 
appears to be something quite different. Performance theorists simply find ways to stand 
outside while claiming to be inside the performance. This outcome, the textualizing of the 
performance, allows the heretic to again apply the normal tools of interpretation and control. 
What starts out as an impulse towards community quickly reformulates itself as a heretical 
expression. And not only does this heresy declares its interpretation the correct one, but it 
takes the original tactic of suggesting the means of all prior interpretation needs correction. 
Heretical performance theorists must immediately find a way of consolidating the 
tremendous power this move establishes; they will not disperse that power, so instead they 
return to the only mode of control they know, the text. 
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This textualizing of the performance occurs at many levels, but the most common 
method consists of focusing interpretation on film and television versions of Shakespeare's 
plays. Coursen asserts that such an approach provides the stability needed for 
interpretation. He heralds the VHS cassette as the great tool of performance theory since 
the critic can rewind and re-watch the performance. But what does this have to do with 
enactment and participation? This seems to run totally counter to Coursen's objection that 
"the reader does not engage in the communal act of theater nor does he or she participate in 
and contribute to the continuum of energy that is created by performance" (18). The 
cassette becomes a book (text) to read and re-read under conditions the critic manipulates 
completely. How can any continuum or true performance occur if the critic stops, rewinds, 
and replays portions of the play? The critic in no way enters into that communal act. 
Fragmentation results in just the same way a close-reading isolates certain passages to 
interpret. The play has become textualized, encompassed, and remains under the complete 
dominance of the heretical critic to extract meaning as desired. Heretical moves in literary 
criticism always accumulate power; they never relinquish it. Performance must undergo 
containment so the critic can use it to maintain leverage in the institution. 
Even when the critic attends a live performance of Shakespeare, a certain outsideness 
remains to insure control over meaning. Blasting Miscall Kahn's 1989 production of Twelfth 
Night at the Folger--set in India--Coursen decrees, "I do not believe, though, that 
Washington is ready for much more than the basic sappiness of Kahn's conception and 
rendition" (30). Notably Coursen creates a significant distance between himself and the 
audience. He assumes the audience could not interpret the play because of their low level of 
expertise, an expertise Coursen of course possesses. He stands clearly outside the 
performance textualizing both the play as it is enacted and the audience, himself excluded. 
Again no participation takes place. Coursen complains throughout his book of audiences 
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who give standing ovations to inferior productions and directors who utterly fail, such as the 
"god-awful Bognadov version" of Taming of the Shrew (28). In no way trusting the 
audience to interpret with him, Coursen stands outside all performance to judge it rightly. 
Perhaps most telling, he points to the existence of "fallacy" and "possibility" when it comes 
to interpretation in performance (32). But from where could Coursen determine such things 
except from the play text or the textualizing of a performance? He will allow no communal 
meaning to develop.9 
Another approach to performance consists of reconstructing the event of performance 
itself for interpretation. Cartelli's believes "the playtext . . . asks us to reconstruct the 
dynamics of audience engagement from the point. of view of the audience itself" ( 11). This 
can take several forms. First, the critic can reconstruct a hypothetical audience, a sort of 
average audience, and determine how that audience might engage a play. Second, and more 
common in recent studies, the critic can reconstruct an actual audience, most often an 
Elizabethan one, and interpret that audience's reactions and engagement especially in terms 
of social influence upon the culture. This approach occurs most often in New Historicism, 
with the emphasis often being more on the audience instead of the play itself Indeed, it 
often seems irrelevant which play the critic examines~ the audience will always react in a 
clearly predictable way, usually a politically subversive one. 10 While both approaches yield 
often interesting criticism, in the end the central issues discussed here rarely come into play. 
If critics posit a hypothetical audience, no real engagement takes place, and if they 
reconstruct an audience, the power again resides in the hands of the critic who interprets, 
from the outside, the reactions and meanings that derive from a performance. Critics draw 
no nearer to that illusive idea of participation and enactment. 
So performance theory and Shakespeare would appear to reach an impasse. On the one 
hand, the heretical strategy of some textual critics dismiss or ignore the component of 
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performance; on the other, heretical performance theorists demand performance emerge as 
the central event in interpreting Shakespeare's drama. The impasse arises when these same 
performance theorists textualize performance and therefore revert back to employing the 
same language, techniques, and control as the textual critics. Performance theory has 
identified a very serious need, for participation in enactment, but it has yet to discover a 
workable solution. The dictates of heresy overcome the impulse to create a space for 
performance to occur. The heretical critic wrestles control of the play back for the benefits 
of power in the crticism. 
A possible way out of this situation does exist, however, and a play by Shakespeare may 
contain part of the solution. But before looking at it, critics must be willing to leave textual 
criticism behind. Critics must allow for what they do, but they cannot pretend it has 
anything to do with Shakespeare's plays as drama. Instead they should concede that textual 
critics investigate a set of texts called, for want of a better term, Plays, that exist apart from 
the Play Scripts Shakespeare wrote for performance on the stage. Such a concession would 
allow textual critics to continue their interpretation without muddling the issue of 
performance, and it would also allow performance theorists to quit feeling the impulse to 
seize control of the discourse and therefore performance itself Both camps must escape the 
impulse to textualize every form of art in order to impose interpretative control upon it. 
This textualization becomes an easily controllable medium to exert heresy under the guise of 
restoring Shakespeare to performance. 
The intent here is not to make another heretical move around the normal means of 
interpretation to seize power once again. Rather it is to clear a neutral ground of 
community that might allow both the critic and enthusiast of Shakespeare to sit together in a 
new forum of interpretation and meaning. Rather than rendering the present discourse on 
Shakespeare somehow "wrong" or obsolete, I wish to declare Shakespeare as something 
85 
more than textual, and therefore in need of another mode of apprehension, a mode apart 
from the usual work of the critic, a mode that in no way seeks control over meaning or 
arrives at an autonomous interpretation. Do Shakespeare's plays offer a new alternative of 
thinking about literatur~, criticism, and the institution's relationship to it? I believe they do. 
And with the play as the subject, some first, tentative steps away from the trend of heresy 
can begin. 
Approaching performance requires foremost the constant idea of community. A 
performance means nothing without an audience, and an audience does not gather to stare at 
a vacant stage. But community means more than a simple assembly; a degree of 
participation on all parts of the community must take place in order for the performance to 
succeed. Meaning can never be invested in only one area of the performance. If a director 
refuses to share a common vision for the play, the performance will falter. If an actor does 
not participate in the interplay of characters, the sense of the play will vanish. If the 
audience never gains· access and therefore fails to respond, no meaning can take place. Such 
performance remains a far cry from the isolated act of textual interpretation of performance. 
Peter Brook states that in performance "what matters is for us [ actors and audience] to have 
a living contact with one another. If this contact isn't there, then everything we can possibly 
say about the theater in theory just falls to pieces" (I). 
How can this "living contact" in performance find definition? One possibility involves 
considering the Greek idea of community, or fellowship, as a way of modeling community in 
performance. The most common Greek word for true fellowship, koinonia, derives from 
two words, koinonos, a sharer, and koinos, shared by all. 11 Koinonia itself means 
partnership, or even more literally, participation. This participation and sharing can exist on 
any superficial level, but koinonia describes the most intimate and complete type of 
community possible. John uses it to define a Christian's relationship with God and the 
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community of the church (I John 1. 6-7) and also warns that those who do not enter 
completely into the truth of Christianity delude themselves into thinking they possess 
koinonia (I John 1.6). This fellowship not only defines the relationship of community, but it 
also creates the space within which meaning and truth take place for the member. All are 
partakers and sharers, and without koinonia not only fellowship, but meaning and truth, 
cease to exist. 
The idea of koinonia insists that all the members of the community must participate for 
meaning to occur. Those who stand outside of this fellowship also find themselves cut off 
from the true meaning of the community's activities, an idea which fits nicely into the 
context of performance. The entire participation of those present creates the meaning of any 
performance. Any interpretation that goes on happens in the moments of any particular 
enactment. Once the performance finishes, once koinonia is broken, any further grasping 
for meaning becomes futile. The members of the community may ponder the significance of 
the event for themselves as individuals, but they can in no way make any claims of meaning 
apart from the full participation of the community that made the performance possible. The 
act and the interpretation of that act take place simultaneously as the community both 
creates and comments upon that creation in performance. 
Skepticism toward such an approach results from seeing all literature as the property of 
individuals to take and shape in whatever way desired, especially now that post-structural 
critics have dispensed with the author and intention. The usual means of forging meaning 
from the text concerns autonomous power, especially in regard to heresy in literary 
criticism. The suggestion here is simple: meaning in performance means sharing and 
participating in a community. That meaning becomes the property of all of the community 
and vanishes once fellowship ceases at the end of a performance. Heretical critics cannot 
control and dictate communal meaning to gain power over the performance. Such 
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fellowship requires trusting not only the performers but those viewing the performance. 
Even more important it means sharing the act of interpretation and meaning with all those in 
the community because these ideas can occupy a space not defined in terms of power or 
authority. 
The question of power in literary interpretation strikes at the heart of both heresy and 
the alternative of community. Does the assertion of power in interpretation form the only 
basis from which to engage literature? Heresy in criticism works from that assumption and 
would have the entire institution believe the same. But as Booth has demonstrated in his 
work on plurality, and as this study has illustrated, the move for power in interpretation 
through the banishment of other voices undermines the entire critical enterprise. Booth 
argues that "wherever understanding is maimed, our life is threatened; wherever it is 
achieved, our life is enhanced" (349). The strategy in heresy to deem opponents as 
"dogmatic" or "orthodox" in a crippling sense maims criticism by diminishing the open 
inspection of all types of interpretation. 
But even more than that, heresy and community lead to questions about the very 
metaphysics of existence. Does individual autonomy and power outweigh all considerations 
and define the basis of what it means to be human? If it does, then the strategy of heresy 
makes perfect sense as a position within literary criticism. But can koinonia better define 
both the critical and the human enterprise? Mary F. Rousseaus writes that "The ultimate 
roots of questions about community, then, are metaphysical--the perennial problem of the 
one and the many" (3). How those questions are answered determines the methods and 
strategies employed by critics in literary interpretation. 
Performance leads to the heart of these questions by positing an intepretive setting 
where participation becomes crucial to any sense of meaning. The picture of the meditative 
critic alone with a text determining meaning becomes untenable in a performance situation. 
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Therefore performance offers a unique opportunity to test the ideas of community as a 
model for other areas of textual criticism. The question of the one or the many has already 
been answered in performance; the gathering of the many makes community a neccessity in 
rendering meaning. 
To return then to the question posed at the outset of this chapter, should we read 
Shakespeare? Does encountering Shakespeare so frequently in texts diminish the ability to 
form community when viewing a performance? Do those who textualize Shakespeare form 
an interpretation that they then impose on the performance and the audience and therefore 
stifle koinonia? If critics bring no preconceptions to the performance might they trust those 
performing a bit more? Might they be willing to listen to the reactions of other members of 
the audience during the performance while also offering up their own? Might they more 
quickly abandon themselves to the spirit of the play rather than standing outside to make 
sure everyone gets the performance "right"? Does reading Shakespeare in the end destroy 
Shakespeare? 
At the very least it would seem critics should read Shakespeare in a new way if they ever 
hope to recover the performance aspect of his art. What form that reading takes should be 
the real task of the performance theorists. Shakespeare criticism should also invest in what 
forms the basis for koinonia in the performance setting .. How can critics better foster this 
sense of fellowship so that true performance can take place with regularity in Shakespearean 
productions?12 The actors and directors and scenery makers are more than adequate; the real 
problem lies in critical attitudes toward performance and the hesitancy to participate in it. 
To discover another dimension of Shakespeare heretical critics must relinquish their desire 
to control and market what they uncover in performance, a relinquishing made difficult 
because it conflicts with the interests of heresy in literary criticism, interests constantly 
striving for new heretical expressions devoid of community interest. 
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No debate whether Shakespeare considers or ponders the best and most effective way of 
engaging and communicating to his audience is necessary here; the basic economic demands 
of delivering a product audiences will pay to see make Shakespeare's interests in that area 
clear. Shakespeare appears to have a clear sense of his audience, but to what extent does 
that sense include the idea of koinonia? At least a glimpse of Shakespeare's philosophy 
emerges in Act 5 of A Midsummer Night's Dream. The play within the play that concludes 
the wedding celebration challenges Shakespeare's audience and their attitude toward 
performance. 
The members of the wedding party appear ready to enter into the community of 
performance at the beginning of the play, when Theseus dismisses the objections ofEgeus 
that the play will be too crude for their liking: 
I will hear this play; 
For never anything can be amiss 
When simpleness and duty tender it. (5.1.81-3)13 
Theseus imparts perfectly here the idea that as long as the performers honestly engage the 
play and they as the audience share in their effort, meaning will ensue from the community. 
However, what ensues is not community, but the reshi:fting of the Athenians to a position 
outside the play, a position from which they can interpret the play. After Quince's Prologue, 
everyone comments on the defects of his delivery, including Lysander, "He hath rid his 
prologue like a rough colt: he knows not the stop" (5.1.119-20). Continually throughout 
the play, the audience (wedding party) continually punches through the performance to 
demonstrate its imperfection and unreality, as when all continue to remark on Snout's role as 
the wall. While Snout knows perfectly well he at no time becomes a wall, he acts in good 
faith to create a performance out of which meaning might take place. However, the 
audience refuses to enter into fellowship with the actors to create meaning in the 
performance. Theseus and the others remain outside the performance as critics, never 
permitting completion of the performance to occur. It is their shortcomings, not those of 
Quince and his players, that doom the performance to failure in terms of a communal 
expenence. 
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Shakespeare further delineates the crucial roles of all participants, audience and players 
alike, in performance by stressing the innocence of the players who act the drama. As to the 
matter of having a lion in the play, Bottom warns 
you must name his name, and half his face must be seen through the lion's neck, 
and he himself must speak through, saying thus or to the same defect: "ladies," or 
"fair ladies, I would wish you" or "I would request you" or "I would entreat you 
not to fear, not to tremble. My life for yours. If you think I come hither as a 
lion, it were pity of my life. No, I am no such thing. I am a man, as other men 
are" --and there, indeed, let him name his name, and tell them plainly his is Snug 
the joiner. (3.1.33-42) 
Bottom has faith that whatever the play says signifies to the audience, even to the point of 
causing panic because a lion roams the stage. Thus, adding some loam to Snout makes 
him a wall. Bottom and the players fail to recognize that the audience must also accept 
these conventions in order for the performance to be enacted. 
These ideas in many ways mirror the shortcomings of New Criticism after the 
Scholar/Critic debates. New Critics, like Bottom, believe literature contains some fixed 
meaning that reveals itself without the help or acknowledgement of the reader or audience. 
That world within the piece of literature contains truth that remains self-evident throughout 
all time. Yet this belief leads to a clever type of heresy that then announces that the critic 
will diwlge the truth inherent in literature, just as Snout announces "I am a wall." Such 
perceptions stifle community by withholding the work from the audience and dispensing its 
"meaning" through the narrow voice of the critic or the passive acceptance of what the 
actors tell the audience. No participation ever takes place. 
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Shakespeare does a remarkable job in A Midsummer Night's Dream of demonstrating 
how meaning and power can be withheld in performance by the audience as well. After all, 
should the Duke and his party enter into fellowship, they would have to bestow power onto 
the players to create meaning in the same way they can. Performance always levels power 
relationships, and Shakespeare deftly has the working class act in this play to highlight the 
difficulty some have of sharing power in performance. The Duke cannot do it; although he 
extols the virtues of simple honesty in performance, he still refuses to uphold his end and 
participate in the meaning of the play; to do so would mean creating a sense of equality he 
appears unwilling to foster. 
The attitude of Theseus actually serves as an ironic commentary on literary criticism 
today. In the effort to find innovation, the heretical critic always works to stand outside the 
text in order to contain it and its meaning. Any sharing of that interpretive power, even with 
the text itself, threatens to diminish the critic's power over the discourse. The critic must 
strive to focus all attention on the act of interpretation, sometimes destroying or 
marginalizing the text or performance itself to insure the success of the heretical statement. 
However, even as he stands outside the performance community, Theseus makes two of 
the most telling remarks about koinonia found anywhere in Shakespeare. After Hippolyta 
complains that "This is the Silliest stuff that ever I heard," Theseus replies, "The best in this 
kind are but shadows, and the worst are no worse if imagination amend them" (5.1.209-11). 
Then continuing in the same vein, Theseus comments, "Ifwe imagine no worse of them than 
they of themselves, they may pass for excellent men" (5.1. 214-15). Certainly, says Theseus, 
performance means nothing but illusion, but if the audience will participate through 
imagination they can invest reality in that communal act. The shadows have life as long as 
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the community will sustain and empower them. In one sense, Theseus declares a 
performance only as good as the audience that watches and completes it with the players; 
the performance becomes as great as all parties allow it to be. And no matter how great the 
performers, no performance will succeed in the end if the audience withholds its 
participation. That seems to be the message of Robin in the Epilogue: 
If we shadows have offended, 
Think but this and all is mended: 
That you have but slumbered here, 
While these visions did appear; 
And this weak and idle theme, 
No more yielding but a dream, 
Gentles, do not reprehend. ( 5 .2.1-7) 
If viewers do not like what they have seen, says Robin, they may simply refuse to impart 
meaning to the performance through sharing; all will then be but a dream. The second 
koinonia fades, the audience awakens from the illusion and punctures the reality they helped 
to create in the performance. Theseus and his party puncture that community from the 
outset while Shakespeare advises the audience that they have the choice to invest the 
performance with meaning or stand outside and merely view a spectacle to criticize and 
interpret. Either way the play gets acted; it merely becomes a question of whether true 
performance occurs within the community participating in it. Again the issue of whether 
power or shared meaning dominates the critical enterprise arises. In the context of 
performance the only sensible answer has to be that the idea of koinonia must prevail for 
any real meaning to take place. 
Critics will not suddenly leave Shakespeare's texts to the actors and directors; too much 
power remains at stake to be so naive. But perhaps the sense of koinonia clears a space for 
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performance not to be controlled by heretical textual and performance critics alike. If 
critics can somehow share Shakespeare with the audience and the performers, they might 
discover more about the plays than all commentary and interpretation have labored to 
uncover for so many years. But such a community requires a trust and participation that 
must be cultivated. Perhaps some sector of literary criticism will take it upon itself to lead 
others into such fellowship. Perhaps such should be the goal of criticism as it touches upon 
Shakespeare. 
The concept of koinonia can extend much further than merely performance of 
Shakespeare. The idea of community can form the basis of an approach to literary criticism 
that delivers critics from the morass of heresy. By applying the idea of community to the 
study of literature in order to accomplish the goals of the institution and arrive at meaning in 
any literary setting (the classroom, a text, a performance, a journal article), critics can 
devalue the merits of innovation for its own sake as a means of consolidating power in 
criticism. The emphasis moves away from what critics can say for the sake of uttering 
something heretical, to what they should say to further the success and well-being of the 
community. 
Critics must participate with literature in order for the community to thrive. They must 
listen to the text and allow it to enter into the act of interpretation. They must participate 
with other critics and even others outside the institution to better understand what they are 
about. This type of participation will produce a plurality of voices as defined by Booth 
because community means respecting vitality, justice, and understanding through mutual 
sharing and participation. Heretical critics must check impulses which do not have the 
interests of the community or the vitality of the text and its interpretation in mind. Dissent 
should be a vital component of the process, but it should be dissent that genuinely has the 
goal of reforming the community when it has strayed from fostering the understanding of 
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literature or the purposes of the field. Systematically destroying works and interpretations 
because such a heretical stance accumulates power in criticism does nothing to further the 
community or the study ofliterature. Likewise, divorcing interpretation from the text in 
order to write something innovative in no way adds to the advancement of understanding as 
it does not give justice to what the text has to say. 
The suggestion here is that a large body of criticism in literary studies refuses, like 
Theseus and the wedding party, to allow community and enactment to occur for the sake of 
maintaining power. This study will continue to demonstrate that such voices use heresy to 
thwart community and the presence of the text to insure their own control over literary 
discourse. True koinonia always leads to a sharing of meaning and an emphasis on equality. 
Heresy in literary criticism tries to get outside community to encompass and dominate all 
interpretation and meaning. 
Theseus never experiences a performance of the play offered by Bottom and his fellow 
actors; he never enters into koinonia or allows for the possibility of true enactment by the 
community. Like heretical literary criticism, he instead creates an interpretation divorced 
from the performance that he can control and preside over. Not what happens, but what 
Theseus says is happening becomes the focus of the action. This stance has enormous 
advantages in terms of power within the group formed by the wedding party and players, but 
Theseus loses the possibility of a sharing of meaning and interpretation that can energize the 
community to move in new directions and produce collectively what Theseus could never 
attain with his autonomous grasp on what the play means. Only Theseus, not the 
community, benefits from his position. Eventually he will only be talking to himself 
Purposely absent here is a precise indication of the specific direction in which the 
community ofliterary· studies should move or what goals it should pursue. That task 
remains for the institution as a whole. Instead, the following chapters will examine how 
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heresy infiltrates certain critical theories and how that heresy removes itself from the texts it 
claims to study and the community as a whole. Following these examinations are 
suggestions, illustrated though analyses of specific texts, of how a particular theory might be 
used for the good of the community no matter which path it might choose. Criticism must 
choose a communal direction or critics will all be talking to themselves, much to the 
annoyance of everyone else. 
Chapter4 
New Historicism: 
The Heresy of Relevance 
In 1054, when Rome finally decided it must force a schism with the Eastern church, 
the main point of contention involved the theological concept of filoque, the assertion that 
the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Son and the Father in an act of full godhead by 
Christ (Johnson 180). Rome had only included the term in its mass since 1014, and that at 
the urging ofHenry II, but the pope's court convinced itselffiloque involved one of the 
foundational utterances of the church and derived from "immemorial antiquity" (Johnson 
180). When the papal legates met with representatives from the East, they accused the 
East of purposefully omitting the "filoque from their creed centuries before" in an act of 
subversion against the Rorrian church (Johnson 180). The final schism had occurred. 
This dispute aboutfiloque displays New Historicism in action. 1 Or perhaps it 
should be called Proto-New Historicism. The papal legates, while convincing themselves 
of a long historical progression of subversion by the East, arrived at a radically different 
conclusion about it than present-day New Historicists. Rome saw such subversion as a 
threat to its security and therefore moved to suppress it; today's New Historians champion 
subversion and locate it everywhere in Renaissance texts, from Shakespeare to records of 
New World colonialism.2 This subversion in texts shapes and re-shapes the culture and 
society where such literature finds itself Literature does not merely reflect reality; texts 
create and transform reality. 
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The controversy involving.fi/oque also demonstrates a favorite methodology of the 
New Historicist: The Opening Anecdote. 3 Frank Romany complains that New Historicism 
does nothing but rely on "telling anecdotes" (272), and David Bevington calls the 
"eccentric anecdote" one of the distinguishing characteristics of New Historical rhetoric 
(74). These anecdotes generally derive from some obscure event or text from the 
Renaissance and become the structure and point of the argument that follows. The 
Opening Anecdote seeks to provide a bridge between the literature under study and the 
cultural subversion it supposedly ignites. A better name for the anecdote might be The 
Totalizing Metaphor. The Totalizing Metaphor constructs a world in which literature 
continually undermines the oppressive elements of society and offers instead a subversive 
voice of openness and liberality, a breaking down of barriers into the fresh light of 
plurality. 
The major problem with New Historicism and The Totalizing Metaphor concerns 
the hollowness of its construction. In the end, the New Historicist weds text and historical 
context with a clever anecdote which intends to convince readers of their unbreakable 
union and interplay. Jean E. Howard rightly points out that "such a procedure seldom 
stops to question why a particular historical context has been selected to align with the 
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literary text, as if such choices were not often arbitrary in the extreme and [ a hindrance] to 
seeing the full intertextual network in which a literary work exists" (24). The Totalizing 
Metaphor seeks to convince by the sheer force of its originality, rather than by the actual 
and demonstrable connection between a particular text and a specific historical moment. 
As Frank Romany warns, "works of art and the world are not really equivalent or 
homologous with one another. It is essential, therefore, to be as attentive to as possible to 
the specifics of both ifwe are to avoid a historicism that is wayward, eccentric, and 
unhistorical" (287). 
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Stephen Greenblatt, in Shakespearean Negotiations, purposes to reveal the 
movement of "social energy" in Renaissance texts. He begins his essay "Invisible Bullets" 
with an anecdote about Marlowe's alleged atheism and its connection with Thomas Hariot, 
the Renaissance scientist, often accused of atheism but with very little proof These events 
turn themselves into an anecdote concerning the presence of doubt and disbelief in the 
Renaissance. Greenblatt provides an account ofHariot's writings on the New World, in 
particular the Algonquins, and their potential connection to Shakespeare's history plays, 
most notably Henry V He supplies this connection by claiming "Hariot's description of 
Algonquian society implies a description of comparable mechanisms in his own culture" 
(27). Greenblatt then makes a most telling statement: 
There is a perversely attractive, if bleak, clarity in ... deciding that 
subversive doubt was totally produced and totally contained by the ruling 
elite--but the actual evidence is tenebrous. We simply do not know what 
was thought in silence, what was written and then carefully burned, what 
was whispered by Hariot to Ralegh. (35) 
Even though Greenblatt concedes the unknowns of the historical particulars, he does not 
let this lack of evidence bother him. The fact that a text may harbor subversive 
undercurrents remains enough for him; the possibility that Hariot might be undermining the 
dominant ideology of the day should be enough to enable critics to take the gigantic leap 
(by using that Totalizing Metaphor at the start of the essay) that somehow in turn 
Shakespeare's writing perhaps turns Elizabethan society in new directions, although 
Greenblatt admits "it is not at all clear that Henry V can be successfully performed as 
subversive" (63) [italics mine]. Stanley Fish, in his essay about New Historicism and 
Milton studies, calls such conclusions historical "non-work," that somehow New 
Historians feel the connection between history and texts is a "relevance [that] need not be 
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demonstrated; it is merely assumed and because it is assumed one need not establish it by 
going through the steps that practitioners of other kinds of criticism consider obligatory" 
(''Milton's" 261). 
Heretical New Historicists assert perhaps the oddest of all heresies. It is an impulse 
which abandons all in the name of political relevance. As Howard Felperin notes, New 
Historicism begins "with the signified it desires rather than the signified it encounters. It 
knows in advance the meaning it seeks from the text, which it either approves for 
delivering or, more often nowadays in the cause of canonical texts, rebukes for failure to 
deliver" (ix). Felperin, of course, has his own heresy to defend, but his statement strikes at 
the fundamental outlook of heretical New Historians--they want beyond all else to prove 
literature influences and molds the outlook and decisions of the society that produces it. 
Too often though this desire proves too difficult to trace, so instead the heretical New 
Historian resorts to a favorite strategy: literature-as-subversion. The text may not actually 
participate in the political choices of a society, but why should it? Society operates under 
the heavy hand of domination, and literature seeks to destroy and wrestle that authority 
into a freedom of plurality. As a heretical strategy, New Historicism attacks not only the 
orthodoxy within literary criticism, but any orthodoxy that chokes any facet of society. 
This tactic yields much greater results. All the critic must do is hint at the potentially 
subversive nature of the text, a subversion generally contained by either the state or the 
author, to win the case. Heretical New Historicism is all about what might happen rather 
than what actually happens in the Renaissance. Or as Alan Liu puts it, New Historicists 
love the Renaissance because "the interpreter can fantasize about subverting dominance 
while dreaming away the total commitments of contestation" (751 ). The Totalizing 
Metaphor creates a tidy structure that makes literary texts appear enormously influential 
over society and its political negotiations. 
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Like all literary heresies, heretical New Historicism claims to save criticism from 
some stifling orthodoxy, in this case all types of formalism. Jonathan Dollimore, a leading 
proponent of cultural materialism, the British counterpart to New Historicism, sees his 
methodology as a personal journey to freedom. 4 He tells the reader that "as I became 
more familiar with literary criticism of this drama [Renaissance], I realized that much of it 
tended to normalise, moralise, and suppress exactly whatever it was I found attractive" 
(Radical xi). Jean Howard agrees, complaining that "a purely formalist pedagogy should 
be debilitating for those who teach any literature, not just that of the Renaissance" (15). 
Dollimore contends that his work "presumes to challenge a politically conservative way of 
doing criticism" (Radical xiii). 5 Formalism offends heretical New Historicism for obvious 
reasons; formalist thought always tries to wrench the text from its historical context and 
create a set of conclusions that exist for all time and all readers. Such an interpretative 
strategy looks within the text for answers without reaching outside the text to gauge the 
impact the world around might have on a work. 
Heretical New Historicists attempt to carve away the foundation that upholds 
formalist conclusions, what Dollimore calls ''essentialist humanism" (Radical xxxii). The 
only way to ascribe transcendent properties to a text is to construe a reader with a 
transhistorical essence to apprehend them. Arguing for New Historicism, Louis Montrose 
believes the theory is "new in resisting a prevalent tendency to posit and privilege a united 
and autonomous individual--whether an Author or a Work--to be set against a social or 
literary background" (6). The individual has no essence, and therefore the true object of 
study should entail what societal forces create the behavior of individuals in any given time 
period. Heretical New Historicists argue that literature plays a large role in that creative 
process. Dollimore goes so far as to see essentialist approaches to literature as sinister: 
"the entire counterfeit of transcendence and of the hereafter has grown up on the basis of 
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an impoverished life" (Radical 250), and "Essentialist theories of human nature, though 
not intrinsically racist, have contributed powerfully to the ideological conditions which 
made racism possible" (Radical 256). 6 Dollimore and other Heretical New Historicists 
brush aside the question of essence in humanity as easily as Greenblatt forms his metaphors 
on the relation between literature and society. 
Such outcomes should come as no surprise. The drive for heresy makes all other 
considerations secondary. Therefore, the demand for historical inquiry on the one hand 
and a somewhat theoretical laziness on the other, reflects a constant problem in literary 
studies; "'English' has always had to be on the defensive against charges of'unseriousness,' · 
but has also been anxious and embarrassed by any connection it might have with 
philosophy or 'high theory"' (Smith 2.70). Dollimore wants to banish "essentialist 
humanism," while at the same time tell readers that the heretical New Historicists uniting 
of history and literature overflows with relevance. Relevance becomes the great creed of 
the heretical New Historicist, and the more relevance the better. From it comes the wish 
of the New Historicists to obliterate the unique essence of the individual because in doing 
so the critic can then think of society in terms of a mass, responding univocally to the 
forces of culture shaping it. Individuals become nothing more than a representation of the 
societal whole, reacting and functioning in the same manner as any other randomly chosen 
person. 7 This mode of interpretation allows the New Historian to generalize on a grand 
scale, to assert that any hint of subversion found in a text subverts all of society equally. 8 
Because people merely become what the culture dictates, the critic uses The Totalizing 
Metaphor as a means of describing the entire society. Liu sees this as the "searching for 
the subject, any subject able to tell us what it is ... that connects the plural to the 
dominant, historical context to literary text, and so creates a single movement of culture, a 
single motivated artifact" (732). The idea of a "single moment of culture" permits the 
heretical New Historian to defend his work as encircling the entire society he peers at 
through the lens of his metaphorical unification. 
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New Historicism's pursuit of relevance has as much to do with the current state of 
literary criticism as it does with comprehending the Renaissance. New Historicism "is 
motivated not by curiosity about literature and history in the past so much as deep 
embarrassment about the marginality ofliterary history now" (Liu 722). The project of 
heretical New Historicism involves convincing literary criticism of the impact of literature 
upon the forces of change in history, but it also works hard to persuade itself that the task 
of the critic carries importance as welL The subtext of heretical New Historicist rhetoric 
tells the reader of the momentous implications of the literary historian. The heresy of 
New Historicism is not only correct; it is important to the present culture. 
Many heretical New Historicists appear to feel disenfranchised in the larger circle 
of academics and society at large. Much of their discourse revolves around a longing to 
possess more power in shaping political and cultural thought, much in the same way they 
posit such opportunities in the Renaissance. Howard ''imagines ... literature participates 
in historical processes and in the political management of reality" (25). He almost appears 
to say this out loud to himself on the page as a source of comfort in the interpretative 
enterprise. Even more to the point, Montrose acknowledges, "Many of those who profess 
the humanities see themselves and their calling as threatened by marginalization within a 
system of higher education increasingly geared to the provision of highly specialized 
technological and pre-professional training" (11). Montrose continues this lament to the 
final moments of his essay: "I do not believe that it compromises the intellectual 
seriousness of this concern [New History] to see it as impelled by a questioning of our very 
capacity for action--by a nagging sense of professional, institutional, and political 
impotence" (11-12). Unable to garner the power they long for in the present, heretical 
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New Historicists instead look to the past as a place where literature accomplishes 
everything they cannot. Greenblatt's mournful quoting of Kafka at the end of an essay, 
"There is subversion, no end of subversion, only not for us" ("Invisible Bullets" 65) could 
easily serve as the slogan of heretical New Historicism. Liu rightly concludes that New 
Historicism recognizes that "postmodern intellect is a failed political 'power"' (747). 
The heretics of New Historicism, faced with such a situation, understandably reach 
for power outside the institution as well as within it, .and they brand any type of 
interpretation as hopelessly orthodox which does not seek the same influence. Again they 
exhibit a repulsion to New Criticism because it lets the text retain an intrinsic value. 
Critics like Dollimore seek interpretations that give "not a vision ofpolitical freedom so 
much as a subversive knowledge of political domination, a knowledge which interrogated 
prevailing beliefs, submitted them to a kind of intellectual vandalism; radical in the sense of 
going to their roots or even pulling them up" (Radical xxi). Greenblatt asserts that 
"everything represented on the stage was at least potentially dangerous and hence could be 
scrutinized and censored" (19). Notice the dynamic literary world both men create; 
subversion and radicalism lurk behind every page and near every text. Such is the 
subversive role heretical New Historicists wish for themselves in their culture, and they 
accomplish it to a certain degree by uncovering the layers of domination in Renaissance 
society and the literary texts that undermine such efforts. New Historicism becomes "an 
elegant form of social protest" (Bevington 73-74) for the critic who feels otherwise 
powerless working in the institution. The heretical critic embraces a subversion 
methodology because the New Historicists believe they too must sabotage the structures 
of domination around them. Speaking of Louis Montrose's work, Anthony Dawson thinks 
" it seems ... possible and even fruitful to locate Montrose's project within a present-day 
politics whereby his own texts also contest authority, most especially that of older 
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historicisms and the humanist assumptions they embrace" (332). The heretical New 
Historicist wants nothing more but to elicit this sort of conjecture, not only within the 
institution but outside ofit. The heresy of New Historicism has no time for critics who do 
not push the reading of texts into generalities that demonstrate the importance of literature 
in shaping society. All other approaches become stagnant orthodoxies that set up modes 
of domination over literary criticism. 
Once the critic locates an· area of subversion, "what happens when this kind of . 
challenge begins to have its effect and prevailing power structures are indeed partially 
'deligitimated'? At this stage those in power typically make violent and punitive bids for 
religitimation, finding scapegoats in the process" (Dollimore, Radical xxiii). An excellent 
question, and demonstrating the answer to it would seem to be the next logical step for 
Dollimore and the heretics of New Historicism. But this important juncture marks the spot 
where the heretical New Historical enterprise begins to stall. For despite all the assertions 
of subversion and the movement of texts in society, New Historicism has problems 
delivering historical facts to demonstrate its discursive certainties. Time and again the 
critic cannot escape the metaphorical and exchange it for the actual and concrete. Fish . 
points out that all too often the New Historical reading contains words such as "'probably,' 
'would have been appropriate,' 'it is interesting,' for these words act to remove the 
argumentative pressure from the facts they introduce" (''Milton's" 261). 9 The heretical 
New Historical reading always remains fixed in a state of possibility~ critics use a steady 
stream of "possibility" words: maybe, implies, imagines, could be, potentially, presumes, 
perhaps. 10 Liu argues that "the New Historicism proceeds tropologically as if literary texts 
and historical con-texts had equal priority" (744). But when it comes time to demonstrate 
that equality, New Historical critics fall back on the Totalizing Metaphor in place of 
specific events. What they offer "is only a metaphorical transference pointed out ... 
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through a deft manipulation that might well seem to older historians of ideas a wave of the 
wizard's wand" (Liu 744). The heretical New Historicist replaces history with histories, 
actually imagined histories that do not "seek to change the present through the process of 
historical and critical inquiry so much as to rewrite the past in terms of the present" (Smith, 
''Rest" 276). And that present contains the figure of the New Historian as heretic seeking 
relevance in contemporary society through a subversive reading of the Renaissance. 
The heresy of New Historicism raises and then fails to answer the concern, what 
does literature do in the process of history, or as Nigel Smith asks, "what happens after 
representation? What about circulation, dissemination, affect? How are they to be 
measured" (275)? Liu wonders, "Given New Historicism's prejudice for synchronic 
structure--for the paradigmatic moment-in-time in which the whole pattern of historical 
contexts may be gazed at in rapt stasis--is any action conceivable at all" (734)? Heretical 
New Historians confront the same frustration they experience in the present; they can 
construct a scenario whereby literature does something in the Renaissance, but they 
struggle to find a method or set of events to demonstrate that action in definable terms. 
Greenblatt claims at the start of Shakespearean Negotiations that he wishes to hear the 
dead speak; instead, to deliver any message of subversion that carries weight, he must 
speak for the dead. He admits as much in his use of the quote by Kafka; there is no 
subversion so it must be created; in tum the reader must be convinced that metaphorical 
potential equals historical reality. New Historicism as a heresy believes it can save 
criticism by making it relevant to society and culture at any cost. 
In the quest for relevance, heretical New Historicism, regardless of all the talk of 
histories and identifying a locus for a particular narrative, continues to search for 
monolithic answers to questions of how culture and society work, what Barro II deems 
"monological history" (445). Liu argues that New Historicism simply becomes another 
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type of formalism due to this impulse, exchanging the concept of "motive" in interpretation 
for "power" (734). The failure to show conclusively how literature subverts or shapes 
power results in large part from New Historicism looking for a narrative that will define all 
people of the Renaissance. People, with or without an essence, do not all come under the 
same influences or react to them equally. Heretical New Historicism simply wants too 
much in the way of relevance; it demands a totalizing answer for literature's role in culture, 
and such an answer does not exist. The heresy of New Historicism wants total control of 
the culture and texts it studies. The heretical New Historian claims history is too 
fragmented, pluralistic, and diverse to control, and· then creates a narrative that denies all 
these things and contains an imagined history with a metaphorical fence. But the heretical 
New Historian remains essentially correct because the imagined histc;>ry of New Historical 
discourse bears little resemblance to the actual histories that resist all attempts to subdue 
them. 
Heretical New Historicism also suffers from the extremely narrow way it defines 
relevance in its discourse. For the New Historian relevance means power, especially 
political power as vested in the state. The oversimplistic recourse to the Will to Power 
plagues much of postmodern culture and refuses to acknowledge that relevance governs a 
wide spectrum of activities and events. New Historicism as a heresy has done a 
tremendous job of pointing out the need to pursue some type of relevance outside the 
institution, but like all other heresies it immediately returns to the strategy of gaining 
control over the criticism, and in the case of heretical New History, power in the culture at 
large. Ultimately it loses a vision of what that relevance might entail. The drive to define 
all relevance in terms of power comes back to the essential dilemma Milton outlines 
between Satan and the community he rejects: which carries the greater significance, 
individual control or communal sharing of purpose? 
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The inability to define and pursue relevance·in terms other than power also comes 
back to issues of community in literary criticism. The community has failed miserably to 
formulate a center that defines a purpose for criticism within and without the institution 
and therefore opens the door to strategies of heretical power to fill the vacuum. English 
studies can be relevant without controlling political machinery or guiding foreign policy or 
determining legislation. 11 What about the relevance of producing a literate society through 
the classroom equipped to make a life and participate in the world at large? What about a 
History of Comfort to demonstrate the ways in which literature·provides a means of 
expression for the marginalized and suffering? What about pursuing the relevance of a 
shared body of images and ideas the population draws upon to govern itself? What about 
a History of Delight that records the manner in which literature increases the quality of 
living and well-being of society. and diverts frustration in creative directions? Insisting that 
relevance exists only in those texts that influence or subvert the minute circle of political 
interests in any culture has to be the most oppressive kind of history of all. 
All of these suggestions mean heretical lit~rary criticism itself will have to stop 
writing its own history as a battle for control over criticism through the process of heresy. 
Heretical critics will have to make a history that allows room for community and a plurality 
of relevance. They will have to agree upon and pursue those avenues of relevance which 
put the interests of the community ahead of individual power and control. Literary critics 
should stop being embarrassed by what they do and instead celebrate the many ways they 
can shape the culture of this century, perhaps not in terms of political power, but in a 
myriad of other ways--perhaps most markedly by modeling an idea of community for the 
society at large. 
Towards that end, it seems only reasonable that the first step in making history and 
literature relevant involves moving away from the Totalizing Metaphor. Heretical critics 
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need to set their sights on the particular and the concrete situations that arise out of 
specific events and details. What cart literary criticism learn, not by generalizing the 
impulses of literature, but by measuring the actual impact certain texts exert over actual 
individuals?12 This methodology does not have the ability to deliver the enormous claims 
of heretical New Historicism, but it does provide a means of access to history and 
literature that will lead to conclusions both the community and those outside of it can 
respect, examine, and study. Instead of potential it offers actuality, an actuality critics can 
assert with confidence. As the community looks for ways in which literature delivers 
relevance in quantifiable terms, those outside the institution will take notice and critics can 
achieve, on a smaller scale than heretical New Historicism seeks, an influence that impacts 
society. This chapter will now tum its attention to just such a concrete situation, 
Shakespeare's Richard II and the Essex rebellion, as a means of modelling the approach 
just outlined. Hopefully the results will demonstrate the ability ofliterature to speak to 
individuals within society, although the outcome may provoke surprise. 
On Saturday, February 7, 1601, a special performance of Shakespeare's.Richard II 
took place at the Globe Theater. The performance was notable in that the play had not 
been presented in quite some time and that many members of the audience supported 
Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, in his plans to force Queen Elizabeth to restore him to a 
place of prominence in the government . In fact, these very men have convinced the actors 
to perform the play in exchange for 40s. plus the gate receipts (Lacey 282). The 
performance gains greater significance when on February 8, Essex and his followers indeed 
stage an unsuccessful rebellion against Queen Elizabeth. Essex will later be executed, and 
the actors from the Globe required to testify in preparation for his trial. Although the 
actors are cleared of any conspiracy related to the rebellion, the state obviously wanted to 
discover what connection, if any, this performance had on the uprising. 
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The question of that connection remains today. Literary historians and critics have 
long debated the importance and relationship between Essex's coup and the performance of 
Richard II the night preceding it. Critics such as Evelyn May Albright view the staging of 
the play as an indication of the political influence of Shakespeare on society in general and_ 
Essex and his followers specifically. Some have even gone so far as to suggest 
Shakespeare had Essex or someone similar in mind as he developed the character of Henry 
Bolingbroke, most notably Lily B. Campbell. She views Richard II as political allegory for 
Elizabeth's own court and the intrigues present there. Shakespeare becomes political 
satirist and his play, in the words of Peter Ure, "a mere peg on which he hung a political 
controversy of his own time" (lvii). 
No literary mystery stands complete without a vehement denouncement from an 
opposing faction. In this instance Richard Heflher feuds with Albright in PMLA over her 
interpretation of Richard H's relation.to Essex. Heflher complains about the way Albright 
reads certain documents from Essex and o~hers during his trial to mean he has great 
interest in the play and watches it often. 13 Disagreement stems from two essential matters: 
does Shakespeare actually have political allegory in mind when he writes the play, and how 
familiar is he with Essex and his standing at the court? Ure finds it hard to imagine 
Shakespeare anticipating the events of 1601 in a play he most probably composed around 
1595. He complains that "There is not reason at all to suppose that what Essex's followers 
hoped would have a seditious effect in 1601 had been composed by Shakespeare six or 
seven years earlier with a seditious intention" (lviii). The problem appears to result from 
the inability of formalist critics to conceive of Essex's followers using Richard II to stir up 
dissent unless Shakespeare had intended it to do so in the first place. The resulting 
interpretation allows only the events surrounding Essex to wield any influence in its 
formulation, and elicits a dissenting response that such an interpretation views the texts in 
110 
a too narrow and manipulative fashion. The considered texts include not only the play but 
the documents surrounding Essex and his career. 
The idea of intention on the part of Shakespeare may appear almost quaint today, 
but the fact remains that formalist critics have definite criteria for their historical approach 
and proceed accordingly. Heretical New Historicism abandons intent, of course, and 
contends that a play only requires the potential to be political or seditious to warrant 
historical scrutiny. Richard II and Essex appear tailor-made for the New Historicist. The 
critic does not even need to create a metaphor to demonstrate the connection; the interplay 
exists on the foundation of concrete events. 
So what do heretical New Historicists say about Richard II and Essex? 
Surprisingly, remarkably little. Greenblatt covers the incident in The Power q.f Forms and 
rejects the idea of those who say Richard II carries no political subversion: "[I]n 1601 
neither Queen Elizabeth nor the Earl of Essex were so sure: after all, someone on the eve 
of a rebellion thought the play sufficiently seditious to warrant squandering two pounds on 
the players, and the Queen understood the performance as a threat" (4). But Greenblatt 
never really takes his argument much farther and never discusses the situation at length. 
Jonathan Dollimore gives even less attention to Essex, simply stating that "A famous 
attempt to use the theatre to subvert authority was of course the staging of a play called 
Richard II (probably Shakespeare's) just before the Essex rising in 1601" ("Introduction" 
. 
8). Dollimore actually undercuts the connection to Shakespeare, casting doubt on which 
play The Globe performed and simply leaves the affair at that. Even Leonard 
Tennenhouse, who examines Essex more in depth, makes little of the Richard II 
performance. The fact remains that no New Historian has ever given Essex and Richard II 
the type of analysis one would expect from a theory that benefits from the historical 
certainty of subversion the situation offers. 
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Two reasons explain the strange lack of interest in Essex. The first has to do with 
the nature of heresy in literary criticism. In the never-ending quest for innovation, heretical 
New Historicism offers an exciting avenue of possibility, except where Richard II is 
concerned. After all, earlier formalist historians have noted the possible subversion in the 
text, even though disagreements ensue, and simply removing the need for intention on 
Shakespeare's part does little to advance the argument. For fear of covering old ground 
and losing the opportunity for a clearly heretical stance, heretical New Historicists merely 
recognize Essex in passing, even though he offers such rich opportunities to build on past 
research: The dictates of heresy stifle this impulse as New Historians look instead to 
spaces of their own, free of prior critical attention. 14 
The other, more compelling reason, involves the nature of heretical New 
Historicism itself Essex and his failed coup do not lend themselves to the totalizing 
impulses of the heretical New Historical approach. How can one apply this situation to all 
of Elizabethan society when only a handful of people take part and others fail to join them 
even when given the chance? The Essex rebellion has too many particulars and specifics to 
suit the heretical New Historian; it is in that sense too historical to warrant appropriation 
by the Totalizing Metaphor. Heretical New Historicism in the end depends on rebellion 
that might happen, not rebellion that actually does happen, because such events restrict the 
subversive enterprise to definable locations in society. Essex acts, and in that action, 
shatters the world of static possibility the heretical New Historian cherishes. 
What then should critics make of Essex and Richard II? Must the incident be 
jettisoned simply because the rebellion does not conform to a general rule governing all of 
society? Does Richard II fail as a piece of subversive literature simply because only a 
few, and not all of society, rally around its contents? I do not think so. Would it not be 
fruitful to examine the historical particulars of this case and see what can be discovered 
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about the effect of literature on certain people? The men in the Essex rebellion do not fail 
in making a connection between art and life; they are moved and led to actions based in 
part on their reaction to Shakespeare's Richard 11. Barroll has no doubt the conspirators 
were "fascinated by the power of stage plays--upon themselves, at any rate" (454). The 
fact that the rest of England did not share in their response does not lessen the effect upon 
those particular individuals. Dollimore, in his only other comment about the play and 
Essex, draws even closer to an answer: "what made Elizabeth I so anxious was not so 
much a retrospectively and clearly ascertained effect of the staging of Richard II (the 
uprising was, after all, abortive and Essex was executed) but the fact of the play having 
been appropriated--been given significance for a particular cause" ("Introduction" 12). The 
idea of appropriation describes perfectly what occurs, and that act does not lose its 
importance because the uprising fails. Why Dollimore refuses to follow this line of 
reasoning remains a mystery. 
But why this appropriation, and more specifically, why Shakespeare's account? The 
attorney bringing charges against Gilly Merrick, one of the conspirators, notes that when 
Augustine Phillips tried to persuade the conspirators to show another play they responded 
that "no play else would serve" (Albright 689). The intriguing relation to draw out of the 
performance of Richard II involves determining those circumstances which would make 
the presentation of Shakespeare's play so appealing to Essex. The crucial historical factor 
worth examining is how Shakespeare's rendering of the facts could influence men to 
internalize the play to the point of rebellion. In order to do so the play does not require 
having repercussions for all of English society. Nor does the government have to perceive 
the play in the same way Essex and his men do. To approach Essex honestly, he and his 
followers must achieve individuality as real men who live in a definite time. The play must 
disclose attributes which could compel men to commit acts of treason. To draw larger 
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inferences about Elizabethan society as a whole defeats the purpose and creates automata 
which move and talk at the command of the heretical critic to substantiate his theories. 
The real interest should lie in real historical persons engaging life and a piece of literature. 
The first point to consider then is the man himself, Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex. 15 If 
critics discover an unbalanced ruffian with delusions of grandeur, conclusions may prove 
less valuable because in the end the man had no grasp of reality. But such is not the case. 
Devereux was born November 10, 1567 to Walter and Lettice Devereux, who at the time 
were Viscounts but not yet Earls. Walter died at an early age and left Robert with huge 
debts totaling over 35,000 pounds (Lacey 26). As a result, Devereux travels to the court 
of Queen Elizabeth to secure favors and hopefully a lucrative position with the 
government. Most coveted would be a job that levies taxes because the holder of such a 
title kept any profits above what the government required. Essex received more than he 
bargained for. After distinguishing himself in a battle against the Spanish on behalf of the 
Dutch, he quickly rose to prominence in the court and became the Queen's favorite. They 
engaged in some type of affair, although the exact nature of it is hard to determine owing 
to Elizabeth's penchant for playing rivals off one another and Essex's and the Queen's 
often stormy quarrels (Strachey 58-60). That Essex was twenty and Elizabeth fifty-four 
when they began their relationship complicates matters even more. Holding considerable 
power at court and possessing the ambition to put it to his own personal advancement, 
Essex gained further notoriety with a series of military adventures, including the taking of 
Cadiz in 1596. 
Essex's career might have continued along its charmed course if not for the fact he was 
human like everyone else. He had great, sometimes unrealistic, aspirations, mood swings, 
and was jealous of anyone he perceived as threatening his place at court, especially Robert 
Cecil, son of Lord Burghley. Essex's antagonism toward Cecil proved to be the beginning 
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of his downfall. During a Council meeting to select an ambassador to handle the Irish 
rebellion, Essex nominated a friend of Cecil's, but Elizabeth saw through the power play 
and dismissed the idea. Essex would not let it drop however: 
Essex lost his temper, jutted his bearded jaw fiercely at the Queen, and then 
turned his back on her contemptuously. Furious, Elizabeth stood up, 
reached out and caught Essex a fierce box on the ear . . .. Essex whirled, 
his hand on his sword. Nottingham stepped between the two combatants. 
Essex was beside himself shouting that he would never and could never 
endure such an insult from any man, and especially not from a woman. 
(Lacey 212) 
Certainly only Essex's close relationship with Elizabeth saved him from being dispatched to 
the Tower of London. As it was, the dispute lasted for more than two months (Harrison 
207). Essex sulked in the country, and while absent, Elizabeth made up her mind to send 
him to Ireland for his insolence (Harrison 210). 
Ireland was no small punishment to endure. Two thousand British soldiers had just 
been massacred at Yell ow Ford by rebels under the command of the Earl of Tyrone. The 
situation had gotten out of hand, with the only garrison of consequence at Dublin 
(Strachey 170). Essex received ill-equipped troops with no stomach for civil war, and he 
had little will to fight. Essex would write a lament-filled letter to Elizabeth shortly before 
his departure: 
From a mind delighting in sorrow, from spirits wasted with passion, from a 
heart tom to pieces with care, grief and travel, from a man that hateth 
himself, and all the things else that him alive, what service can your Majesty 
expect, since any service past deserves no more than banishment and 
proscription to the crudest of all islands? ... [Y]our Majesty shall have no 
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cause to mislike the fashion of my death, since the course of my life could 
never please you. (Nichols 432) 
Essex hardly displays the confidence needed to go and fight a civil war. He further 
suffered under a barrage of sarcastic letters from Elizabeth questioning his tactics and 
desire to fight. When Essex made a secret deal with Tyrone, a deal Strachey views as the 
"most impotent that could have been imagined" (214), Elizabeth not only rejected it but 
hinted it could involve disloyalty (for some strange reason Essex refused to divulge the full 
contents of their conversation which basically consisted of agreeing to a truce to last the 
duration of six weeks when each party might renew it [Strachey 214]). This secrecy would 
cost him dearly. Essex decided his.only recourse meant returning to England and 
explaining himself, even though he was under direct order not to do so. Essex convinced 
himself Elizabeth was being manipulated by bad advisors, and his own standing had 
suffered because of them. 
Essex did not return home to open arms, but Elizabeth quickly put aside her opposition 
to him and all seemed well for the moment (Harrison 249). However, when he returned 
later in the day, Elizabeth, suddenly furious with him, confined him to York House to stand 
trial before the Star Chamber on charges of treason. 16 Essex must have been stunned at 
this change of mind on Elizabeth's part; at this point Essex convinced himself that all of the 
Court except for the Queen were trying to remove him from power and influence. Surely 
Essex could relate to Bolingbroke's words when banished: 
every tedious stride I make 
Will but remember me what a deal of world 
I wander from the jewels that I love. (1.3.268-70) 
Essex's perceived banishment from Court marks the beginning of his identification of 
himself with a Man Wronged, and there appears no better model in popular drama than the 
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Bolingbroke of Shakespeare's play. 
A few months later Essex found himself on trial at a public hearing before a Special 
Commission, but its only purpose was to publicly scold Essex for his deeds. They found 
him innocent and released him from confinement on August 26, 1600, nearly one year after 
his first internment. Banished from court, Essex received orders to retire to the country 
(Harrison 269-70). Such banishment insured Essex's inability to pay his debts, as removal 
from court meant removal from lucrative government titles. Essex found himself on the 
brink of economic ruin just prior to his rebellion. He frantically wrote Elizabeth of his 
impending collapse in September of 1600: "but [for] the means of satisfying a great 
number of hungry and annoyed creditors which suffer me in my retired life to have no rest, 
I would appear still before you Majesty as a mute person" ( Harrison,. Elizabethan 
Journals 116). 
From the country, Essex wrote another fascinating letter to Elizabeth, begging her 
to end his banishment: 
" 
I am gnawed on and torn by the basest creature upon earth. The prating 
tavern haunter speaks of me what he lists; the frantic libeller writes of me 
what he lists; they print me and make me speak to the world, and shortly 
they will play me upon the stage. (Williams 14 7) 
Essex fears what might happen should he be played upon the stage. He somehow feels 
that the image of him portrayed will be more powerful than his own character and abilities. 
Here the first glimpse of Essex's fascination with drama as a means of power shines 
through. The representation of him carries greater impact than his actual existence. His 
later identification with the dramatic representation ofBolingbroke becomes more logical 
in light of this letter. Literature carries a power he craves and tragically trusts in, causing 
in part the downfall of his career. 
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The mood of Elizabeth's court also played a role in Essex's perception of himself. 
Critics who argue that Shakespeare writes political allegory in Richard II are not being as 
ridiculous as one might suppose because members of the court themselves drew such 
parallels. As early as 1598 Sir Francis Knollys employed the analogy between Elizabeth 
and Richard in a letter of warning sent to her (Albright 690-91), and Henry Lord Hunsdon 
explained his lack of influence at the Court by writing, "I never was one of Richard H's 
men" (Chambers 353). Elizabeth's costly wars and many favorites make for easy 
comparisons. Lily B. Campbell recognizes that "While there were other lessons which 
Richard was used to mirror, it was as a king who was dominated by favorites and who 
allowed favorites to rule and ruin his kingdom that he was generally thought of during the 
first thirty years or so of Elizabeth's reign" (176). Such comparisons cannot have been lost 
on Essex, and especially recognizable to him was the idea of unwise advisors. Of course, 
Essex defined as unwise anyone who opposed him, and he twisted history to mean 
something disastrous might happen if Elizabeth became corrupted and continued to ignore 
his advice. Essex always publicly claimed his motivation for rebellion involved saving the 
Queen from the unwise counsellors who dominated her. His cause had only the best 
interests of England in mind and "To the last Essex insisted that he wouldn't have shed the . . 
queen's blood" (Campbell 188). Even from the scaffold Essex declared he meant no harm 
to Elizabeth; "I beseech you and the world to hold charitable opinion of me, for my 
intention toward her Majestie, whose death I protest I never meant, nor violence toward 
her person" (Nichols 548). Leonard Tennenhouse thinks Essex's rebellion "seems to have 
been aimed at controlling the magical body [Queen Elizabeth]" (88). Like Bolingbroke in 
Richard II, Essex only wanted order and justice to be restored to England. Whether true 
or merely a philosophy Essex used to convince himself and his followers, the precedent of 
Richard's deposition always lingered in the air of the court. After the rebellion, Elizabeth 
herself commented to William Lambard, "I am Richard II. Know ye not that" (Nichols 
552)?17 
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Other factors contribute to the Richard story as well. If Elizabeth feared being 
deposed, who would do it? Interestingly, many people seem to have formed a definite 
opinion on that issue. When Essex argued for a continuation of the war with Spain in 
1598, many took note that Essex appealed to the public when the Council failed to take 
heed of him. Such tactics caused some to equate Essex and his tactics with Machiavelli 
(Lacey 209). Others had kinder things to say about Essex. In 1594 Robert Parsons 
published A Conference About the Next Succession to the Crown of England, a book 
which fabricated a conference to discuss who should succeed Elizabeth. The most 
intriguing facet of the book is its dedication to Essex. In it Parsons hints that Essex 
should be made the next king (Campbell 176-77). John Hayward also dedicated a book to 
Essex and saw for him future glory. The dedication contained enough inflammatory 
material to get Hayward imprisoned and tried although he eventually secured his release 
(Barroll 451). John Wolfe, the printer, declared in his statement at the trial, "500 or 600 
copies were sold ... as no book ever sold better" ( Calendar 451 ). The public seemed to 
enjoy the Richard/Essex association as well. As if Essex's ambition was not enough, add 
to that the expectation of people around him that he might very easily ascend to the throne. 
Essex underwent comparison with Henry Bolingbroke in some circles; he was just, loved 
by the people, and armed with a sincere grievance against the crown. That the story of 
Richard II came to loom very large in Essex's life appears in a letter he wrote to Lord 
Keeper Egerton (Keeper of the Great Seal) in reply to a warning to be careful of his 
conduct after his confrontation with Elizabeth over the Ireland situation: "What, cannot 
Princes err? Cannot subjects receive wrongs? Is an earthly power or authority infinite? 
Pardon me, pardon me, my good lord, I can never subscribe to these principles" (Lacey 
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213). Essex has spoken the unspeakable about a sovereign. Yet he couched his argument 
in relation to his being wronged. The parallel between this letter and Bolingbroke's 
justification for deposing Richard, especially in Shakespeare's account, is remarkably clear: 
My father's goods are all distrain'd and sold; 
And these, and all, are all amiss employ'd. 
What would you have me do? I am a subject, 
And I challenge the law. Attorneys are denied me, 
And therefore personally I lay my claim. (2.3.131-35) 
Essex believed that his banishment from Court did not allow his case to be properly heard. 
He longed to find a way to appeal to the Queen directly. It makes sense to recognize 
Essex's increasing identification between himself and the Richard story. 18 
As for the production of Shakespeare's Richard II, there seems little doubt that 
--
Essex saw the play. Essex's closest friend, the Earl of Southhampton, Shakespeare's 
patron, held private performances of plays at Essex House. Sir Walter Ralegh wrote to 
Robert Cecil on July 6, 1597 indicating that he and Essex had a private showing of Richard 
II and that the latter enjoyed it greatly (Chambers 353). Speculation also abounds that 
Essex not only saw the play but watched it often (see Note 13). Finally, we have the 
involvement of Essex's followers in the performance of Richard II the night before their 
rebellion. The actual men who arranged the performance were Charles and Jocelyn Percy 
and Lord Monteagle (Barroll 446). Rather than seeing the performance as an attempt to 
undermine authority, would it not make more sense to view the showing of the play as a 
means of steeling Essex's followers into action and confirming their belief that Essex would 
prove to be another Bolingbroke? Bolingbroke was a man who acted and was rewarded. 
The Privy Council forced Essex and his followers into just such action. While several of 
the conspirators watched Richard 11, a messenger arrived to inform Essex he must give an 
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account of himself to the Council (Strachey 241). Although unprepared, the men decided 
they must rise up and rebel or Essex might be arrested before they could. 
The appeal of Shakespeare's version of Richard II to Essex's followers and to 
Essex himself should prove most apparent. Plenty of accounts of Richard's life existed to 
choose from for anyone interested. Among them are Holinshed's Chronicles and Daniel's 
Civil Wars. What is important is not only the appeal of the Richard story to Essex but 
Shakespeare's interpretation of that story with which Essex identified most strongly. The 
dilemma of staging the deposing of a king for an Elizabethan audience forces Shakespeare 
to present the story in the most pleasing and least offensive manner possible. Bolingbroke 
cannot be characterized as a fiendish usurper who succeeds. Instead, Bolingbroke emerges · 
from the play as a man wronged who only wants what is rightfully his and, as William 
Kittredge puts it, "Bolingbroke appears to be a creature of events, rising naturally to 
assume the throne of England once it has been vacated for him" (xv). In addition, Richard .. ,,. 
does not really get deposed; he abdicates after recognizing the hopelessness of the 
situation and his own foolish mistakes. Shakespeare, according to Tennenhouse, "makes 
Richard appear as a tragic version of the patriarch who exercises his authority for 
penurious and exclusionary ends. In contrast with the anointed king, Shakespeare makes 
the displaced and dispossessed Bolingbroke into the figure who rescues the principle of 
genealogy and links it to the law" (76). Richard's death is not Bolingbroke's fault but the 
result of the misguided judgement of Sir Pierce Exton. Shakespeare creates a Bolingbroke 
guided by destiny to the throne; he rightfully belongs there. 
At least that is how Essex and his men could easily construe it. Bolingbroke's 
return from exile to reclaim the lands Richard has taken must strike a chord as well. 
Essex's major followers all owed huge amounts of money, including the Earl of 
Southampton, who owed the modem equivalent of over half a million dollars (Lacey 271 ). 
121 
Hasn't Essex been betrayed of income due to the treachery of Elizabeth's wicked advisors? 
After his first trial for treason, Essex was denied renewal of his contract to exact duties 
from the import of sweet wines from the Mediterranean and Levant. Its loss finally sent 
him to the brink of financial ruin (Strachey 235). Like Bolingbroke, Essex and the others 
want only what is rightfully theirs. Bolingbroke is a man to be admired, a man who stands 
up for what is his, even if that means challenging the King. Once more we can hear the 
echoes of Essex's "What, cannot Princes err?" Essex is no criminal; he has been wronged 
and no one, not even the Queen, should be allowed to impede justice. If other events 
happened to transpire, as in the case ofBolingbroke, so be it. He wants justice so he can 
rid Elizabeth of the men poisoning her against him. Essex and his admirers surely derived a 
great pleasure from seeing Bolingbroke dispose of Bushy and Green: 
Near to the King in blood, and near in love 
Till you did make him misinterpret me--
Have stoop1d my neck under your injuries 
And sigh'd my English breath in foreign clouds, 
Eating the bitter bread of banishment, 
This and much more, much more than twice all this, 
Condemns you to the death. (3.1.17-20, 28-29) 
Equally attractive to Essex's faction must be the relative ease .with which Bolingbroke 
moves from one victory to another. Even when men such as the Duke of York oppose 
him, they end up following him (2.3). The King himself wilts under the force of 
Bolingbroke's destiny and abdicates. The people love Bolingbroke as well: 
Ourself and Bushy, Bagot here, and Green 
Observ1d his courtship to the common people; 
How he did seem to dive into their hearts 
With humble and familiar courtesy; 
What reverence he did throw away on slaves, 
Wooing poor craftsmen with the craft of smiles 
And patient underbearing of his fortune, 
As 'twere to banish their affects with him. 
Off goes his bonnet to an oyster-wench; 
A brace of draymen bid God speed him well 
And had the tribute of his supple knee, 
With "Thanks, my countrymen, my loving friends"; 
As were our England in reversion his, 
And he our subjects' next degree in hope. (1.4. 23-36) 
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This sort of groundswell of support Essex felt he had himself, and its failure to materialize 
on the day of the uprising went far toward making the whole scheme collapse. Cecil 
complained that "with the common people and soldiers he pretended that none cared for 
them but himself'' (Calendar 583). Essex felt confident that like Bolingbroke he had won 
the heart of the common people and that they would respond when he decided to clear the 
court of the evil present there. Elizabeth's council realized, however, that "notwithstanding 
the great love the Londoners bore unto the Earle, yet they will not cyde with hime" 
(Nichols 545). Essex counted on this support to outweigh all other obstacles. "Even after 
the government discovered his plans," writes T ennenhouse, "Essex believed the mere 
display of his colors and the support of relatives, friends, clients, and household retainers 
would gain him the popular voice and military force to achieve authority" (88). 
Essex's own ineptness at carrying out the rebellion may have had more to do with 
its failure than anything else. The people never received the opportunity to rise up because 
the conspiracy ended before it hardly began. Once things began to collapse on the 
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afternoon of the 8th, Essex made a pitiful march into the City to rally support, but no one 
had been told of his plans or even of his presence once he arrived (Harrison 286-87). 
Those who did happen to see Essex totally misapprehended his intent: the Londonders 
thought "that the Queene and Earle were made friends, and that her Majesy hadde 
appoynted him to ryde in that triumphant manner through London, unto his house in 
Seeding-lane" (Progresses 544). While contemplating his rebellion, he must have seen 
himself as riding on a crest of popularity from one success to the next just as Bolingbroke 
in Shakespeare's play. He would use that power just as Bolingbroke does, first as a 
bargaining tool to get justice, then if that failed, as a weapon to take what was rightfully 
his: 
Henry Bolingbroke 
On both his knees doth kiss King Richard's hand 
And sends allegiance and true faith of heart 
To his most royal person; hither come 
Even at his feet to lay my arms and power, 
Provided that my banishment repeal'd 
And lands restored again be freely granted. 
If not, I'll use the advantage ofmy power, 
And lay the summer's dust with show'rs of blood 
Rain'd from the wounds of slaughtered Englishmen. (3.3.35-44) 
Essex identifies with Bolingbroke's ability to act, a·decision that would eventually cost him 
his life. Interestingly, ifhe would have acted like Bolingbroke, Strachey, Harrison, and 
Lacey believe he would have had a reasonable chance of succeeding in his rebellion. 
While we cannot know for certain Essex's reaction to Shakespeare's Richard II, 
the world in which Essex found himself after his disgrace and removal from court, 
124 
combined with his financial problems and :frustrated aspirations, may have prompted him to 
identify more and more with the Richard saga, especially as rendered by Shakespeare. As 
the Bolingbroke who will deliver England from her woes, he will purge Elizabeth's court 
of the harmful influences that threaten to destroy it. If the tide of approval washes him 
into the throne, so be it. Essex can live the fantasy of Shakespeare's rendering; the people 
will clamor for him, and there will be no bloodshed--even his foes will join his side. For 
Essex does not want to wrest power from the state; he wants it thrust upon him in the 
same manner Bolingbroke seems to gain it. All of these issues culminate in the 
performance ofFebruary 7, 1601. Ultimately, Essex's followers did not expect the play to 
stir up much public dissent; the play had become for them a sort of fantasy into which they 
could project themselves. Their lives might be such if circumstances worked out correctly. 
After all, the Richard II story was clearly in the air. Essex would be vindicated, and they 
would reign with him wisely and divide the wealth of the nation among them. Only when 
they finally tried to create their own revolution did they discover their plans to be as much 
an illusion as Shakespeare's play. 
The real tragedy of the Essex rebellion concerns the inherent danger of equating 
literature and reality too closely. Essex and his followers began to believe the self-
contained world of the play mirrored their own reality. The simple train of events, 
inevitable conclusion, and powerful closure became irresistible set against their own 
chaotic state. History became a closed narrative with no threat of rupture or chance of 
competing claims to authority or outcome. Essex never planned his rebellion because he 
did not need to; the throne and justification would come to him as easily as it does to 
Bolingbroke. Hasn't that always been one of the most powerful attractions in literature? 
The certainty of the ending, the relative ease of resolution, the linear momentum of events, 
all these hold us spellbound, set in the foreground of our own uncertain existences. 
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Heretical New History instinctively knows this as well and therefore seeks a metaphorical 
wholeness based on potential rather than a truly historical narrative full of disappointment, 
fragmentation, and openness. 
Heretical New History and the community of literary criticism should make as its 
focus the individual in history. It should locate women and men in history and with the 
documents available place them in a world where they can engage the texts of their time. 
To force generalizations from such a limited number of examples is naive at best and 
ludicrous at worst. Even if oppressive structures exist, how do individuals still manage to 
make their society_ function and how do texts help in that process? No one piece of 
literature can either reflect or shape society as a whole. But any one text can influence any 
one individual from that time. The community needs this kind of literary history because 
the world measures relevance in terms of real events, not potential subversions. Even if it 
remains impossible to know all of Shakespeare's intentions surrounding Richard II or how 
the play molds Elizabethan culture, critics can discover how it may have influenced one 
man such as the Earl of Essex and how that influence profoundly altered the society of 
London and of the court. Essex and others appropriated a text and, despite any intention 
of the author, used it as a tool to formulate their perception of Elizabeth's reign and 
determine how things could be different. Studying such appropriations in history can tell 
us much about the ability of literature to induce change or maintain a stable meaning from 
one individual to the next. History is comprised of the individual acts of real people, not 
machines responding to the general laws heretical New Historians, or anyone else, create 
for them. And the power of literature to move such individuals to acts heroic or base 
remains a subject worth pursuing. 
Chapter 5 
Milton and Women: 
The Heresy of Gender 
Up to now, the heresies looked at in this study have been ones generally open to all 
the members of literary studies; the critic simply adopts the strategies and rhetoric of the 
heresy to participate in its dissemination. However, the heretical voices heard in criticism 
very often try to exclude competing interpretations in varying ways limiting Booth's sense 
of vitality and justice. Thus, heretical performance theory attempts to negate those critics 
who focus on the text by declaring all such efforts contrary to a true understanding of 
drama. Heretical New Historicists reach for authority by insisting that the determination 
of political relevance in texts should be the real work of the literary critic, thereby isolating 
approaches with different concerns. 
Both of these heresies allow anyone to join their ranks though. They proselytize in 
a certain sense, welcoming all those who see the truth of their theory to come and 
participate. After all, more practitioners of a certain heresy usually result in more influence 
and power within literary criticism. What if a heresy takes a different tack, though? What 
if a heresy not only declares the work of orthodoxy null and void, but at the same time 
announces its unique approach as out of reach to the overwhelming majority of literary 
critics? A new basis for power establishes itself; the heretic erases the criticism of 
orthodoxy but also reserves control over her own rhetoric by preventing a dilution of 
power as other critics seek to appropriate the heretical voice. 
Feminist criticism presents a heresy of this type. While pursuing the 
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interpretation of literature in feminist terms, the critic also implicates society in a system of 
patriarchy whose impulse desires the restriction and subjection of all women. Literature 
seeks to perpetuate this system by portraying women in subsetvient terms. Using gender 
as the basis for its expression, feminist criticism marks a new center of power but also 
restricts those who can participate: those not benefitting from or furthering the aims of 
patriarchy. While some men indeed write feminist criticism, a certain "outsideness" 
always exists in their efforts as can be seen in the examples that follow. 
Heretical feminist critics have a pervasive way of rejecting all objections to their 
heresy--to disagree simply means the critic wants to keep the present system of patriarchy 
intact. The outcome puts the heretical feminist critic in an enviable position; she retains a 
seat of control in literary criticism that very few can join, and she also resists having her 
position being assailed through the fear of appearing oppressive and patriarchal. Most 
non-feminist critics cautiously agree or defer to the feminist critic's interpretation, 
recognizing they are unable to comprehend fully or to criticize legitimately. The feminist 
critic also has the ability to move easily outside the canon to declare most works part of 
the patriarchal structure, creating the need to find better models of women in more 
marginalized texts, usually by women. 
In talking about feminism in heretical terms here, I do so with the awareness of the 
complexities of feminist thought, the enormous disagreement among feminist critics on 
certain issues, and the fact that not all women are feminist critics. My aim is to 
demonstrate a definite line of thought in feminist criticism which employs several heretical 
strategies concerning Milton. A large body of criticism takes Milton to task for his 
portrayal of women, and in the process these critics, mostly pursuing a feminist line of 
thought, create a space of power for themselves and collapse the influence of Milton and 
also much of the criticism written about his work. This heresy very often contains 
something like a moral imperative to it; to support Milton and his patriarchal view of 
women supports the oppression of women today. 
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Couching interpretation in moral terms produces an interesting outcome in the 
heretical debate surrounding Milton. Rather than agreeing with feminist critics and trying 
to participate in feminist power, many Miltonists seek the rehabilitation of Milton's work in 
a series of texts friendly to women, indeed empowering toward women. Milton becomes a 
sort of proto-feminist antithetical to the normal antagonism most Renaissance texts display 
towards the feminine. Why does this occur? Several possible reasons exist. For one, 
many critics refuse to have Milton cany the taint of misogyny that dogs him throughout 
many time periods; for another, unlike many other battles in literary criticism, in this one 
several critics perceive feminist conclusions about Milton as definite acts of 
misinterpretation, errors in understanding, as Booth would put it. Finally, such an act 
delivers its own kind of heresy. Milton the Radical,.undermining the prevalent ideology of 
his day, carries a powerful image of subversion most heretics revel in today. Such an 
interpretation thwarts one heresy while simultaneously producing a new one critics can use 
as a new base of power. 
Almost all discussion of Milton and heretical feminist criticism leads to the 
discourse surrounding the perception of Eve in Paradise Lost, and this one will be no 
different. Eve is the key woman in Milton's work, the source around whom critical 
commentary centers and from whom most conclusions about Milton's attitudes derive. 1 
The depiction of Eve also involves Milton's treatment of biblical texts and raises the 
question of how much he either participates in or writes against the patriarchy many 
heretical feminist critics find implicit in the Old Testament. Complicating matters further, 
Eve falls before Adam in Paradise Lost, and interpreting how Milton handles that event 
goes far in determining how. a critic views Milton and women. 
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Much has been said about Eve that will not find its way into this discussion which 
will instead follow a clearly defined line of comment and response that best exemplifies the 
feminist heresy and the reaction to it in Milton studies. What emerges from this debate are 
two startling different constructions of Milton: one casts Milton as a patriarchal authority 
subjugating women in his work and in some sense thwarting all women and especially 
women writers after him; the other construction offers a Milton uniquely in tune with 
women and their struggles which he then seeks to address in his work. Perhaps nowhere 
else in literary criticism is there such a polarity of interpretation as a heresy seeks to 
establish itself and a counter-heresy emerges to engage it. 
Two articles from early in the feminist controversy about Milton help to define the 
major points of each camp. Marcia Landy's "Kinship and the Role of Women in Paradise 
Lost" lays the groundwors for later heretical readings, although she does not take a 
decidedly heretical stance, and Barbara K. Lewalski's "Milton on Women--Yet Once 
More" replies to it. Landy quickly draws the boundaries for a new type of criticism, noting 
that commentary on Milton "has come largely from men and that their views have 
determined the critical climate" (''Kinship" 3). The problem with this situation is that "a 
reading is that critic's reading and grows out of that individual consciousness" ("Kinship" 
4). The point Landy suggests is that male critics remain unaware of Eve's true condition in 
the poem because they operate under the limitation of their "individual [male] 
consciousness." Landy employs the tactics of the heretic; she works to isolate the 
orthodox stance on Milton by implying it ignores the concerns and perceptions of women. 
Such blindness can only lead to incorrect interpretations of Eve since it overlooks the 
subjection of women in general that Eve represents. 
Milton's own view of women has more to do with his time than with the poet 
himself "rather than being a misogynist, Milton was a representative seventeenth-century 
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Protestant poet("Kinship" 5). Here Landy pulls back from an assertive heretical stand and 
the article plays a clever rhetorical game as it seeks in many ways to stay within certain 
orthodox boundaries; being the one to suggest Milton should be expelled from the canon 
on feminist grounds does not enter into the argument. Instead the work makes the 
argument that Milton writes as a product of his culture. The implications however will 
prove telling: not only Milton, but all men in the seventeenth-century become hostile 
toward women. Landy exonerates Milton by having to condemn the entire society. All of 
seventeenth-century society works to keep women in their place. 
Turning to Eve, Landy makes her emblematic of all efforts to subjugate women 
under male dominance. She touches upon the key points in the feminist complaint against 
Milton: the denial of authority, creativity, and knowledge to Eve keeps her in a subservient 
state. Landy argues that Eve "is deprived of authority and punished for attempting to 
usurp it" ("Kinship"l 0) and has no means of expressing creativity: "The principle of 
creativity, the highest principle of the cosmos, is denied to women" ("Kinship"l l). Finally, 
"Eve's desire to know is limited by Adam's censorship" ("Kinship"l2), thus making her 
"less well equipped than Adam to understand the temptations of the serpent" 
(''Kinship"l 1).2 Eve's only role in Eden consists of her being a mother-wife, a role Landy 
sees as "childlike," passive, and always under Adam's dominance. Landy ends by stressing 
again Milton should not be called a misogynist. Milton does everything possible in 
Paradise Lost to make Eve inferior to Adam; labelling Milton a misogynist at this point 
makes very little difference. Landy triumphs over Milton while appearing to defend him. 
Lewalski answers Landy directly in her article and formulates the basic argument 
against feminist criticism of Milton. First though, she must defend the last vestiges of her 
own heresy, New Criticism. Lewalski asserts that feminist criticism has too narrow a 
focus, and she "would yet affirm the capacity of great art to transcend these lesser 
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categories of human experience and speak to our common humanity" ( 4) because poets 
"are gloriously and supremely right about the most essential things" (5). She also warns 
that "a feminist analysis of Paradise Lost, with its nearly exclusive emphasis upon the 
image and role of women in the poem, may do real violence to a woman reader's 
imaginative experience of and response to everything else that the poem contains" ( 4). 
Not only that, "Feminist criticism often seems prone to substitute sociological for literary 
analysis" (4). Lewalski gives a last hurrah here in the early seventies for the New Criticism 
crumbling under the pressure of newer and more dynamic heresies within the field. Such 
bandwagon support of one's heresy still goes on at the beginning of many critical articles 
yet remains largely unstudied and uncommented upon in literary criticism. 3 
Lewalski then turns to a defense of Milton himself, claiming vehemently that "few 
writers of any era--including our own--have taken women so seriously as Milton does, as 
multifaceted human beings with impressive intellectual and moral powers and 
responsibilities" (5-6). This argument on Milton's behalf appears over and over again in 
criticism as scholars attempt to fashion a Milton in step with feminist concerns. Turning to 
specific points brought up by Landy, Lewalski sees Eve as one who "is imagined to share 
fully with her mate in the necessary work of the world" (8). 4 As far as a lack of authority 
goes, Eve names the flowers (XI.276), a "point unperceived by many critics, including 
Professor Landy" (8). The emergence of any new heresy generally receives its greatest 
condemnation in how the heretic reads a text: Scholars call New Critics sloppy, New 
Critics call Post-Structuralists sloppy, Post-Structuralists call New Historicists sloppy. 
Lewalski calls Landy's competence as a critic into question by attacking her methodology. 
The issue of Eve's knowledge and access to information has nothing to do with her 
fall according to Lewalski: "among the complex factors involved in Eve's fall, one which is 
specifically excluded is insufficient intellectual powers" (15). Eve has sovereignty and 
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power over her decisions, and she has the intelligence to make wise ones, as "Eve is no 
dependent child-wife: her choices are and must be freely her own" (13). Her dependence 
on Adam has nothing to with subservience because "Eve is, if anything, shown to be even 
more necessary to Adam than he to her" (18). Lewalski seeks an independent Eve, 
unfettered in her actions by a clinging need for Adam. Eve falls, but she falls on her own 
terms, able to make the choice clearly for herself She does not enter into the temptation 
with Satan already tainted and therefore doomed to failure. The negotiation of Eve's fall 
becomes complex; feminists want to absolve Eve of her guilt by demonstrating Milton 
creates a weak Eve who has no defenses or possibility of triumph because Milton's 
patriarchal system demands a clear scapegoat for sin entering the human race. Those who 
support Milton desire a strong Eve who bears all responsibility for her fall, because in that 
act she demonstrates her autonomy over herself, apart from Adam and even God. 5 
Lewalski's perception of Eve focuses on what occurs after the fall. Eve becomes a 
symbol of hope and redemption for all of humanity: "it is the woman who is made a type of 
the Messiah's redemptive love" (19). Eve reaches out to Adam so they may reconcile and 
create a new life for each other that foreshadows the ultimate reconciliation of God and 
humanity through Christ. This redemptive role functions as the crucial point for those who 
counter heretical feminist arguments against Milton. 6 Whatever happens before the fall, 
Eve guides humanity in the right direction afterwards and will eventually be the source of 
its salvation. Lewalski ends again on a New Critical note: "it will not be long before we 
can all again read Milton for what is of enduring importance rather than what is historically 
conditioned in his conception of men and women" (19). The heretical feminist voice in 
criticism threatens to drown out the real issues of literature that transcend all time. 7 
So the battle lines around Milton and women find clarity in the early work of Landy 
and Lewalski. The feminist argument sees Eve as lacking in authority, creativity, and 
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knowledge; the absence of these lead her to a certain fall and subsequent dominance by 
Adam. Milton's supporters argue Eve has all she needs for self-sufficiency and takes on a 
redemptive status after the fall. These arguments undergo some variation, and in the 
tradition of all literary heresy, much greater theoretical sophistication with attending 
jargon. But the key issues remain the same. As the case for and against Milton's depiction 
of women rages, an interesting event occurs; a critic appropriates Milton as the acme of 
male repressiveness in a patriarchal society. In perhaps the greatest heretical expression 
ever in literary criticism, Sandra Gilbert, first in a PMLA article and then as part of a larger 
study with Susan Gubar, outlines the looming presence that is "Milton's bogey. "8 Gilbert 
takes heresy in feminist rhetoric to new heights. 
Gilbert basically posits Milton as the source from which women feel cut off from 
the opportunities of writing in particular and the possibilities of any fulfillment in general. 
Paradise Lost becomes the locus that "expresses institutionalized and often elaborately 
metaphorical misogyny" (189). The focus of this hatred against women, the "barrage of 
angry words" by Milton, is of course Eve (210). Milton accomplishes his misogyny so 
completely that "to the female imagination Milton and the inhibiting Father--the Patriarch 
ofpatriarchs--are one" (192). This identification of Milton with the "inhibiting Father" 
occurs as "the story Milton . . . most notably tells to women is of course the story of 
woman's secondness, her otherness, and how that otherness leads inexorably to her 
demonic anger, her sin, her fall, and the exclusion from that garden of the gods which is 
also, for her, the garden of poetry" (191). Milton's bogey forever tears asunder the idea 
that women might participate in poetry, in creativity, in a male-dominated world which 
reserves that power for itself 
Milton's campaign against women involves the identification throughout Paradise 
Lost of Eve with Satan: "Milton himself seems deliberately to have sketched so many 
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parallels between her and Satan that it is hard at times for the unwary reader to distinguish 
the sinfulness of one from that of the other" ( 196). Gilbert employs a revealing tactic here. 
Milton is so diabolical that uninformed women cannot discern his intent properly. Such a 
statement in tum allows her to assign great power into the hands of the critic, especially 
herself Such critics (whom I have labelled heretics) claim to return control of the tex't 
back to the public, but in reality they always portray themselves as "reading correctly" and 
passing that knowledge on to the uninitiated. 9 Gilbert declares that Milton cannot be 
trusted, that his wiles remain too complex for the normal reader to unravel; she will 
perform the service for others and in doing so shepherd interpretive co.ntrol of the text. 
Eve's identification with Satan also means that "Milton's Eve falls for exactly the 
same reason Satan does: because she wants to be 'as Gods,' and because, like him, she is 
secretly dissatisfied with her place, secretly preoccupied with questions of 'equality"' (196). 
The association becomes so strong that "the enmity God sets between the woman and the 
serpent is thus the discord necessary to divide those who are not opposites or enemies but 
too much alike, too much attracted to each other" (196). Finally, "in the grim shade of 
sin's Medusa-like snakiness, Eve's beauty, too, begins (to an experienced reader of 
Paradise Lost) to seem suspect" (199). 
Eve, unable to participate in the act of creation which poetry and writing 
engenders, has no option but to follow Satan's path, and Gilbert therefore has no option 
but to make Satan the true hero of the poem for women. Eve embraces Satan because 
"Eve is the only character in Paradise Lost for whom a rebellion against the hierarchical 
status quo is as necessary as it is for Satan" (202). Gilbert simply takes the Romantic idea 
of Satan as hero in the poem and turns it to her own uses. Eve becomes a revolutionary 
seeking freedom and equality just as Satan does in his rebellion against heaven. "The 
Prince of Darkness," argues Gilbert, "was literally the first Outsider" (205), a position 
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women from Eve on inhabit; therefore, they seek to become like Satan. The woman 
writer's "feelings of female powerlessness manifested themselves in her conviction that the 
closest she could really get to being Satan was to be his creature, his tool, the witchlike 
daughter/mistress who sits at his right hand" (207). In the end, dominated by Milton's 
bogey, women sees themselves as "at best a creation of male 'Genius'" (208). Women have 
no place to reside in Milton's poem: "as a male poet justifying the ways of a male deity to 
male readers he rigorously excludes all females from the heaven of his poem" (211). 
Gilbert argues that all women writers, especially those of the nineteenth century, struggle 
to free themselves from Milton's bondage just as Satan rails against God in Paradise Lost. 
The brilliance of Gilbert's heretical attack is both breathtaking and troubling. In a 
brief span Gilbert lays to waste years of Milton scholarship while implicating it in a system 
of bondage for women writers. She accuses Milton of stifling the women authors who 
followed him and solidifying a patriarchal culture that gives women no power to express 
themselves through authorship. Furthermore, Gilbert claims women share a female 
unconsciousness that reacts to Milton in a unified manner, and she takes the role of chief 
spokeswoman for that unconsciousness. This creates an avenue of power for Gilbert that 
silences her opponents by branding them oppressors and allows her to speak for what she 
perceives as a monolithic female vision of literature and interpretation. 
But after the initial surprise of Gilbert's argument, one quickly realizes that very 
little evidence exists for her case beyond the force of her rhetoric. Gilbert offers no close 
reading of Paradise Lost, no references to key passages to illustrate her contentions, no 
critical background of how she arrives at her conclusions. She quotes one critic, Robert 
Graves, and a handful of feminist theorists that have nothing to say about Milton himself. 10 
Gilbert's heresy expects critics to believe on the basis of nothing more than a force of will. 
Gilbert demands faith in the assumption that Milton must inescapably think the way he 
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does and Eve must as a result be hopelessly subjugated along with all women. Criticism 
becomes a hostage to Gilbert's heresy--rejecting her reasoning means siding with Milton 
and patriarchy--in the name of freedom for women. Booth warns to "Suspect any text that 
sets itself up as king, demanding one law for itself and applying other, more stringent, laws 
to the commoners" (224). "Milton's bogey" in many ways finds itself predicated upon 
another bogey, the specter of male oppressiveness that must be eradicated at all costs and 
accepted as informing the production of whatever text the heretic assails. 11 
To disagree with Gilbert does not minimize the contribution of feminist thought or 
the way it greatly enhances the reading of texts today. Feminist theory has gone far in 
demonstrating how authors and texts seek to contain the idea of women within narrowly 
prescribed roles. Such criticism also provides new ways of thinking about writing and its 
impact upon a much broader spectrum of readers. However, Gilbert's use of feminist 
thought as a heresy abandons all such benefits in the name of establishing power within 
literary criticism, and she does so by also holding herself above the normal critical practices 
of most scholars. The innovation matters above anything else; the proof for the argument 
gets buried under the heretical assertion and its formulation. 
Gilbert demonstrates how heresy can become a destructive impulse. More than 
just an attempt to offer new interpretation, this species of heresy offers provocative 
conclusions meant to negate other criticism. This tactic not only fractures the community 
ofliterary studies; it undermines the very credibility of its existence. Heretical criticism 
becomes little more than a verbal game in which the participants take ever more strident 
positions to score points in the academy. Heretical literary criticism has nothing to offer 
the community or those outside of it except political posturing where the winners are 
determined on the basis of who can utter the most outrageous heresy on any given text. 
Literary studies of this type fail to discuss purpose, meaning, relevance, proof, evidence, 
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impact, plausibility or scholarly integrity; they aim instead to deliver arguments void of any 
based upon rhetoric or political oneupsmanship. 
In light of Gilbert's charge, Milton scholars face a crisis concerning Eve and 
Paradise Lost. Does Gilbert's heresy discredit Milton and along with him years of critical 
study, or does Milton have.more to offer feminist thought than a mere "bogey" to 
dismantle? The reaction to Gilbert takes a fascinating tum. Even those who laud Gilbert's 
conclusions feel uneasy about her methods, 12 and several critics use her criticism as an 
opportunity to return to many of the issues raised earlier by both Landy and Lewalski. In 
many ways, Gilbert's criticism ignites an interest in Eve perhaps long overdue, and this 
interest in tum solidifies many ideas about Milton's views of women just below the surface 
of much earlier criticism. Gilbert posits a patriarchal yes-man in Milton, and critics offer in 
return a proto-feminist Milton anticipating and addressing the concerns of women in the 
twentieth century. This controversy produces one of the few instances where a heresy 
fosters a genuine response that seeks to refute that heresy's claim and delivers an 
alternative meant to restore Milton's importance and not simply spawn more innovation. 
The critical community responds to a challenge and writes a body of criticism that furthers 
the health of Milton scholarship. 13 
William Shullenberger best captures the heart of the feminist controversy and 
suggests his own remedy for it. 14 Recognizing the reductivist tendencies of Gilbert's 
argument, Shullenberger points out the monolithic conclusions of Gilbert's hypothesis: 
the unquestioned assumption about that study [Gilbert's] is that it is bound 
to be antithetical, as if the only woman's response to poetry with the kind of 
claims which Milton makes is to be a resisting reader, to anatomize the 
terror and refuse the amazement, to dismiss the possibility of blessing as ifit 
could only be given to a son. (69) 
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Shullenberger also wonders if Gilbert's approach means that "traditional" women critics 
"purchased their interpretive authority by sacrificing the authority of their experience as 
women" (69). Keeping the idea of a community ofreaders before him, Shullenberger 
warns that Gilbert can poison women readers of Milton by her unfounded claims of 
misogyny (70)15 and then adds a note challenging her methodology: "Gilbert's procedures 
open themselves not just to interpretive differences but to basic questions about the ethics 
of scholarship" (82). Shullenberger allows for plurality in criticism ("interpretive 
differences"); what he attempts to correct are heretical abuses that substitute rhetoric for 
strong critical methodology (research, textual evidence, biographical context). 
Turning to Milton and Eve, Shullenberger argues instead that "the subtext of 
Paradise Lost encourages and supports feminist reading" (70). Shullenberger does an 
excellent job of avoiding the self-defeating strategy of heresy; instead of dismissing 
heretical feminist reading out of hand and offering his own brand of heresy in its place, he 
embraces feminist concerns as important to the community and challenges only Gilbert's 
conclusions about Milton. Shullenberger does justice to Gilbert's position and then offers a 
critique and an alternative. Why do Gilbert, Landy, and others reach their particualr 
conclusions? Because "the prospect of finding their own critical idealism confirmed and 
encouraged by so powerful a patriarchal text would be embarrassing" (70). 
Acknowledging that Milton anticipates and engages feminist concerns, allowing for the 
possibility that Eve emerges independent and vital from the text, means heretical feminist 
critics lose a tremendous amount of power over the text, and especially over texts written 
by males. Literary heresy abhors diluting or sharing its power. Such an outcome also 
means heretical feminist critics cannot dismiss all male texts as inherently oppressive, thus 
greatly narrowing the range over which they can exert control. 
Once critics allow Milton to speak to feminist issues, however, they discover "His 
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representation of true heroism, embodied in the gracious actions of Christ and of Eve, 
anticipates what feminist psychologists and social historians describe as 'women's values"' 
(71). Shullenberger expertly summarizes feminist precepts and then applies them rationally 
to Milton, but he does not duck the fact that by necessity Milton is "nominally patriarchal. 
Feminist criticism provokes the question whether the poetry is consequently repressivezv 
patriarchal" (72). While no one can deny that Milton's age was a patriarchal one, does that 
guarantee a certain type of writing? Shullenberger, by bringing us back to the text, 
demonstrates that it does not. The possibility but not the certainty exists. The text should 
be allowed to speak for itself, and Shullenberger, unlike Gilbert, allows it to do so. 
Shullenberger's reading of Paradise Lost brings critics back to the central issues 
raised by Landy--authority, knowledge, creativity. Eve gives up one type of knowledge 
and creativity for others throughout the poem: "Her food preparation is an art of earth 
more dignified in its spirituality than Adam's fruitless and quizzical astronomical 
speculation" (74). Milton celebrates domestic spirituality in the poem and Eve is the 
example, "Eve is Eden" (74). The idea of identity for Milton concerns a "non-self-centered 
relational structure," a structure Eve works desperately to restore at the end of the poem 
so that Adam can begin the process ofredemption. Eve embraces the values of a center 
and community that Satan so utterly rejects. As a result, "All that is Edenic argues against 
the feminist embrace of Satan as the covert hero of the poem and Eve's model for a self-
assertive identity" (78). Heretical feminist critics must elevate Satan to the position of 
hero because to do otherwise means admitting Milton understands women and his poem 
has something to say to them. This, as Shullenberger recognizes, would prove too 
embarrassing and costly for the heresy of feminism. 
While Shullenberger goes far in restoring a balanced picture of Milton in criticism, 
it will take a heretic as bold as Gilbert to make the case for a feminist Milton complete. 
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Just such a critic is Joseph Wittreich. Feminist Milton is Wittreich's brilliant effort to 
become even more feminist than heretical feminist critics. Wittreich works from the 
premise that "Milton was not just an ally of feminists but their early sponsor" (ix). He 
circumvents normal readings of Milton to discuss the ways in which women until the 
middle of nineteenth century read Milton. His study reveals "Milton's epic-prophecy is in 
part a woman's text--indeed, a lost feminist text--a large part of which has been buried by 
patriarchal culture. It is a text that invites and has its own hidden agenda for a feminist 
criticism that would remove from literary works incrustations of patriarchal interpretation" 
(x). The problem, argues Wittreich, is not Milton but criticism's patriarchal reading of 
Milton through the years. Critics must look elsewhere to read him correctly. 
The real place to apprehend Milton and his attitudes on women can be found in 
women readers prior to the Victorian era: 
Paradise Lost especially was regarded as a woman's text--not just one 
through which women could challenge the cherished beliefs of Milton's 
male readers, but one through which Milton himself had challenged those 
beliefs by fashioning a new female ideal with the intention of forging a new 
social and political reality. (Wittreich xii) 
Wittreich shifts the focus away from literary criticism to women readers of the past, and he 
also suggests Milton contains not a latent misogyny but an active feminist agenda. How 
does he explain the conclusions of modem feminists? Wittreich has an explanation that 
champions women of the past: "that their perception of Milton differs so markedly from 
that of present-day feminists opens the question of which group of feminists, yesterday's or 
today's, has been seduced by patriarchal culture and is, while promoting its traditions, 
purveying its attitudes by perpetuating its readings and interpretations" (xix). The real 
heretics, claims Wittreich, are women readers who create their own sense of meaning apart 
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from patriarchal literary criticism. Modem feminists reach the conclusions they do because 
they "have accepted the tamed Milton of critical orthodoxy If ( 14). Wittreich implicates 
today's heretical feminists in patriarchal mis-readings of Milton that lead to erroneous 
interpretations. 
If nothing else, one has to appreciate Wittreich's outflanking of heretical feminist 
critics by claiming a position even more feminist than theirs. At the same time he takes on 
the mantle of true heresy that seeks to undermine the oppressiveness of patriarchal, 
orthodox readings of Paradise Lost. For Wittreich, "Paradise Lost introduces 
disharmonies beneath an apparently harmonious surface in order to transport conventional 
propositions about women into a zone of new and (to the orthodox) unsettling 
perceptions" (9). Crites should not doubt Milton has a feminist message to deliver: it only 
takes a critic ofWittreich's skill to point out those "disharmonies" just below the surface. 
Wittreich projects a positive view of Milton toward women while at the same time 
retaining interpretative control so that he can guide critics to that conclusion. 
One might conclude Wittreich engages in the same type of rhetoric as Gilbert but 
with a different spin. Yet he does not end there. Through a careful review of women 
readers' attitudes toward Milton, and especially Eve in Paradise Lost, Wittreich makes a 
strong case for his feminist Milton. Books 11 and 12 become the keys for this reading, 
"the books in which females readers found ideological mirrorings were the ones a male 
readership would muffle" (110). Wittreich returns to the idea of Eve as symbol of 
redemption offered, as we have seen, by other critics. Eve's 
submission is less to a husband than to a fate that befalls Adam and Eve 
alike. It is a submission to mutual cooperation, service, and 
understanding--a selfless submission to and expression of love in 
accordance with the Blakean adage that the sublimest act is to put another 
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before you. Eve's is an expression oflove without subjection. (106). 16 
Wittreich refers to 12.596-97, ("all her spirits compos'd/To meek submission"), arguing 
that after the fall Eve "excels Adam" and her vision "gives life to Adam, ... redeems him 
and history and rest~res paradise to both" (99). Likewise the final two books show an Eve 
who sings "lyrics which, religious in nature, embody a redemptive hope and ascribe to Eve 
herself a redemptive role in history" (104). Eve offers women readers a model of strength 
and stability, a model that does not weakly follow Adam out ofparadise but who instead 
forges a hopeful path that will end in the salvation of humanity. Those critics who cannot 
see this remained shackled by the criticism of the past: 
It is true that men have controlled, and still control, the climate of critical 
opinion, but in this they are currently aided and abetted by a feminist 
criticism that would turn the revolutionary Milton into a reactionary or 
make a cautious . . . Milton out of a bold and inquiring spirit. ( 154) 
Current heretical feminist critics spout the same patriarchal interpretations of Milton, only 
they condemn him for his views rather thanpraising him as male critics do. Both are amiss 
in their conclusions. 
Wittreich goes far in bringing the controversy of Milton and women back to the 
portrayal of Eve in Paradise Lost, but his book remains steeped in heretical charges and 
counter-charges. Nevertheless, his work clears the field to look at Eve honestly and decide 
what happens in the poem rather than to use the text as an occasion to espouse feminist 
doctrine, either positive or negative. In one sense Eve continues to be dominated, albeit by 
critics who mean well and desire her release from patriarchal structures. But the truth of 
the matter is Eve does that herself in the poem, and she does so through focusing on a 
different type of authority, creativity, and knowledge that most critics rarely consider. 
Eve's alternative way of thinking clearly privileges relationship and community above other 
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modes of existence. 
Critics can see these issues at work in Satan's deception of Eve. Does Eve fall 
through inferiority or for some other cause? As Philip Gallagher points out, whatever the 
reason, Eve must fall due to the restrictions of the biblical texts. Milton does not somehow 
diabolically plot the undermining of Eve; she falls in Genesis and she must fall in Milton's 
epic. But what Milton does instead is create an atmosphere conducive to deflecting the 
outcome of that event on to Satan and away from Eve. As Gallagher so insightfully 
argues, Milton early on shines the focus toward Satan: "Th' infernal Serpent; hee it was, 
whose guile/Stirr'd up with Envy and Revenge, deceiv'd/The Mother of Mankind" (1.34-
36). Here the poem "tends to deflect blame for the deceived to the deceiver, and it 
dignifies Eve as the progenitrix of the human race instead of demeaning her as a secondary 
and derivative creation" (52). For some reason, critics downplay Satan's deception when it 
comes to Eve and inflate it when it comes to everyone else (Satan almost overthrows 
Heaven). Besides, too often critics pretend that she is the only one deceived in the whole 
epic; the fact of the matter is nearly everyone who comes into contact with him falls. A 
third of the host of Heaven listens to his message; Sin and Death allow him to pass toward 
Eden; the sentinels prove powerless to stop him. Only Abdiel and God personally see 
through Satan's deception in any meaningful way. All others must be warned by God to be 
wary of Satan's ploys. 
Of course this includes Adam and Eve who do receive ample warning, causing the 
reader to wonder, "how can Eve possibly be deceived?" (Gallagher 53). But Milton again 
highlights Satan's abilities, not Eve's fallibility, in this process by demonstrating, as 
Gallagher illustrates, the deception of Uriel. Satan easily deceives Uriel because "neither 
Man nor Angel can discern/Hypocrisy, the only evil that walks alone,/Invisible, except to 
God alone" (3.682-84). These startling lines make it clear that Uriel has no power to 
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discern Satan's disguise and false witness. In this moment, Gallagher notes, "The 
deception of this angel allows us to see--long before the temptation and fall--that Eve's 
intelligence is equivalent to that of Adam. But apart from certifying her mental acuity, the 
passage more importantly renders plausible--though it does not cause--Eve's transgression" 
(55). 
Uriel's deception also helps to explain Adam's reaction to Eve's fall: "Ignorant of 
the experience of Uriel, Adam erroneously thinks that deceit can be mastered by 
intellectual discernment; he is dead wrong (no wariness can prevent a 'fall into deception')" 
(Gallagher 63). Uriel, who stands "In sight of God's throne" (3.655), fails to see through 
Satan's pretense; Eve too, no matter her intelligence or perception, has no chance against 
Satan's hypocrisy; she has no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Serpent's message, 
although she has every reason to reject the temptation to spurn God's command. She 
disobeys God through a conscious choice, not because of inferiority or a knowledge Adam 
possesses and she does not. 
Misunderstanding occurs when critics privilege Adam's interpretation of the event 
over Eve's and simply accept Adam's plea ("Would thou hadst heark'n'd to my words, and 
stay'd/With me, as I besought thee" [9.1135-36]) as a simple cure to what has befallen 
them. Such a reading ignores the real truth spoken by Eve: 
hadst thou been there, 
Or here th' attempt, thou couldst not have discem'd 
Fraud in the Serpent, speaking as he spake; 
No ground of enmity between us known, 
Why hee should mean me ill, or seek to harm. (9.1148-52) 
Just as Uriel has no reason to suspect Satan as an angel oflight, so Eve has no reason to 
suspect the Serpent. Critics condemn Eve in the same way Adam does, giving themselves 
a sense of moral superiority over both her and the poem. Eve must be flawed to fall; 
Milton must be a misogynist to create a flawed Eve. It is too much to accept the fact 
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Satan outwits human intelligence and that human will can fall prey to temptation. Adam 
refuses to acknowledge such a possibility, as does the critic who refuses to understand 
Eve's choice as totally her own, free from any inferiority or defect of judgement. The 
censure of Milton's depiction of Eve has more to do with a reluctance to face all humanity's 
weaknesses than it does with Milton's alleged misogyny. 
The amazing thing to note in so much criticism of Paradise Lost is how often 
critics apprehend the choice between Eve's vision of the world and Adam's, and how often 
they choose Adam's interpretation with little or no thought of the reasons why. Perhaps 
Wittreich has stumbled upon something; perhaps critics have become so conditioned to 
reading Milton in a patriarchal way that they condemn the poet for their reading instead of 
themselves. Clearly after the fall, Eve's voice becomes the one most associated with right 
thinking and God's divine will for reconciliation. Yet critics still go right on listening to 
Adam's childish response to the fall (it's Eve's fault not mine) and ignore Eve's beautiful 
efforts to restore what has been so tragically lost. 
But Eve's choice to eat the fruit strikes deeper than feminist concerns--it goes to 
the very core of the critical enterprise. In her choosing, Eve turns her back on the 
community she otherwise cherishes in the poem for selfish self-enlightenment. Her choice 
in turn calls into question the glorification of self-indulgence that marks the rationale 
behind much literary criticism and intellectual pursuits. The call to an individuality that 
abandons all responsibility toward the community and relationships, the impulse to 
privilege the self above all other possible good, the strident insistence that any gesture 
toward the sharing of duties and work means an inherent oppressiveness, all of these 
characteristics define the heresies this study has been examining, all of which recoil at Eve's 
146 
fall as a repudiation of their philosophy. Certainly Eve cannot fall because she desires 
independence and autonomy; to see such an act as the source of sin and tragedy means the 
author (Milton or the Bible) must harbor a patriarchal bias that seeks the control of women 
so that men can pursue the exact same course on their own. 
For such a vision of fulfillment, Satan becomes the only hero. Only he constantly 
rails against community, responsibility, and accountability to others. Only he has the 
unbridled freedom to do whatever he wishes despite the destructive results. Satan 
becomes the heretical ideal, an individual unencumbered by any duty other than his own 
satisfaction and accumulation of power. Milton repeatedly condemns such impulses and 
delivers a clear message that such a course in the end leads to personal and spiritual ruin. 
As C.S. Lewis points out, to vote for Satan is to vote for "incessant autobiography" (100). 
Everywhere Satan turns is hell because everywhere Satan turns he finds only himself with 
no hope of relationship with any other creature. Satan wants not only God's power but his 
isolation, what he perceives as the independence from all other beings to pursue any course 
of action he wishes. Satan even demands self-creation to insure his autonomy: 
We know no time when we were not as now; 
Know none before us, self-begot, self-raised 
· By our own quick'ning power (6.859-61) 
Satan's desire mirrors only too well heresy's drive to free itself from any connection to 
other criticism, to declare itself "self-begot" and without need of any influence or support. 
Heresy gathers power for its own sake without thought for the rest of the community's 
existence. 
Adam comes dangerously close to the same tendency, and thus his need for Eve. 
Eve embodies community and relationship as God makes clear: 
I, ere thou spak'st, 
Knew it not good for Man to be alone, 
And no such company as then thou saw'st 
Intended thee, for trial only brought, 
To see how thou couldst judge of fit and meet: 
What next I bring shall please thee, be assur'd, 
Thy likeness, thy fit help, thy other self, 
Thy wish, exactly to thy heart's desire. (8.444-51) 
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God understands Adam's need for Eve; God brings Adam to the same recognition before 
creating her. By providing Adam with "thy other self," God establishes an idea of 
relationship which should govern human accomplishment. As the center of community, 
God models this idea throughout the poem by always using power to create new 
relationships and to heal fragmented ones. God creates humanity in response to Satan's 
rebellion; God creates Eve to complete Adam; God allows the Son to sacrifice His life to 
bring about the re-establishment of communion with fallen creation. God's expression 
always involves the furthering of harmony and community among things, never the 
isolation or championing of self-realization apart from others. 
Eve keeps this idea before her, except in her deception by Satan. It is clearly 
reflected in her attitude toward knowledge. When Adam inquires of Raphael about 
astronomy, Eve "Rose, and went forth among her Fruits and Flow'rs" (8.44). Eve 
recognizes that such knowledge has nothing to do with maintaining community in Eden, 
even though she could understand fully whatever information Raphael might impart (8.48-
49). Rather, as Stevie Davies writes, "Milton makes it possible for us to see that the 
tendence of 'fruit and flowers . . . bud and bloom' may express a variant form of wisdom 
and virtue" (243). Eve chooses correctly when Raphael warns Adam not to seek 
knowledge that does not bear upon his own existence: "joy thou/In what he gives to thee, 
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this Paradise/ And thy fair Eve" (8.170-72). What Eve really desires is the interaction she 
will enjoy with Adam, not the raw knowledge he will impart, because in their conversation 
they strengthen the relationship that sustains them. 
The question here becomes one not of gender, but an option between two modes 
of knowing. Adam repeatedly longs for knowledge for its own sake, detached from any 
significance to Eve or their ability to live successfully in Eden. Eve always privileges 
knowing that furthers their relationship and sense of place in the world, so she leaves to 
tend to their surroundings. Her knowing always leads back to the center of community. 
Critics who privilege Adam's impulses either view Eve as inferior or Milton as sexist for 
not having Eve pursue knowledge in the same way Adam, and they, would. Critics fall 
prey to the same delusion Adam does: that somehow the accumulation of any knowledge 
means progress. Eve recognizes that knowing for its own sake does nothing but give the 
individual a false sense of power over creation; it will come to nothing. Raphael tells 
Adam 
Heav'n is for thee too high 
To know what passes there; be lowly wise: 
Think only what concerns thee and thy being (8.172-74) 
Raphael does not have to admonish Eve; she already knows and practices his counsel. 
Eve demonstrates her greatest understanding of community and relationship after 
the fall. She initiates the reconciliation that prefigures Christ's redemption ofhumanity. 17 
Adam can think only in terms of affixing blame and does everything possible to distance 
himself from Eve and the fall. He utterly rejects his responsibility and his relationship with 
Eve. Adam reasons in terms of the law which condemns;18 Eve thinks in terms oflove 
which redeems. She turns to Adam for consolation and hope: 
I beg, and clasp thy knees; bereave me not, 
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Whereon I live, thy gentle looks, they aid, 
Thy counsel in this utmost distress (10.918-20) 
Adam sees the fall as a personal disaster brought about by another; Eve sees the fall as 
jeopardizing the relationship that is the only possibility for existence. Adam transfers 
blame while Eve takes it all upon herself as a means of reconciliation. Jason Rosenblatt 
recognizes that "Eve proclaims the continuity of her love for Adam and the supreme value 
of their life together" (59). Only after Eve's offer to bear the punishment alone, only after 
Eve models the correct response to the fall, does Adam recognize the importance of 
sharing their sorrow: 
But rise, let us no more contend, nor blame 
Each other, blam'd enough elsewhere, but strive 
In offices of Love, how we may light'n 
Each other's burden in our share of woe (10.958-61) 
This new Adam emerges solely from Eve's grace, before even God reaches out in 
forgiveness. Rosenblatt argues that "Adam the unworthy becomes worthy, not through a 
complex system of mediation that requires his own loss of identity and his redeemer's 
crucifixion, but simply and immediately through the transforming power of Eve's love for 
him" (59). Eve recognizes her sin as one against her relationship with God and Adam, a 
striving for power that banishes all notions of sharing and community and can only lead to 
death. Her response involves reconciling with Adam, the most pressing presence in her 
life, and then leading both of them to reconcile with God, even if that means bearing the 
full brunt of God's wrath. Even Eve's contemplation of suicide displays a selfless act meant 
to ensure no suffering befalls generations to come. 
Eve, not Adam, becomes the source of humanity's redemption ("By me the 
Promis'd Seed shall all restore" [12.623]) as she has already brought Adam back into 
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relationship and community. Adam's inability to think of the fall other than in terms of the 
law and rigid consequences (abstract knowledge) threatens his relationship with both Eve 
and God. Because Eve instead thinks in terms ofrelationship, she understands that 
forgiveness and redemption always remain possible among people who love each other and 
a God whose essence is love and who forms the center of all community in the poem. And 
although punishment does occur (banishment from Eden), the real meaning in existence 
(relationship) remains intact. So Eve confidently instructs Adam to lead the way out of 
Eden: 
but now lead on; 
In mee is no delay; with thee to go, 
Is to stay here; without thee here to stay, 
Is to go hence unwilling; thou to mee 
Art all things under Heav'n, all places thou. (12.614-18) 
Eden for Eve has always been about relationship; she emphasizes it to Adam as they leave 
a physical location to forge a new paradise in spiritual terms. Rosenblatt sees a parallel 
here between Eve and Ruth: "Eve's brave, heartening charge to Adam to lead them out of 
paradise ... merits comparison with Ruth's decision to live with Naomi in a decidedly 
secondary world" (59). But no world is paradise without others to share it with, and no 
world is secondary if a community exists to enjoy its pleasures and bear its burdens. Eve's 
momentary loss of that truth causes the fall, but her immediate regathering of it makes 
anywhere Adam and Eve travel a potential Eden. 
Eve resists oppression by patriarchal society and heretical feminist criticism. She 
emerges as the impetus of redemption in Paradise Lost and holds the promise of 
redemption for all humanity. As long as heretical literary criticism rejects community, it 
will reject Milton's Eve; as long as heretical feminist criticism champions Satanic 
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autonomy, it will portray Milton as a misogynist. Eve's call to relationship runs alien to the 
heresy that literary studies reward; it is little wonder heretical critics brand her as a failure 
in need of deliverance from the life of community that makes "all places thou" for her. But 
perhaps the first glimmers of hope emerge as Miltonists resist the conclusions of heretical 
feminist readings and instead look to Eve as a model for women and all humanity. Eve's 
way involves exchanging one way of knowing for another and sacrificing pure self-interest 
for the welfare of the community, the ultimate act of self-fulfillment. 
Chapter 6 
The Word and Its Act: 
Toward an Idea of Community 
The final chapter of this study will seek to move toward a more extensive definition 
of community for literary criticism to consider. Booth's ideas of vitality, justice, and 
understanding provide a reasonable set of expectations for critics to follow as they seek to 
encourage a sense of plurality that allows the community to flourish. Buber and Milton 
demonstrate that some sort of center must define the enterprise of community, so that all 
the members have a clear sense of where their energies and purposes lie. Buber and 
Milton both envision this center in terms of some transcendent idea, and this chapter will 
also posit a center with clear metaphysical dimensions that allows for both plurality and 
purpose to be maintained. 
But why should community matter? Why should there be an insistence on 
communal value over individual power and achievement? Because heresy in literary 
criticism is not only antithetical to the survival of the institution which it seeks to dominate 
and control, it is antithetical to the very means by which all people exist. In other words, 
heresy not only threatens criticism, but the basis for all possibilities of functioning in 
society. Heresy as a strategy for power at any level denies the communal imperative which 
makes all meaning and purpose possible. 
This chapter will begin with a clarification of what community means and what the 
foundations for its survival entail. Then, beginning with the ideas of Logos, Dabhar, and 
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Edah, the options for the way a text can be read will be explored with a formulation of 
what type of reading insures the creation of community. Then, by looking at a passage 
from Shakespeare's Titus Andronicus, that type ofreading will be modeled. Finally, some 
suggestions for where this type of reading might lead the community will be explored. A 
basic organizational structure will be implemented here that seeks to uphold the criteria of 
plurality and that warrants further discussion among the community of literary critics as to 
where the institution should move to create a center from which community can thrive. 
The idea of what constitutes community is certainly riot a monolithic one. Frank 
Kirkpatrick offers three models of community that cover the range of communal structures 
found within all facets of society. The first of these, the atomistic/contractarian forms the 
type of community generally thought of as American culture. Kirkpatrick argues that "Its 
controlling metaphor is that of independent atoms rationally contracting with each other 
for the terms of their enforced relationship" (2). The ideas of Locke immediately come to 
mind when thinking of contractarian community and the emphasis in this model is the 
autonomy of the individual not relationship. Kirkpatrick sees this as a negative model for 
community as it "takes the practical life with utmost seriousness, regards it as essentially a 
clash of wills, and resolves the conflict by the individual appropriation of power. The 
relation of agents in this mode is essentially one of competition for power" ( 180). This 
type of community "arises out of fear of the power of the other person to limit my freedom 
to do what I want" (181). 
The emphasis in the contractarian model always returns to the individual seeking 
the limits of power over the world and others. Any agreements entered into are seen 
merely as necessary impediments to complete autonomy. Each individual attempts to 
construct binding contracts that favor his or her own pursuit of power. Heresy in literary 
criticism, when it thinks of community at all, uses the contractarian model to formulate its 
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relationship to the institution at large. Heresy works to hold all other claims of 
responsibility at bay while pursuing a course of individual realization. It seizes every 
opportunity to dominate other positions in the critical debate through a rhetoric of 
isolation that defines all competing interpretation as threatening to freedom and autonomy. 
The use of the terms orthodoxy, dogmatism, and tradition becomes the means by which 
other voices are negated. The contractarian model appeals "to the morality of the law as a 
way of keeping the other at bay" (Kirkpatrick 181). This model constructs itself more in 
terms of the minimum requirements of relationship to others rather than to a full interplay 
among members of the community. Eric Loewy recognizes that a contract arrangement 
for community cannot insist on "obligations beyond those of utter respect for freedom" 
(105). While sounding enlightened, such a view creates stagnation since any relationship 
makes demands on basic individual freedoms. Responding to the need of another causes 
the forfeiting of attending to personal needs in some respect. 
The second mode of community Kirkpatrick terms the organic/functional which 
metaphorically exists as "organs, interdependent and functionally related to each other 
within a larger organism" (2). The concept of the communal as a living organism with 
individuals performing functions for the survival of all would seem to offer a reasonable 
model of cooperation. But performing required functions can often cause a sense of 
doubleness for the individual. The Scottish philosopher John Macmurray calls the organic 
model the contemplative because 
the person conforms his practical life to the demands of the social order but 
in his private life withdraws into what he regards as his 'true' self If the real 
world does not meet his needs, he creates an ideal or spiritual world where 
they can be met. Real life is enjoyed at the level of contemplation, 
meditation, or simply privacy . . . . He makes his activity in the practical 
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world as automatic as he can. (Kirkpatrick 180) 
This in many ways describes the dilemma of the heretical New Historian. Confronted with 
the difficulty of making society function according to a personal ideal, the heretical critic 
creates a metaphor to describe how the public world should operate in terms of the 
individual vision created. The pressures of actual society cause a retreat into an imagined 
construction of how literature and culture should interact. The heretical critic then 
chooses bits and pieces of actual life to bolster the private world. Kirkpatrick sees the 
organic model predicated upon "fear of relationship with the actual other: a fear that in 
practice the other can disturb the center of my being" (181 ). The organic model produces 
an outer adherence to what Macmurray calls "good form" while the members believe all 
the while that the real business of existence takes place internally through contemplation 
and reflection. 
Buber would define both of these modes of community as deriving from I-It 
relationships. For Buber, "There is no I taken in itself, but only the I of the primary word 
I- Thou and the I of the primary word I-It" (3). No true community occurs through the 
objectification of people so they can be controlled for the purposes of achieving individual 
power and control. Buber does not deny the reality of I- It relationships because the "will 
to profit and will to power are natural and legitimate as long as they are tied to the will to 
human relations and carried by it. There is no evil drive until the drive detaches itself from 
our being" (98). Buber does not deny the basic desires for profit and power, but without 
tempering those with responsibility to the Thou of the I-Thou relationship, "they abjure 
life" (98). Therefore, "The structures of the communal human life derive their life from the 
fullness of the relational force that permeates their members" (98). Both the contractarian 
and the organic models of community seek to create a society in which the individual can 
function without responsibility to the Thou of the I- Thou relationship. The individual can 
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exist by objectifying all human relations into the I- It and seek to control them for the 
purpose of power divorced from the spirit. Eventually, however, life exacts its price: "To 
be sure, life takes its time about settling the score, and for quite a while one may still think 
that one sees a form move where for a long time a mere mechanism has been whirring" 
(98). 
Heresy as a strategy for power seeks the objectified relationships of the/- It 
construction. Without a sense of responsibility to others in the community, by seeing the 
communal as an arena to exert as much individual autonomy as possible, the heretic tests 
the limits of isolating and defeating other critical interpretations. But as Buber points out, 
this eventually destroys the existence of community and in the process the heretic no 
longer has a place to declare control. Life, as Buber says, eventually settles the score. 
Booth would see this as the defeat of plurality and therefore the diminishment of the 
critical enterprise. 
Kirkpatrick and Macmurray argue that the problems of the contractarian and 
organic modes derive from an incorrect construction of the individual. Kirkpatrick 
identifies this issue with the construction of'self as a thinking individual: 
To start one's understanding of persons with the assumption that they are 
essentially thinkers is to start with persons in practical isolation from other 
persons, as Descartes himself did when he began by doubting everything 
with which he was immediately in relation. (159) 
The outcome of such a construction is that the self "does not know from the outset that it 
is a 'thou' in relation to other selves because its starting point does not permit it to accept 
anything as a given other than its own thinking withdrawn from relation to others" (160). 
The self as thinker leads to a construction of binaries (theory/practice, reason/action, 
mind/body, appearance/reality) that makes relationships impossible to maintain because the 
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self always returns to its isolation. 
Macmurray is adamant about the illusion of the self as autonomous thinker, isolated 
and complete: 
[T]here are few things which I can desire to do, and none that are of 
personal significance, which do not depend upon the active co-operation of 
others. We need one another to be ourselves. This complete and unlimited 
dependence of each of us upon the others is the central and crucial fact of 
personal existence. Individual independence is an illusion; and the 
independent individual, the isolated self, is a nonentity. In ourselves we are 
nothing; and when we tum our eyes inward in search of ourselves we find a 
vacuum . . . . It is only in relation to others that we exist as persons; we are 
invested with significance by others who have need of us; and borrow our 
reality from those who care for us. (211) 
But how does one escape the long tradition of formulating the self as autonomous thinker? 
Macmurray posits that the self should be thought of not as inward thinker, but outward 
agent. Therefore, "Acting, that is, engaging ourselves with a world exterior to us, both 
precedes and follows the temporary withdrawal into thinking" (Kirkpatrick 162). As a 
result, "the ultimate test of one's thinking must be in its ability to return one to the fulness 
of immediate experience without frustration or repeated failure" (162). This construction 
does not negate thinking; it merely makes it the tool of the agent acting in the world. 
But how should the self as agent act? This leads to the third construction of 
community, the mutual/personal. The mutual/personal is a community where "distinct 
persons find fulfillment in and through living for each other" (Kirkpatrick 2). Rather than 
seeing others as threats to individual freedom, others become the entire reason for 
communal existence. In fact, others form that center the community requires for success: 
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"the center of interest and attention is in the other, not in himself' (Macmurray 158). 
Loewy overcomes the objection that such a model defeats individual achievement: "the 
relationship between individuals and their communities, far from being a necessarily 
competitive one, is a relationship in which both seek to expand their role and in which both 
see that expansion as critically necessary for both" (172). Loewy terms this constant 
expansion and change for the success of both individual and community "homeostasis" 
(47). Here the embodiment of Buber's I- Thou construction finds fruition; community "is 
constituted by seeking the fulfillment ofothers for their own sake" (133). 
Such a model of community requires a tremendous departure from much Western 
thought where the individual and personal fulfillment so often reign supreme. What 
Macmurray, Kirkpatrick, and others suggest is that the self as an individual thinking in 
isolation is an illusion that thwarts not only community but genuine existence. The need 
for others to create any sense of selfleads to community as the foundation for all 
subsequent endeavors. 
The idea of responsibility to the Other as the center of community finds helpful 
clarification in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas sees the encounter with the Other 
as the quality that actualizes the self The apprehension of the Other leads to a realization 
that "I experience myself as an instance that tries to appropriate the world by labor, 
language, and experience, whereas the other instance does not permit me to monopolize 
the world because the Other's greatness does not fit into my enclosure--not even that of 
theoretical comprehension" (Peperzak 21). 1 Levinas defines the encounter with the Other 
in terms of height (hauter) that comes to the self from on high and parallels transcendent 
apprehension. For Levinas, total Otherness approaches a type of divine encounter that the 
self must respond to in terms of responsibility: "we recognize the Other as resembling us, 
but exterior to us; the relationship with the Other is a relationship with a Mystery" ( 75). 
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After having one's world punctured by the Other, the self comes to the realization 
that "obligation with regard to the Other is also infinite, who, without self-interrogation 
about reciprocity, without posing questions about the Other at the approach of his face, is 
never done with the neighbor" (108). Levinas conceives of this responsibility to the Other 
chiefly in moral terms: 
the encounter with another reveals the supreme law: my selfhood must bow 
before the absoluteness revealed by another's look or speech. My home, 
my food and beverage, my labor, and all my possessions of the earth that I 
enjoy receive their definitive meaning by being put into the service of 
another who, by her unchosen 'height' makes me responsible. (Peperzak 24) 
Unlike Heidegger, who emphasizes the contemplative and poetic aspects of human life, 
Levinas asserts the moral responsibility to the Other as the basis of meaning in human life 
(Peperzak 26). Furthermore, the self cannot generalize responsibility to the Other, but 
must care for Others individually as they are encountered. This process accomplishes two 
things: first, the self is not overwhelmed by knowing it must care for all Others, only the 
one now meeting the self face to face, and second, the self cannot generalize about 
responsibility because "collective measures lose their human meaning because they have 
forgotten or masked real faces and real speech" (Peperzak 31). Such generalizing causes a 
dangerous situation as "This forgetfulness is the beginning of tyranny. If the infinite 
dignity of concrete individuals whom we love has been obscured, the only outcomes are 
universal war in the name of innumerable conflicting needs, or the dictatorship of an ego 
who happens to be the handiest of all" (Peperzak 31-32). 
Levinas's ideas about responsibility to the Other fit well with Macmurray's 
formulation of the self as agent, because it is only in acting in behalf of the Other that the 
responsibility of the self can be truly fulfilled. Community finds as its center all Others that 
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the self come into contact with in personal, concrete situations. This mutual effort of 
providing for the needs of each other creates a genuine sense of Koinonia that makes all 
relationships and meanings possible. 
The claims of the Other and of community exclude the strategy of heresy. As 
Levinas makes clear, heresy seeks to appropriate the Other for purposes of control and 
dominance. Such a tactic denies not only the uniqueness (height) of the Other but denies 
the essential nature of existing as a self. An act of seizure against the Other constitutes an 
act of violence against the self as one who bears infinite responsibility for the Other. The 
quest for individual power and control denies the primary state of being, responsibility to 
the Other, that defines human life. 
What impact do such theories have upon literary criticism? The critic owes the 
text, as a production of the Other, the responsib1lity that the Other demands. Isn't the 
erasure of the author in post-structural theory merely the attempt to deny the Other so that 
the text can be appropriated for individual power and control? Interpretation becomes an 
act that the critic makes on behalf of the text to insure its survival as a unique production 
of an Other. As such, the critic must not view the text as an occasion for the accumulation 
of power, for such a view leads to the seizure of the text in an attempt to render it the 
Same as the critic's own theoretical or heretical outlook or to expel it when it cannot be 
easily rendered to that Sameness. Such approaches violate the unique Otherness the text 
possesses and undermine the critic's responsibility to it. Rather than an opportunity to 
assert individual power, the critic must ask, "What do I owe this text as a unique 
expression of an Other?" 
Naturally the immediate objection to such a responsibility emanates from questions 
of intention, language, and signification. But if the self sees the Other not as a unique 
difference to be feared, but as the basis for existence, language should not intimidate the 
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critic. The way to think of the Otherness oflanguage takes the self to the idea of Logos. 
Derrida claims in Differance that all philosophies of language in the end are theological. 2 
Taking Derrida at his word, one may assume that language concerns a theory of God, 
which forms the basis of considering language's height (hauter) as defined by Levinas. 
The selfs relation to language then concerns itself with Logos as the divine utterance of 
God, not logos as mere word, argument, or even calculation. 3 Language must be 
theological because language comes nearest to apprehending that divine utterance, that 
Word, and containing it within its own words. 
As Derrida sets out to construct his theory of God, and Derrida best defines the 
crisis language causes in responsibility to the Other, he finds himself continually frustrated 
by the words that cannot name the Word: "There has to be a transcendental signified for 
the difference between signifier and signified to be somewhere absolute and irreducible" 
(36). Language as it is commonly known cannot find that transcendental signified, 
however, and the sign becomes "deferred presence": "this structure presupposes that the 
sign, which defers presence, is conceivable only as the basis of the presence that it defers 
and moving toward the deferred presence that it aims to reappropriate" (61). This 
difference between the sign and the presence it wishes to name becomes the foundation for 
all of Derrida's ideas about God and subsequently about language. In the end, "in the 
system of language, there are only differences" ( 64). 
This difference, or differance, Derrida also defines as an absence, an absence of 
presence, an absence in writing of both the speaker and hearer, an absence even of all 
Otherness, and this absence produces a "drift" in the sign that enables the word to signify a 
plurality of meanings. Absence means that 
Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the usual sense 
ofthis opposition), as a small or large unity, can be cited, put between 
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quotation marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and 
engender infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. (97) 
Because the sign does not mean one thing (its signified), it can mean all things. Critics do 
not consider the sign and the signified it seeks, but rather the space between them and all 
that might fill that absence. 
Drawing finally to the heart of his theological quest, Derrida uses the imagery of 
John to complete his description of the estrangement of the Word from language. In 
"Plato's Pharmacy," "Logos is a son, then, a son that would be destroyed in his very 
presence without the present attendance of his father" (117). But unlike in John where the 
father and the son are one (John 1.1 ), the son goes forth without the father and as a 
consequence will be "nothing but, in fact, writing" (117). Writing then, the son without 
the father, becomes "a desire for orphanhood and patricidal subversion" (118). Who will 
take up this orphan, what will the son do without the father? Here it seems the critic might 
come to the rescue as the "responsibility for the logos, for its meaning and effects, goes to 
those who attend it, to those who are present with the presence of a father" (118). It 
would seem the responsibility to the Otherness of the text might be fulfilled. But the critic 
who would name the son must be wary, because writing as pharmakon, as Derrida 
deconstructsthe parable of Plato, means both poison and remedy, and therefore there is no 
"such thing as a harmless remedy. The pharmakon can never be simply beneficial" (128). 
Those who would translatepharmakon as merely remedy fail to recognize the word retains 
all of its possibilities, including poison, against any attempt to interpret it. 
So the Word, the son, proceeding from the father becomes a word, an orphan that 
belongs to all and yet no one, that contains all its meaning and its non-meaning as inscribed 
in writing. Derrida takes God to task for leaving the son unattended, for allowing the 
Word to drift into the unstable world of mere human language and inadequate signs, 
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because signs, apart from their signifieds, have the potential to do no end of harm as 
interpreters fill up the spaces in-between them. What mischief will be visited upon 
humanity by the absent father who allows the Word to roam free and without signification? 
For every remedy an equal calamity awaits unleashing. There exist no readings but only 
mis-readings, no interpretations but only mis-interpretations. 
This instability of the sign in language would appear to make protecting the 
interests of the Otherness of the text impossible, because the gap between sign and 
signified makes apprehension of the Otherness all too fleeting. But if the word names a 
cancer so it has the ability to name a cure. For what Derrida fails to take into account 
about the logos concerns its dual function as both word and act. The logos does not 
merely exist as the utterance, the speech, the word of God, but also as God's agent of 
action. The son, no matter how removed from the father, contains the act of meaning 
within himself He will go forth; he will signify in some matter; his purposes will not be 
thwarted. The Hebrew dabhar, word, pertains here as it carries with it the connotation of 
"deed." As ThorliefBoman points out, '"Word' is, so to speak, the point of intersection 
between two entirely different ways of conceiving of the highest mental life" (68). For the 
Greeks, the Word leads to reason; for the Hebrews, the Word leads to deed. But as 
Boman points but, the two words are so intertwined that they give and take from each 
other (67-69). Like the spirit brooding upon the water in Genesis, the logos tabernacles 
among us (John 1.14) seeking the signifier that will make action, any action, possible. The 
word must find an outlet which allows it to mean, to be this and not that, and it does not 
rest until it finds the signifier that will accept that responsibility. The word, through the 
tremendous force of its own will as act and utterance, collapses the space of its own 
accord and crushes any rhetorical structure that seeks to hold it at bay. 
In a similar way, the father lets the son wander where he may. Implanted in the 
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father's utterance is also the father's will as to how the word should act, but the father will 
not coerce the son. The word speaks of the act that it desires, but only through the 
recognition of the interpreter can that action find completion. Here the ability to connect 
to the Otherness becomes possible. The word can be led to any signifier the interpreter 
chooses, but the word cannot be held at bay to make all meanings possible. What deed 
forged through interpretation does the critic owe the text and the community which 
depends upon responsibility to all Otherness? As action, the word will only hold one 
meaning at a time. The word may indeed be remedy or poison, but it cannot be both 
simultaneously because as an action as well as an utterance the word must choose. If 
critics or readers absolve themselves of that responsibility by imagining they can hold the 
word hovering over the space meaning all things, they merely send the word on its way to 
a place where choices will be made and the word can act. 
Saying the word can be both remedy and poison at the same time reveals the true 
dangers of language lurking in the space between sign·and signified. One action will 
prevail; the word seeks the signifier that gives it lodging. Language as remedy and poison 
leads to phrases such as "ethnic cleansing" and "collateral damage." Writing contains 
possibility, but writing must be interpreted to be made intelligible and then the deed comes 
to fruition. One of the key terms in the idea of community in the Hebrew language is the 
word edah, 4 which literally translated means· "testimony" or "witness." But edah is "used 
only of things posited to establish permanence and unequivocal facts" (Harris 649). The 
word includes the testimony of God's covenant with Israel and the stones gathered as a 
remembrance of the work of God in a particular locale. The idea of edah is that to belong 
to the community one must testify to something of value. The critic in the community of 
literary studies must testify to the deed that brings remedy from the text and so protects 
and provides for its Otherness. That testimony can provide further remedy to the 
community at large or it can serve as a warning when it sees the language of the text 
heading toward an act that could result in poison or violence. 
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In Act 2.1 of Shakespeare's Titus Andronicus the opportunity arises to comprehend 
how different ways of interpreting testify to certain deeds emerging. Tamora's sons and 
Aaron plot the rape of Lavinia. Aaron instructs the men to leave the court because 
The Emperor's court is like the house of Fame, 
The palace full of tongues, of eyes and ears, 
The woods are ruthless, dreadful, deaf, and dull. 
There speak and strike, brave boys, take your turns. 
There serve your lust, shadowed from heaven's eye, 
And revel in Lavinia's treasury. (2.1.127-32) 
Entering this course of action leads to violence taken against Lavinia and subsequent 
bloodshed between families to revenge the deed. All of these acts arise out of an 
interpretive choice: Aaron and Tamora's sons "read" nature in a particular way. 
Critics and readers alike have long thought of nature as a text to be read and 
learned from throughout history. From the first religions that looked for signs (words) 
from nature that their sacrifices pleased the gods of the woods,.to Emerson reading nature 
to discover the transcendent, to environmentalists of today reading the treatment of nature 
as a parable of humanity's own destructive tendencies, nature has been read to discover 
meaning and purpose. Those "readings" have in tum led to actions proceeding from the 
words found in nature. 
Paul certainly sees the issue that way in the book of Romans. He makes it clear to 
his audience that anyone can "read" nature to discover the truth of God's creative work: 
"For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities--his eternal power and divine 
nature--have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men 
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are without excuse" (Romans 1.20). For Paul, this "correct" reading of nature should lead 
one to acknowledge the author of nature's wonders and give praise for them (1.21). In 
fact, this reading should prove quite simple as God "has made it plain to them [ even the 
pagan]" (1.19). However, Paul makes it just as clear that nature can be mis-read, to make 
a plurality of other dangerous meanings possible. These other meanings also produce 
actions that lead to destruction: "They exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped 
and served created things rather than the Creator" (1.25). Once nature opens itself up to 
such mis-reading, various kinds of tragic acts result, acts that for Paul lead to death and 
separation from God (1.24-32). 
For Paul, the word (nature) must seek only one action, the praise and recognition 
of God. Yet at the same time Paul recognizes the word can seek other actions based upon 
other readings (for Paul mis-readings) of nature. One can easily read nature as end unto 
itself, as an object to worship rather than an object that points to the true focus of worship. 
Trying to deny the presence in the word, however, will not deny the word's ability to act; 
Paul argues that one either produces life or death according to how one reads nature's text. 
One cannot hold the word's ability to act in stasis by recognizing all the possible outcomes 
the word can generate. So nature (the word) contains both life and death, but the reader 
will never have the opportunity to keep both in check by asserting the reality and presence 
of both. The reader must choose. 
Aaron and Tamora's sons read nature in such a way that they radically deny any 
divine presence in the woods. For them, nature shields humanity from the transcendent; it 
does not reveal itself as God's creation. And just as Paul reasons, this reading of nature 
allows for acts that lead to death. Lavinia, in fact, begs for a different interpretation: 
'Tis true the raven doth not hatch a lark. 
Yet I have heard--0, could I find it now!--
The lion, moved with pity, did endure 
To have his princely paws pared all away. 
Some say that ravens foster forlorn children 
The whilst their own birds famish in their nests. 
0, to be to me, though thy hard heart say no, 
Nothing so kind, but something pitiful. (2.3 .151-56) 
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Lavinia offers another reading of nature, a reading that sees the possibility of mercy and 
compassion in the midst of the struggle for survival, and that also takes her Otherness into 
account in her relation to Tamara's sons. She offers this interpretation as a means of 
escape from the cruelty Tamara and her sons would commit. Her alternative to Aaron's 
reading of nature can bring no solace however unless Tamara's sons let her words produce 
the action they desire. It does not turn out to be so--Lavinia's reading does nothing but 
hang emptily in the air as Tamara's sons drag her off to be raped and mutilated. 
The reading of nature as a place of violation exists together with nature as a site for 
mercy. The word will not remain still, though; it must seek an action to complete itself, 
and Tainora's sons choose violence over possible reconciliation by interpreting in a way 
that forgoes their responsibility to Lavinia. That the presence of mercy still resides in the 
text of nature means nothing for Lavinia; that the space between sign and signified might 
as easily allow her freedom becomes impotent in the face of her screams for pity in the 
woods as Tamara's sons pervert the word for the darkest of actions. 
One can easily appreciate the terror of choosing the action that can ensue from the 
responsibility of interpretation. But the word will find its act, and the attempt to hold the 
text in potential will simply delay the act but will fail to defer it indefinitely. The critic who 
will not choose has already chosen, because the word moves on to find a new site for 
action, and the critic relinquishes the right to protest through the failure to testify. The 
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gesture of shaking one's fist at heaven, of raging against the inability to know for certain, 
cannot find erasure through trying to withhold all knowing from the text. Tamora's sons 
read nature and Lavinia cannot defer their act by suggesting the text contains within itself 
the promise of mercy as well as violence. 
Demetrius and Chiron must now find a way to blot out the horrendous crime they 
have committed. Like Philomel, Lavinia's tongue is cut out so she cannot testify against 
her attackers. But the brothers know that this will not suffice; writing can still betray 
them. The word does not lose its potency simply because Lavinia cannot speak it; writing 
the names ofTamora's brothers will bring the vengeance she desires because her writing 
will find interpretation from a community (her family) that will not let the space remain 
silent; that community will take Lavinia's Otherness seriously and seek to protect it. They 
will fill it up with the act to avenge Lavinia's ravishment. So the brothers cut off Lavinia's 
hands and Chiron taunts her to "Write down thy mind, bewray thy meaning so,/An if thy 
stumps will let thee play the scribe" (2.4.3-4). Chiron is confident that could she write, 
Lavinia would "write her mind" and precisely describe the atrocity done against her. The 
brothers have no doubt that writing and the spoken word both do the work that leads to 
action and would inevitably hasten their death. 
Shakespeare's use of the word "bewray" deserves notice in this context. The word 
connotes the idea of "revealing" or "divulging." Lavinia must have writing to "reveal" the 
source of her rape. The signs of her body cannot lead back to the signifiers who imprinted 
them. Without language, Lavinia cannot testify as to who inscribed the wounds upon her, 
although all can "read" her body to understand the outcome of the act. A real gap between 
sign and signified exists as Lavinia stands helpless to name the origin of her condition 
without writing. In vain, Marcus tries to discover the source of Lavinia's suffering, but he 
can only comment instead upon its effects (2 .4 .11-5 7). Demetrius and Chiron have 
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literally cut off all means of Lavinia taking the signs of abuse on her body and tracing them 
back to Tamera's sons as the signifiers that cause her anguish. She has no word to speak 
or write and therefore no act to defend her. 
Yet Lavinia does in the end "write her mind." First, she names her plight by finding 
the story of Philomel in Young Lucius's books ( 4.1 ). Lavinia need not write her own 
tragedy; she merely needs the shadow of Philomel's story to fall across the path of her 
family to begin the process of signification. She accomplishes that beginning through 
writing and words which name the signs upon her body while at the same time everyone in 
the play still reads nature as a place of horrors. "O, why should nature build so foul a 
den/Unless the gods delight in tragedies?" (4.1.58-59), asks Marcus as Lavinia's plight 
starts to dawn upon him. Lavinia creates the context of her suffering through writing; now 
she must find the means of naming the origin. She does so, again through writing. After 
Marcus demonstrates how to write with a staff upon the ground with his feet and mouth, 
Lavinia takes her tum and writes the names of Chiron and Demetrius in the dirt ( 4.1. 79). 
Writing the words allows the process of vengeance to begin. Marcus recognizes that 
"There is enough written upon this earth/To stir a mutiny in the mildest thoughts" (83-84). 
Yet what will happen when Lavinia quits that piece of earth and the names of 
Demetrius and Chiron linger in the dust? Could heretical critics say that in her absence 
.they will again take on the ability to register any meaning as signs displaced from their 
signifier? Indeed they may, but they will still seek their act, and the reader will again have 
to choose where they will rest. Even if a foot should wipe away those names, the act 
against Lavinia will never change, the signs her body carries of that violation resist erasure 
even after the words have passed away. Heretical critics cannot obliterate history by 
passing their critical feet over the dust of countless texts and pretend to re-write in the 
spaces the acts those words have sought and fostered. Neither can critics hold the text at 
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bay to never act again. In the absence of the father, they must attend to writing and testify 
as to whether this word will become remedy or poison, and if they say to the word "you 
are both" they shoulder the responsibility for the consequences of whatever act ensues. 
The heretical critic then can offer no solace to Lavinia that Tamora's sons might 
have read nature differently, that the absence that allows the violence against her also 
contains the mercy that might save. Instead, they must choose to write the names of 
Demetrius and Chiron in the dust as Lavinia does to testify that their reading contains 
poison, to make clear their interpretive choice has led to ruin and atrocity. They must 
name the origins of that act in this poisonous reading just as Lavinia names the origins of 
the signs upon her body. They have no power to change the act that proceeds from the 
word Demetrius and Chiron read in nature, that the woods shelter them from "Heaven's 
eye." They only have the power to say no to that reading and declare all subsequent 
readings of nature in this way as guiding the word toward a venomous act. 
But the text unlike the deed still remains. And here readers and critics have the 
opportunity to champion the mercy that Lavinia pleads for in the woods, a mercy that 
readers and critics owe Lavinia's Otherness as a community. They can choose to guide the 
word toward its future acts and offer the remedial side of the text in interpretation. Doing 
so does not ignore the poison or somehow deny its presence in the text. Instead, they 
recognize all the text contains and testify to the interpretation which seeks to lead the word 
to the act which brings mercy not violence. Writing will not rest in the knowledge that all 
acts remain available to it in the space. Writing awaits the interpretation that points 
toward the shedding of all other contingencies and leaves only a concrete act where the 
word can find completion. Just as the self is agent, so is the word. Writing does not 
concern itself with whether that deed contains the poison or the remedy; it only desires the 
voice that makes the word flesh, not possibility. 
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The prospect of choosing an interpretation which leads to remedy should certainly 
give every literary critic pause. But the responsibility of the critic to Otherness makes it 
imperative. That language contains both remedy and poison does not defer that obligation. 
But as this chapter has sought to show, trying to hold the two in stasis collapses in the end 
by failing to take into account the act the word desires. The word will not be held in 
stasis, and if the critic abandons the field, the word will follow any who offers a deed. 
Critics have no right to condemn the act by refusing to acknowledge its existence in the 
first place and believing the word can remain satisfied in its potential. Without God, 
without the father that attends the son, leading the word to the ideal action creates an 
anxiety that many critics cannot overcome. Therefore, they retreat back into the space 
between sign and signified and pretend all acts remain hidden there. 
Where does Lavinia fit in this world? Will critical reluctance heal her wounds? 
Will acknowledging that other reading of nature she posits restore her body to herself? 
The word needs attendance; critics are the surrogate parents who must make the 
heartrending choices that lead to acts they can never control totally. But not to choose 
leaves an orphaned word susceptible to the most horrific forces critics can imagine residing 
in the space. The dictates of Otherness demand the effort be made to testify to the remedy 
that makes the word flesh. Do critics have the stamina for the struggle? Do they dare risk 
the atrocity for the healing touch of mercy? Can they limp away when the words cripple 
them with their power? No act can be held in binary purity; how will critics keep the 
remedy from erupting into poison? 
Only by struggling together can literary criticism hope to determine the remedy 
from the poison. But even if those efforts sometime fail, "community is constituted not 
solely by its degree of achievement, but by the intention which sustains it" (Kirkpatrick 
195). Making these choices will not be easy, but ignoring them will only allow the word to 
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seek the act elsewhere, an alternative that should give literary critics discomfort. There 
will occur moments when an interpretive choice brings pain, but critics must risk that 
possibility. Heresy cannot thrive in a community that puts the word and the act before 
power, that takes up its responsibility to Otherness rather than trying to isolate the text for 
the purpose of holding it hostage to interpretive autonomy and control. 
Lavinia is raped not because nature refuses mercy as a possible reading, but 
because Tamora's sons refuse to make the choice that leads the word to a remedial act. 
Critics become co-conspirators by not testifying against that reading and no amount of 
discussion about the space and the plurality of other meanings that might have issued forth 
relieves them of that guilt. And to further withhold the choice that asserts the mercy of 
nature as a text makes cruelty a possible deed the word seeks over and over again. That 
does not negate forever the possibility of other interpreters choosing that act, but it gives 
the community the right to express outrage and censure whenever it does occur, because 
the community has wrestled with the word and can say, "This and not that" can happen in 
relation to the word and the act in order to protect the interests of both Otherness and the 
community. 
If literary criticism desires relevance, influence, and even a political voice, it must 
exchange heretical power for communal authority; it must bend and make difficult choices 
that may for a time produce regrettable outcomes until critics learn what is best for the 
institution and those they seek to instruct and speak to in society. Such positions are not 
naive; they are rather imminently practical. The word will find its act. What role will 
critics play in guiding it there? Literary criticism needs to explore the remedy of language 
instead of clinging to the belief that heresy offers a quicker avenue to power. 
But the demands of community and Otherness do not stop at the level of criticism. 
Literary studies must explore what it owes to Others at all levels of the critical enterprise. 
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As teachers, how do critics foster the Otherness of students and ensure their well-being 
and success? As members of a larger institution, what do critics owe other members of the 
academy? What should critics testify to outwardly to the public who increasingly see 
literary criticism as hostile or worse, meaningless? All of these questions must find 
answers if community will have any real impact on literary studies. And the formulation of 
those questions begins when critics abandon heresy for the responsibility to Others in all its 
forms. 
And what does this study testify to in the end? Does it really believe in community 
as a genuine principle for literary studies? Solace can be taken in Kirkpatrick's idea of 
"intention" ensuring success for the community even when reality falls short of the goal. If 
heresy continues to be seen as a viable alternative for power in criticism, then eventually 
the institution ofliterary criticism will simply be "whirring" without any purpose, to use 
Buber's phrase. Only in mutuality, only in seeking the success of others in the community 
and in interpretation can literary studies form a basis for continued meaning in the academy 
and society at large. 
Notes to Introduction 
1 Perhaps the best example in recent history involves the Southern Baptist Convention. 
After much wrangling and rhetoric and efforts at finding common ground, the two warring 
factions in the convention went their separate ways, with the Southern Baptists 
representing the "conservative" wing of the denomination and the Baptist Alliance the 
"liberal." This marks the end of a long debate over heresy and orthodoxy and the political 
debate that attends it, although we still see arguments as both sides claim the other tries to 
infiltrate their ranks. 
2 This metaphor ofliterary critic as priest occurs quite often in English studies and has 
been used to great effect by Harold Bloom. See especially Kabba/ah and Criticism. See 
also Frank Kermode's The Genesis of Secrecy, where the religious and priestly role of the 
critic pervades the work. 
3 This outburst occurred at the end of the Scholar/Critic debate among Milton critics. For 
a complete treatment of the conflict, see Chapter 1. 
4 W.H. Auden admitted the necessity of writing criticism for the poet of his era in The 
Dyer's Hand. Auden understood the job as a question of economics more than a 
profession. 
5 Science offers the best comparison with literary studies as a discipline with certain 
dynamics. See Lessl's "Heresy." 
6 The question immediately arises as to the scope a sociological study should take. This 
work does not attempt to examine all the facets of the institution, but rather tries to explain 
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the working of heresy within literary criticism. Such an approach is widely used in the 
application of sociology to other disciplines. See Lessl's work with science in "Heresy" 
and "The Priestly Voice" where he uses sociological models to examine written discourse 
only in the examination of science as an institution. 
7 Orthodoxy as a term will carry various meanings in this study. As used here in the usual 
sense, orthodoxy refers to the established beliefs, doctrines, and practices that govern an 
institution. As the term refers to heresy in literary studies, orthodoxy means any literary 
interpretation that the heretical critic wishes to negate or diminish for the purposes of 
establishing the power of his or her own position. Orthodoxy as it refers to community 
carries the idea of a center from which the institution proceeds to carry out its purposes. 
The context of each use of the term should supply its meaning as defined here, but each 
will be clarified where needed or when used in a potentially ambiguous way. 
8 Dogmatism also carries more than one meaning in this study. In Weber's sense, dogma 
merely denotes the interpretation of a text deemed authoritative by the institution. For 
literary critics, however, dogma carries nothing but a negative connotation. Dogma refers 
to any interpretation that stifles or denies the viability of other approaches. Critics label 
other interpretations as dogmatic to cast them as detrimental to the free play of ideas in 
literary criticism. Employing the term dogma stigmatizes an interpretation and allows the 
heretical critic to offer an alternative with greater power. 
9 The stability of the canon within literary studies has undergone tremendous challenges 
over the past several years as critics try to redraw the boundaries ofliterature. But dogma 
quickly forms around even the most "marginalized" of texts critics interpret. 
10 David Denby points out the recent interest in imperial and colonial studies in his essay 
for The New Yorker. It is instructive insofar as it is written by an "outsider." Mansfield 
Park, Great Expectations, and, of course, Heart of Darkness are among the books he 
mentions in recent colonial studies. The former two books are of special interest, since 
they deal with empire in the most obscure of ways. Denby finds most of the arguments 
baffling or even ludicrous, but in the end he defers to the expertise of the critics. 
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11 From the start, critics have noticed the critique of imperialism employed by Conrad. By 
1967, Avrom Fleishman tries to redefine Conrad in Conrad's Politics, working against 
earlier work by Robert Haugh who characterizes Conrad as a conservative critic of the 
humanitarian enterprise. In 1982 Jacques Darras points out how Conrad takes the West to 
task on every imaginable topic, including empire. In 1985, J. Hillis Miller sums up a 
common critical perception: "Heart of Darkness is perhaps most explicitly apocalyptic in 
announcing the end, the end of Western civilization, or of Western imperialism, the 
reversal of idealism into savagery." So the subject of empire has been well covered in 
Conrad studies. 
12 See Pelikan for the definitive commentary on heresy and innovation in Christian 
theology. 
13 See especially Chapters 1 and 2 of this study where critics try to create space for their 
heresy by negating theoretical approaches even more than individual interpretations. 
14 See Dessen as well as the Jackson and Smallwood anthology and new editions edited by 
Hughes and Bates. 
15 We see the explosion in the "discovery" of marginalized writers especially in regard to 
women writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and in "national" voices among 
colonial endeavors in Africa, India, the United States and elsewhere. 
16 The University of Syracuse in fact requires no surveys of literary history or seminars on 
major writers. Instead students take courses in "textual studies" that define no authors, 
texts, or time periods. Students examine Discourses, Theories of Representation, and 
"Sexualities" among others (Langiulli 5). 
17 The Head of Philosophy at my institution now uses novels instead of philosophy 
textbooks for nearly all of his classes. 
18 See McMillen. 
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19 The most immediate examples that come to mind are recent forays in Chaos Theory and 
literary criticism. Witness the large field of debate among scientists over what uses to put 
such theory to or what purposes at all might come of Chaos Theory, and the use of the 
discipline in literary studies becomes dubious. 
20 Indeed "meaning" itself increasingly comes under attack as heresy gains dominance. 
White calls this Absurdist Criticism which has no foundation except the denial of all 
foundations. See the final chapter of Tropics of Discourse. 
21 Foucault becomes one of the major proponents of the view that structures in society are 
oppressive. Foucault sees the watchful eye of society as a "gaze which each individual 
under its weight will end by interiorizing to the point that he is his own overseer, each 
individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself' (Power.1Knowledge 
155). Foucault makes these remarks in regard to Jeremy Bentham's idea of the 
"Panopticon" and it becomes the overwhelming metaphor of his work. All structures have 
the potential for violence as modem thought is always "advancing towards that region 
where man's Other must become the Same as himself' (Order, qtd. in Coles 71). This 
drive for Sameness leads to oppression at all levels of society. Coles wonders, "why 
would and how could a self who viewed the world only in this way [ as violent] somehow 
express a sense of respect for, affirmation of, and commitment to other selves? Why care? 
What can 'belonging' mean in light of a thoroughly discordant philosophy" (97)? 
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Notes to Chapter 1 
1 The real controversy surrounding Satan begins with the Romantics. As Joseph Wittreich 
points out in his excellent collection of Romantic commentary, the Romantics "more so 
than any others, are the shapers of'modern attitudes"' (Romantics ix). While 
contemporary critics see the Romantics as the main proponents of Satan as Hero, 
Wittreich's valuable anthology documents a wide range of Romantic views toward Milton 
including Satan as Ass and the Promethean parallel of Satan as Human Striver. 
2 S. Musgrove also explores the readers of Milton's day and argues they reach the same 
conclusion as Lewis about Satan: "Milton does not need to prove that Satan is evil; he 
expects his readers to do it and to believe it from the start" (303). That Satan is an Ass is a 
simple matter of fact; the readers of Milton's day knew it, and Lewis posits that Christians 
of today must know it as well. 
3 In his book-length study of Milton's Satan, Werblowsky argues that Milton makes Satan 
too appealing as a Promethean figure, "which has proved detrimental to the unity and 
purpose of the poem" (xvii). 
4 Swift believes that Milton creates a heroic Satan to keep interest in the poem, but he 
views Milton's use of simile as an effective means of "disguising Satan and permitting him 
temporary escape from God's and the reader's judgements" (426). When ready, Milton 
shows Satan for what he is and Satan never "gets away" from Milton as Waldock argues. 
5 Merrill thinks that Milton's loss of control over Satan causes the oddity of Satan being "a 
source of a much profounder religiosity than the juridicial God who speaks in Book 11" 
(285). Merrill also comments on Milton's failure to characterize God as an artistic match 
to Satan. 
6 A long line of critics expose the idea of a hidden poem, especially the Romantics, but 
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most potently Sandra Gilbert who sees Satan as the only alternative for Eve to follow in a 
hostile, patriarchal world. See Madwoman. 
7 Recent commentary on Satan has slowed a bit, and following critical trends, critics have 
turned to grounding Satan in historical and biographical contexts. Schaar sees Satan as a 
deconstructor, while Lanier feels Satan reveals Milton's anxieties about publishing, 
especially in Paradise Regained. Particularly interesting is Freedman's linking of Satanic 
characteristics to Milton's translation of documents announcing the new king of Poland 
shortly before Milton's death. 
8 Steadman recognizes the work of Frank Kastor in this area who traces the literary 
allusions to Satan as Archangel, Prince of Hell, and Tempt er that Milton might have drawn 
upon. 
9 William Hunter was among the first to look at Satan's heretical utterances in concrete 
terms, but he thinks in terms of religious heresy, especially Arianism and Milton's possible 
connection to it. 
Notes to Chapter 2 
1 The first portion of this chapter will use the term "orthodoxy" in the classic sense defined 
in the introduction (i.e., the established beliefs, doctrines, and practices which govern an 
institution) and will note when the meaning of the term changes in the discussion. 
2 A definition of the terms "Scholar" and "Critic" seems essential to the discussion which 
follows. The easiest way to formulate an idea of the two opposing camps resides in 
understanding that Scholars represent the "orthodox" position and Critics the heretical 
element. Scholars can be seen as the established power within criticism. Their critical 
technique involves what we would now call the historical approach. They place great 
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emphasis upon historical context and especially upon authorial intent. Their research, 
exhaustive and at times overwhelming, promotes the idea that proper research produces 
"correct" interpretations. They generally favor biographical study over textual analysis as 
a means of arriving at their conclusions. 
Critics are harder to categorize. While many of the Critics hold to New Criticism, 
not all do. For the most part Critics place emphasis upon the text and believe all meaning 
and worth can be derived from simply studying it free from extra-textual interference, and 
they want almost desperately to make poetry relevant to the modern age, sometimes at the 
cost of accurate historical information ( see Bush). "Art," not boring historical 
archaeology, constitutes their battle cry. At first Critics reject Milton, but they do this 
more to contrast themselves with the Scholars than because of any great loathing of Milton 
( except for Leavis, possibly). Later, many Critics, especially New Critics like Ransom and 
Brooks, show an appreciation for Milton, but still lambast the methods and techniques of 
the Scholars. Therefore, one should not equate liking or disliking Milton with the two 
terms. Plenty of Scholars criticize Milton; it is simply the methods they use to arrive at 
that criticism that come under question. Critics feel Scholars are more interested in cold, 
historical facts than they are in art, a position they feel causes the alienation of the public. 
Scholars hold in contempt what they believe to be the sloppy, subjective approach to 
literature Critics practice. As the orthodoxy/heresy debate becomes less and less about 
Milton and more and more about the control of literary criticism, Scholars and Critics do 
not hesitate to lambast members of their own camp. For a complete history of Scholars, 
Critics, and literary criticism in this century see GrafPs Professing Literature. 
3 While I realize these dates are rather arbitrary and vague, they provide a good frame to 
work within since the Critic/Scholar debate does not appear anywhere as an official period 
in literary history. This also explains why I omit some prominent Miltonists who do not 
really rise to importance until the 1960s, most notably Stanley Fish and especially his 
reading of Paradise Lost. 
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4 Other Scholars question not only Milton's ideology but his standing as a poet, Empson 
being the most prominent. He does not hesitate to dismantle Milton's reputation, but he 
always does so in a "Scholarly" manner, resorting to extensive historical research and 
reasonmg. 
5 See Leavis' Revaluation. 
6 As the debate between Critics and Scholars grows more intense, increasingly Scholars 
overlook disagreements in interpretation to fight the Critics on a united front. 
7 See Lewis's A Preface to Paradise Lost, especially the opening chapter. 
8 Woodhouse's paper later appeared in PMLA as "The Historical Criticism of Milton," 
Brooks' as "Milton and Critical Re-estimates." 
9 For an entertaining account of the Political Correctness wars, see Fish's There's No Such 
Thing as Free Speech. The source of much consternation within the academia in general 
derives from D'Souza's !liberal Education. Graff in Beyond the Culture Wars takes 
D'Souza and others outside the institution to task in the first two chapters of his book 
before launching his own ritual criticism of English studies. 
10 See Lewis, Adams, Tillyard, Bush, and Woodhouse. 
11 Here the shift in the term "orthodoxy" occurs marking it as a position to be avoided in 
literary criticism because of its stifling and dangerous implications. 
12 Booth's idea of understanding serves as helpful gloss on the situation. Understanding 
implies that one reading proves superior to other readings, another formulation of the idea 
of dogma in Weber's sense. 
13 One of the more interesting controversies of late in Milton studies concerns the 
authorship of the Christian Doctrine. William B. Hunter shocked the Fourth International 
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Milton Symposium in Vancouver by suggesting Milton did not write the Doctrine. The 
Fifth Symposium took up the question again in Wales in 1995 by means of a working panel 
consisting of Gordon Campbell, Thomas N. Corns, John K. Hale, David Holmes, and 
Fiona Tweedie. The issues surrounding authorship are heated and extremely political. 
Those who want to project a radical Milton have a great stake in keeping the Doctrine in 
the Milton canon, while others can make their reputation by discrediting it. There also 
exists an undercurrent in the debate of British scholars feeling much more qualified to 
explore the subject because they view American scholars as suspect in historical 
methodology. 
14 See Brooks' "Milton and the New Criticism." 
Notes to Chapter 3 
1 Perhaps the greatest indication of the prevalence and influence of performance theory can 
be seen in the attention now paid by journals to current performances of Shakespeare and 
other playwrights. Shakespeare Quarterly devotes an entire section of each issue to 
"Shakespeare in Performance," and the French journal Cahiers Elisabethains reviews 
Renaissance drama, complete with photographs from the performances. Many other 
journals now regularly include performance reviews and criticism in their issues. 
2 See Berger. 
3 See H.R. Coursen 
4 While the idea of perfection in performance may seem like an odd approach to the 
text/performance debate, "perfection" in many ways strikes at the heart of the issue. For 
many critics, the text constitutes a "perfect" ground for interpretation and discourse, while 
performance remains too slippery and transient. Coursen warns that critics often search 
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for an "Ur-performance ... -- a platonic context which must condemn any manifestation as 
imperfect. But productions do not strive to be 'perfect"' (43). 
5 Barbara Hodgson echoes the tension between text and performance: "the critical reading 
[ of text] seeks to stabilize the text, the performance acknowledges, in its every aspect, its 
ephemeral nature" (65). 
6 I think especially here of the rage surrounding the re-structuring of Joyce's Ulysses and 
the always lively debate over Shakespeare's folio. 
7 For an excellent discussion of textual readings impossible to realize in performance see 
Levin. 
8 While this chapter is not an exhaustive account of performance theory,'it is also not an 
attempt to dismantle its aims and critical approach. In pointing out some of its tendencies, 
especially its potential to voice a heretical position which gains authority and power, I have 
chosen a small representative sampling within the discourse. Performance theory is neither 
monolithic or redundant, but.there is a strain of performance theory that shares common 
assumptions and moves for power through heresy. 
9 Martin argues that the privileging of text over performance has its roots in the captialistic 
system. But he similarly posits that the text involves autonomy by being in complete 
possession of intepretation and meaning. Even when discussion performance, 'Martin 
argues that we define it in terms of its effects on the individual, not the audience ·as a 
whole. 
10 The essential place to begin in New Historical readings and performance theory is the 
Dollimore/Siirlield volume. 
11 For an exhaustive account of koinonia, see Kittel, Vol. 5. For an excellent review of 
koinonia and all its uses in Greek life, see Liddell and Scott. 
12 Performance theorists often take initial steps toward fostering fellowship only to retreat. 
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Hodgson argues that performance is a "public project that re-places the play within a 
theatrical space" (58). But Hodgson never returns to this idea and merely seeks to justify 
the methodology of performance theory as compatible with textual criticism. Of a more 
hopeful note is Miriam Gilbert who argues for seeing productions multiple times as they 
help her to be "less insistent on 'my' reading, more able to accept what the actors and 
director were showing me about the play" ( 610). Gilbert leaves many of these issues up in 
the air and never really engages the role of the audience in creating meaning, but she.does 
at least try to relinquish power to other elements of the performance. 
13 All selections are from the Oxford Complete Works of Shakespeare. 
Notes to Chapter 4 
1 For a good introduction to New Historical thought and ideas, see Morris and Thomas. 
2 See Greenblatt's "Invisible Bullets." 
3 While Greenblatt remains the master of the Opening Andecdote, others·have followed in 
his wake, among them Dollimore. Among the most creative is Jeffrey Knapp. See 
especially his use of tobacco in the New World as a metaphor for Elizabeth, Raleigh, 
colonialism, and literature. Knapp states, "A brief consideration in the Timi us· and 
Belphoebe passage [of The Fairie Queene] helps to begin explaining how the English 
could accommodate tobacco's representation of their own inadequacies" (136). Paul 
Brown uses John Rolfe's request to marry Pochahontas as a metaphor for the construction 
of The Tempest and the ambivalence toward the colonial project. See also Political 
Shakespeare. 
4 Dollimore uses much of his introduction to Radical Tragedy to explain how he wrote the 
book and later submitted it for his dissertation. He had to remove the cover and bind it in 
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a uniform way like all other dissertations. Dollimore uses the incident as a testimony to his 
own subversion of the academic system. 
5 Barroll complains that many New Histoicists themselves fall into conservative approaches 
as well: "many of the the narratives presented by new historicists are disturbingly unself-
conscious and static, constricted by old narratives that tell a traditional story of the drama" 
( 461 ). Barroll's comments are instructive. He attempts to isolate even his fellow heretics 
by declaring they parrot the orthodoxy that must be abolished. There is also a suspicion of 
the "traditional" for no other reason than the fact it has been. previously uttered. 
6 Dollimore in my mind totally misrepresents the idea of essentialism in his discussion of 
racism. To equate one race's essence as superior to another race's destroys the argument. 
Either humanity has one essence or .it do.es not; _no racial categories apply. 
7 The question may naturally arise as to whether the insistence on community reduces 
individuals to the same generalities. But while heretical New Historicists seek descriptions 
that apply to the masses, community respects the individuality and uniqueness of all 
individuals while calling them to corporate responsibility as the greatest means to achieving 
both personal and societal fulfillment. Each individual has a unique contribution to make 
to the community that cannot be generalized. 
8 Bevington has suggested that some recent New Historians inay have found a way out of 
the trend to generalize by appealing to Pragmatism. Bevington finds this encouraging 
since Pragmatism refuses "to posit any single inevitable historical process" (82). 
9 Fish makes these comments in reference to David Norbrook's commentary on Comus. 
10 See Greenblatt's "Invisible," Howard, Dollimore's Radical, and Tennenhouse. 
11 Fish's new work Professional Correctness goes so far as to suggest that influencing 
politics is now impossible as the academy has become too far removed from the corridors 
of political power. No meaningul connection exists between literary critics and policy 
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makers to imagine even the most strident politial theory in criticism exerting influence. 
But Fish goes on to argue that politicians should stop witch-hunting academics since any 
theory from that quarter has no power to impact the political process. 
12 Bevington also suggests that instead of looking for subversion, New Historicists should 
document the ways society always makes things work in the end (82). 
13 A perfect example of this objection exists in a document found in the State Papers 
(Domestic) entitled "Analytical Abstract in Support of the Charge of Treason Against the 
Earl of Essex." A passage from the document reads as follows: 
Essex's own actions confirm the intent of this treason. His permitting 
underhand that treasonable book of Henry IV [by Sir John Hayward] to be 
printed and published; it being plainly deciphered, not only by the matter, 
and by the epistle itself, for what end and for whose behalf it was made, but 
also the Earl himself being so often at the playing thereof, and with great 
applause giving countenance to it. (Ure lviii-lix) 
Although it appears most likely this discussion took place in 1600 during Essex's first trial 
for treason upon his return from Ireland, Albright gives it a 1601 date and surmises that 
the Earl was going to see Richard II and the prosecutor mistook it for a dramatization of 
Hayward's book. Albright then relates this statement to the performance of February 7. 
Heflber counters this argument by dating the document to 1600 and noting the play was 
performed "often" with the Earl present, neither of which is true of the February 7 
performance. For a complete account of this dispute, see the articles of Albright and 
Heflber listed in the Works Cited. 
14 Barroll, for instance, declares all comments on Essex and Richard II as emanating from 
a "time-honored and traditionally tendered narrative about the earl and his connection with 
Shakespeare's drama" (443). Barroll pursues a new avenue of heresy by turning his 
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attention to Essex and John Hayward's book. 
15 For all biographical matter, see the studies of Harrison, Strachey, and Lacey. 
16 Essex's secrecy about his deal with Tyrone came back to haunt him at this trial as rumors 
reached the point that evidence was entered into record that 
from the report of sundry Rebels in Ireland, it appears that Essex was 
generally esteemed by the rebels in Ireland as their special friend; that secret 
intelligences passed between him and Tyrone, and that they had combined 
together that the Earl should be king of England, and Tyrone Viceroy of 
Ireland. (Calendar 454-5) 
While the usual rhetoric of the time is manifested here, it is interesting to note both how far 
rumors of Essex's designs on the crown had ·gone, and how much latitude he was allowed 
since the charges against him were dropped. 
17 When Lambard replied t~~t "Such a wicked imagination was determined and attempted 
by a most unkind Gent. the most adorned creature that ever your Majestie made" in an 
apparent reference to Essex and his rebellion, Elizabeth replied, "He that will forget God, 
will also forget his benefactors." She then complained of the influence the playing of the 
Richard II story may have had on the rebellion: "this tragedy was played 4one times in open 
streets and houses" (Progresses 552). Elizabeth seemed to see in retrospect that the 
drama may have spurred Essex and his followers to action. 
18 Cecil used the connection between Richard II and Essex often, drawing the comparison 
constantly in the Star Chamber: "He would have removed Her Majesty's servants, stepped 
into her chair, and perhaps had her treated like Richard II" (Calendar 555). Cecil would 
use the same tactic in Essex's trial (Calendar 584). 
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Notes to Chapter 5 
1 The use of Eve in heretical feminist work can take several different approaches. Mary 
Wollstonecraft was one of the first to recognize the poem as a sight to engage feminsit 
issues, which she did in A Vindication of the Rights of Women. For a complete outline of 
her argument, see Blakemore. Katherine M. Rogers argued for Milton's misogynistic 
depiction of Eve as early as 1966, contending that "It is because Adam does not maintain 
his due authority over Eve that he falls. Eve's inferiority is insisted on from her first 
··appearance" (152). While most writers focus on Eve as emblem of patriarchal oppression, 
some locate Milton's misogyny elsewhere. Valbuena affirms Adam's choice to stay with 
Eve in Paradise Lost but cl~ms Milton "implicity reverses" that choice in the divorce 
tracts (115). Here Milton's true hostility to women emerges: "to win the reader's heart and 
mind Milton must awaken a longing for divorce from whatever may be associated with the 
feminine" (115), and "Divorce means freedom from the tyranny of enslavement to any 
woman ... or way of thought that would restrict masculine self-determination" (134). 
Here we have one of the odd instances where Eve is the only construction of Milton that is 
positive toward women, according to V albuena. 
2 Riggs sees Eve's problem as deriving from being "created in response to Adam's erotic 
need" (368); therefore she is not equipped to deal with the pressures of temptation and 
even living in the world. 
3 One fascinating example of this bandwagon cheering occurs in an exchange between 
Christine Froula and Edward Pechter in Critical Inquiry. Froula uses Milton as an 
occasion to champion feminist criticism and to undermine the canon, claiming that "The 
Blank Page" is female and asks for silence to speak (''When" 343), neccessitating the need 
to abandon the masculine texts of the canon. Pechter responds by calling Froula's methods 
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into question, complaining that any appeal to Virginia Woolf mystifies her criticism, and 
supporting male readings of Milton. Froula responds again this time by calling Pechter's 
manhood into question and declaring all resistance to her ideas as sexist: the "woman's 
voice threatens to discredit that masculinist culture upon which Mr. Fechter has modeled 
his identity" ("Pechter's"l 78). 
4 See also Davies, 243. 
5 Farwell echoes Lewalski's support of Eve's autonomy to make decisions: "[Milton's] 
picture ofEve--and by implication, ofwomankind--allows her the positive possibilities of 
individuality, separateness, and, at times, independence" (16). Swan also argues that Eve 
"recognizes her role and responsibility in the Fall" because of her independence (64). 
Langford believes Eve "represents an alternative realm which, though officially in 
subjection to the masculine paradigm of heaven, doggedly manifests its independence" 
(120). 
6 After recognizing Eve's part in the Fall, Swan contends that "like the Son, and radically 
unlike Adam, she is willing to take on all of the punishment" (64). Ferry see Eve as "the 
instrument of grace in man's restorationi• (129), and Lim asserts that "She is ... the first to 
reconstruct the rupture that had taken place between herself and Adam, and between them 
both and God" (125). 
7 Landy responds to Lewalski in "A Free and Open Encounter: Milton and Modem 
Reader." While the argument remains the same, the sophistication of Landy's case and use 
of feminist jargon are interesting to note. 
8 I will examine Gilbert's work as it appears in Madwoman in the Attic since this book has 
had the greater impact upon literary studies as a whole. 
9 Notice especially the rhetoric of New Critics in Chapter 1, Leavis in particular. 
10 Gilbert quotes Wife to Mr. Milton by Graves, and then refers to Woolf, Bloom's 
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Anxiety, and de Beauvoir as the basis for her argument. 
11 Pechter1s call for a re-assessing of the canon echoes this argument. 
12 See especially Wittreich's acknowledgement of Gilbert while at the same time calling her 
methods into question (Feminist, see especially the Introduction). 
13 The question for this study is not whether Gilbert is right. The focus is on heretical 
methodology and the purposes of her criticism. 
14 Another fine article that anticipates Shullenberger's is Joan Webber's. She tackles 
Gilbert's methodology and offers an Eve that anticipates twentieth-century women, 
offering the delightful suggestion that "Eve may be a prototype for the modem woman 
who fulfills her profession and is expected to do the dishes as well" (15). 
15 Shullenberger has a special perspective on this issue as he teaches at Sarah Lawerence. 
16 As Eve begins to emerge as the dominant force in the epic, a new heresy may have 
begun to assert itself Adam as oppressed. Langford argues that "the sympathy and love 
she [Eve] finds in her world are actually within herself' and Adam finds no such peace as 
he has been co-opted "by a patriarchal authority which . . . ideologically structures his 
subjectivity" (120). Adam has no choice but to accept the patriarchy which God foists 
upon them, while Eve can fight against it and discover her own identity, 
17 Others who emphasize Eve's redemptive role include Ferry, Swari, and Lim. See note 
6. 
18 Adam in many ways mirrors the response of Paul to the law in the book of Romans. 
Paul demonstrates that strict adherence to the law can produce only death. Only a 
redemptive relationship to Christ offers any hope. See Romans 2-5. See also Rosenblatt. 
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Notes to Chapter 6 
1 Peperzak serves as more of a paraphase of Levinas than an interpretation, so I exchange 
the two freely. 
2 All quotes are taken from A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds unless otherwise 
noted. 
3 For an exhaustive and definitive account of the evolution of logos in Greek thought, see 
Gerhard Kittel who demonstrates how logos continues to accumulate greater and greater 
importance in Greek philosophy until it becomes synonymous with correct reasoning and 
the height of philosophic expression. Kittel also recognizes and demonstrates the Christian 
appropriation of logos as God's expression and will as manifested in the Son: 
The Word is not just the revelation mediated through the speaking and 
teaching Jesus. It is the fact of Christ as such .... There is an 
unmistakable material tendency to regard Jesus Himself as the One who 
gives and is this Word, not only in His addresses, but in His whole, earthly 
manifestation. ("Logos" 4: 127, 129) 
For Kittel this use of logos is unique to the early patristic writers and represents an 
innovation from Greek usage of the term. It is this precise connotation Derrida chooses to 
return to over and over, the word as containing both sign and signified in perfect unity, 
which makes all his writings essentially and wholly theological. 
4 For a thorough account of the word edah, see Gensinius. The word takes as one of its 
roots "a heap of stones" and traces back to the earliest moments which testified to God's 
presence among the Hebrews (729). 
Works Cited 
Adams, Robert Martin. Ikon: John Milton and the Modern Critics. New York: Cornell 
UP, 1955. 
Albright, Evelyn May. "Shakespeare's Richard II and the Essex Conspiracy." PMLA 42 
(1927): 686~720. 
Allen, Don C. The Harmonious Vision: Studies in Milton's Poetry. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1954. 
Auden, W.H. The Dyer's Hand and Other Essays. New York: Random, 1962. 
Barroll, Leeds. "A New History for Shakespeare and His Time." Shakespeare Quarterly 
39 (1988): 441-64. 
Bates, Jonathan, ed. Titus Andronicus by William Shakespeare. London: Routledge, 
1994. 
Berger, Harry, Jr. Imaginary Audition: Shakespeare on Stage and Page. Berkeley: U of 
. California P, 1989. 
"Text Against Performance: The Example of Macbeth." Genre 15 
49-79. 
(1982): 
Bevington, David. "Varieties ofHistoricism: 'Beyond the Infinite and Boundless Reach."' 
Modern Philology 93 (1995): 73-88. 
The Bible. New International Version. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1973. 
Blakemore, Steven. "Rebellious Readings: The Doubleness of Wollstonecraft's Subversion 
of Paradise Lost." Texas Studies in Language and Literature 34 (1992): 451-80. 
192 
Bloom, Harold. The Anxiety of Influence. New York: Oxford UP, 1973. 
---. Kabba/ah and Criticism. New York: Seabury, 1975. 
--. A Map of Misreading. New York: Oxford UP, 1975. 
Boman, Thorleif Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek. Trans. Jules L. Moreau. 
Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960. 
193 
Booth, Wayne C. Critical Understanding: The Power and Limits of Pluralism. Chicago: 
U of Chicago P, 1979. 
Brook, Peter. The Shifting Point. New York: Harper, 1987. 
Brooks, Cleanth. ''Milton and Critical Re-estimates." PMLA 66 (1951): 1045-54. 
---. "Milton and the New Criticism." Sewanee Review 59 (1951): 1-21. 
Brown, John Russell. Discovering Shakespeare: A New Guide to the Plays. New York: 
Columbia UP, 1981. 
Shakespeare's Plays in Performance. New York: St. Martin's, 1967. 
Brown, Paul. "'This Thing of Darkness I Acknowledge Mine:' The Tempest and the 
Discourse of Colonialism." Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural 
Materialism. Ed. Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
UP, 1985. 
Buber, Martin. "Comments on the Idea of Community." A Believing Humanism: My 
Testament, 1902-1965. Trans. Maurice Friedman. New York: Simon, 1967. 87-
92. 
I and Thou. Trans. Ronald Gregor Smith. New York: Scribner's, 1958. 
Bush, Douglas. "The New Criticism: Some Old-Fashioned Queries." PMLA 64 (1959): 
13-21. 
Calendar of State Papers (Domestic) of the Reign of Elizabeth. 1598-1601. Vol. 5. 
London: PRO, 1867. 
194 
Campbell, Lily B. Shakespeare's ''Histories": Mirrors of Elizabethan Policy. San Marino, 
CA: Huntington Library, 1947. 
Cartelli, Thomas. Marlowe, Shakespeare, and the Economy ~f Theatrical Experience. 
Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1991. 
Chambers, E.K. William Shakespeare: A Study of Facts and Problems. Vol. I. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 193 0. 2 vols. 
Coles, Romand. Self/Power/Other: Political Theory and DialogicalEthics. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell UP, 1992. 
Conrad, Joseph. Heart of Darkness. New York: Penguin, 1902. 
Coser, Lewis A. The Functions of Social Conflict. San Francisco: Free, 1956. 
Coursen, HR. Shakespearean Performance as Interpretation. Newark: U of Delaware P, 
1992. 
Darras, Jacques. Joseph Conrad and the West: Signs of Empire. Trans. Anne Luyat and 
Jacques Darras. Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1982. 
Davies, Stevie. The Feminine Reclaimed: The Idea of Woman in Spenser, Shakespeare, 
and Milton. Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 1986. 
Dawson, Anthony. "Measure for Measure, New Historicism, and Theatrical Power." 
Shakespeare Quarterly 39 (1988): 328-41. 
de Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. Trans. and Ed. H.M. Parshley. New York: 
Knopf, 1968. 
Denby, David. "Jungle Fever." New Yorker 6 November 1995: 118-29. 
Derrida, Jacques. A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds. Ed. Peggy Kanuf. New York: 
Columbia UP, 1991. 
Dessen, Allen C. Titus Andronicus. Manchester, Great Britain: Manchester UP, 1989. 
D'souza, Dinesh. /liberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus. New 
York: Free, 1991. 
Dollimore, Jonathan. "Introduction: Shakespeare, Cultural Materialism and the New 
Historicism." Political Shakespeare: NewEssays in Cultural }.,!aterialism. Ed. 
Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985. 2-1 7. 
195 
Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology, and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and 
His Contemporaries. 2nd edition. New York: Harvester, 1989. 
--- and Alan Sinfield, eds. Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural Materialism. 
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985. 
Eliot, T.S. "Milton I." On Poetry and Poets. New York: Farrar, 1957. 156-64. 
Hereafter called Poets. 
"Milton II." Poets. 165-83. 
"The Perfect Critic." The Sacred Wood. London: Methuen, 1920. 1-16. 
Empson, William. Milton's God. London: Chatto and Windus, 1961. 
Erickson, Kai T. Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: 
John Wiley, 1966. 
Farwell, Marilyn R. "Eve, the Separation Scene, and Renaissance Idea of Androgyny." 
Milton Studies 16 (1982): 3-20. 
Felperin, Howard. The Uses of the Canon: Elizabethan Literature and Contemporary 
Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. 
Ferry, Anne. "Milton's Creation of Eve." Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 28 
(1988): 113-32. 
Fish, Stanley. "Milton's Career and the Career of Theory." There's No Such Thing as 
Free Speech and it's a Good Thing, Too. New York: Oxford UP, 1994. 257-66. 
Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political Change. New York: Oxford 
UP, 1995. 
Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost. New York: St. Martin's, 1967. 
There's No Such Thing as Free Speech: And it's a Good Thing. Too. New York: 
Oxford UP, 1994. 
196 
Fleisham, Avrom. "The Condition of English: Taking Stock in a Time of Culture Wars." 
College English 57 (1995): 807-21. 
Conrad's Politics: Community and Anarchy in the Fiction of Joseph Conrad. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1967. 
Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things: An Archaeology Jo the Human Sciences. New 
York: Vintage, 1973. 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. Ed. Colin Gordon. New 
York: Pantheon, 1980. 
Freedman, Morris. "John Milton and the King of Poland." Virginia Quarterly Review 67 
(1991): 687-97. 
Froula, Christine. "Pechter's Specter: Milton's Bogey Writ Small: or, Why Is He Afraid of 
Virginia Woolf" Critical Inquiry 11 (1984): 171-78. 
"When Eve Reads Milton: Undoing the Canonical Economy." Critical Inquiry 10 
(1983): 321-47. 
Gallagher, Philip J. Milton, the Bible, and Misogyny. Ed. Eugene R. Cunnar and Gail L 
Mortimer. Columbia: U of Missouri P, 1990. 
Gesinius, William. A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament. Trans. Edward 
Robinson. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1907. 
Gilbert, Miriam. 11Re-viewing the Play." Shakespeare Quarterly 36 (1985): 609-17. 
Gilbert, Sandra M. and Susan Gubar. The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer 
and the Nineteenth Century Literary Imagination. New Haven,CT: Yale UP, 
1979. 
197 
"Patriarchal Poetry and Women Readers: Reflections on Milton's Bogey." PMLA 93 
(1978): 368-82. 
Graff, Gerald. Beyond the Culture Wars: How' Teaching the Conflicts Can Revitalize 
American Education. New York: Norton, 1992. 
Professing Literature: An Institutional History. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 198 7. 
Granville-Barker, Harley. Prefaces to Shakespeare. Vol. I. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton UP, 1946. 
Graves, Robert. Wife to Mr. Milton: The Story of Marie Powell. New York: Creative 
Age, 1944. 
Greenblatt, Stephen. Introduction. The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance. 
Norman, OK: Pilgrim Books, 1982. 
Introduction. Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in 
Renaissance England. Berkeley: U of California P, 1988. 
"Invisible Bullets." Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in 
Renaissance England. Berkeley: U of California P, 1988. 22-65. 
Grierson, Herbert J.C. Milton and Wordsworth: Poets and Prophets: A study of Their 
Reactions to Political Events. New York: MacMillan, 1937. 
Harris, R. Laird, Ed. Theological Wordbook of the New Testament. Chicago: Moody, 
1980. 
Harrison, G.B. The Elizabethan Journals. London: Routledge, 1938. 
---. The Life and Death of Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex. New York: Holt, 193 7. 
Haskin, Dayton. Milton's Burden of Interpretation. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 
1994. 
Haugh, Robert. Joseph Conrad: Discovery in Design. Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1957. 
Heffuer, Richard. "Shakespeare, Hayward, and Essex." PMLA 45 (1930): 754-80. 
198 
---. "Shakespeare, Hayward, and Essex Again." PMLA 47 (1932): 898-99. 
Hodgson, Barbara. "Parallel Practices, or the Un-necessary Difference." Kenyon Revie1t· 7 
(1985): 57-65. 
Howard, Jean E. "The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies." English Literary 
Renaissance 16 (1986): 13-43. 
Hughes, Alan, ed. Titus Andronicus by William Shakespeare. New York: Cambridge UP, 
1994. 
Hunter, William B. Jr. "The Heresies of Satan." Th' Upright Heart and Pure: Essays on 
John Milton Commemorating the Tercentenary of the Publication <.?f Paradise 
Lost. Ed. Amadeus P. Fiore, O.F.M. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne UP, 1967. 25-34. 
Jackson, Russell and Robert Smallwood, eds. Players of Shakespeare 3: Further Essays 
in Shakespearean Performance. New York: Cambridge UP, 1993. 
Johnson, Paul. A History of Christianity. New York: Atheneum, 1976. 
Kastor, Frank S. Milton and the Literary Satan. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1974. 
Kermode, Frank. The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of Narrative. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1979. 
King, Andrew A "The Rhetoric of Power Maintenance: Elites at the Precipice." 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 62 (1976): 127-34. 
Kirkpatrick, Frank G. Community: A Trinity of Models. Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
UP, 1986. 
Kittel, Gerhard. "Logos." Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. 10 vols. Ed. 
Gerhard Kittel. Trans. Geoffrey W. Brorniley. Grand Rapids, MI: Erdmans, 
1967. 4.69-136. 
Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. 10 vols. Ed. Gerhard Kittel. Trans. 
Geoffrey W. Brorniley. Grand Rapids, MI: Erdmans, 1967. 
199 
Kittredge, Geroge Lyman. Introducton. Richard II. By William Shakespeare. Waltham, 
MA: Blaisdell, 1966. ix-xv. 
Knapp, Jeffrey. An Empire Nowhere: England, America, and Literature from Utopia to 
The Tempest. Berkeley: U of California P, 1992. 
Knight, Wilson C.G. The Wheel of Fire. 4th ed. London: Methuen, 1949. 
Kurtz, Lester R. "The Politics of Heresy." American Journal of Sociology 88 (1983): 
1085-1115. 
The Politics of Heresy: The Modernist Crisis in Roman Catholicism. Berkeley: U of 
California P, 1986. 
Lacey, Robert. Robert, Earl of Essex. New York: Atheneum, 1971. 
Landy, Marcia. "A Free and Open Encounter: Milton and the Modem Reader." Milton 
Studies 9 (1976): 3-33. 
"Kinship and the Role of Women in Paradise Lost." Milton Studies 4 ( 1972): 3-18. 
Langford, Larry L. "Adam and the Subversion of Paradise." Studies in English Literature 
1500-1900 34 (1994): 119-34. 
Langiulli, Nino. "Syracuse University and the Kool-Aid Acid Curriculum." Measure 
September 1990: 5-7. 
Lanier, Douglas. "Unmarkt, Unknown: Paradise Regained and the Return of the 
Expressed." Criticism 37 (1995): 187-212. 
Leavis, F.R. "Mr. Eliot and Milton." Sewanee Review 57 (1949): 1-30. 
---. Revaluation: Tradition and Development in English Poetry. New York: Norton, 
1936. 
Lessl, Thomas M. "Heresy, Orthodoxy, and the Politics of Science." Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 74 (1988): 18-34. 
"The Priestly Voice." Quarterly Journal of Speech 75 (1989): 183-97. 
Levin, Richard. "Performance-Critics vs Close Readers in the Study of English 
Renaissance Drama." Modem Language Review 81 (1986): 545-59. 
Levinas, Emmanuel. Time and the Other and Additional Essays. Trans. Richard A 
Cohen. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne UP, 1987. 
200 
Lewalski, Barbara K. "Milton on Women--Yet Once More." Milton Studies 6 (1975): 3-
20. 
Lewis, C.S. A Preface to Paradise Lost. New York: Oxford UP, 1942. 
Liddell, George Herbert and Robert Scott. Greek-English Lexicon. New York: American 
Book Company, 1843. 
Lim, Walter S.H. "Adam, Eve, and Biblical Analogy in Paradise Lost." Studies in 
English Literature 1500-1900 30 ( 1990): 115-31. 
Liu, Alan. "The Power of Formalism: The New Historicism." ELH 56 (1989): 721-71. 
Loewy, Erich H. Freedom and Community: The Ethics of Interdependence. Albany, NY: 
State U ofNew YorkP, 1993. 
Macmurray, John. Persons in Relation. London: Faber, 1961. 
McMillen, Liz. "A New Wave of French Thinkers." Chronicle of Higher Education 23 
Nov. 1994: A7. 
Martin, Randy. Performance as Political Act: The Embodied Self. New York: Bergin, 
1990. 
Merrill, Thomas F. "Milton's Satanic Parable." ELH 50 (1983): 279-95. 
Miller, J. Hillis. "Heart of Darkness Revisited." Conrad Revisited: Essays for the 
Eighties. Ed. Ross C. Murfin. Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 1985. 31-50. 
Milton, John. Paradise Lost. Complete Poems and Major Prose. Ed. Merritt Y. Hughes. 
New York: Macmillan, 1957. 
Montrose, Louis. "Renaissance Literary Studies and the Subject of History." E,11glish 
201 
Literary Renaissance 16 (1986): 5-12. 
Morris, Wesley. Toward a New Historicism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1972. 
Musgrove, S. "Is the Devil an Ass?" Review of English Studies 21 ( 1945): 302-15. 
Nichols, John, Ed. The Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth. New ed. 
Vol. 3. New York: Burt Franklin, 1823. 3 Vols. 
Nott, Kathleen. The Emperor's Clothes. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1954. 
O'Connor, William Van. "This Alexandrian Criticism." American Scholar 14 (1945): 357-
61. 
Parini, Jay. "Literary Theory Is Not All Bad." Chronicle of Higher Education 17 
November 1995: A52. 
Pechter, Edward. "When Pechter Reads Froula Pretending She's Eve Reading Milton: or, 
New Feminist Is But Old Priest Writ Large." Critical Inquiry 11 (1984): 163-70. 
Pelikan, Jaroslav. The Christian Tradition. 5 Vols. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1974. 
Peperzak, A. To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy ~f Emmanuel Levinas. 
West Lafayette, Ind: Purdue UP, 1993. 
Peter, John. "Reflection on the Milton Controversy." Scrutiny 19 (1952-3): 2-15. 
Rajan, Balachandra. Paradise Lost and the Seventeenth Century Reader. London: Chatto 
and Windus, 194 7. 
"Paradise Lost: The Uncertain Epic." Milton Studies 16 (1983): 105-19. 
Ransom, John Crowe. "A Poem Nearly Anonymous." The World's Body. New York: 
Scribners, 1938. 1-28. 
Riggs, William G. "The Temptation of Milton's Eve: 'Words, Impregn'd withe Reason."' 
Journal of English and German Philology 94 ( 1995): 365-392. 
Rogers, Katherine M. The Troublesome Helpmate: A History of Misogyny in Litearature. 
Seattle: U of Washington P, 1966. 
202 
Romany, Frank. "Shakespeare and the New Historicism." Essays in Criticism 39 (1989): 
271-88. 
Rosenblatt, Jason P. Torah and Law in Paradise Lost. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
1994. 
Rousseaus, Mary F. Community: The Tie That Binds. New York: UP of America, 1991. 
Said, Edward W. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Knopf, 1993. 
Saurat, Denis. Milton: Man and Thinker. Norwood, MA: Dial, 1925. 
Schaar, C. "Satan as Deconstructor." English Studies 70 (1989): 504-06. 
Shakespeare, William. A Midsummer Night's Dream. The Complete Works of William 
Shakespeare. Ed. Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1988. 
311-34. 
Richard II. The Complete Works of William Shakespeare. Ed. Stanley Wells 
and Gary Taylor. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1988. 367-95. 
Titus Andronicus. The Complete Works of William Shakespeare. Ed. Stanley Wells 
and Gary Taylor. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1988. 125-52. 
Shattuck, Robert. "Standing Up for Literature." Civilization Sept-Oct. 1995: 70-72. 
Shullenberger, William. "Wrestling with the Angel: Paradise Lost and Feminist Criticism." 
Milton Quarterly 20 (1986): 69-85. 
Smith, Barbara Hernstein. "Presidential Forum: Breaking Up\Out\Down--the Boundaries 
of Literary Study: Introduction." Profession 89: 2-3. 
Smith, Nigel. "The Rest is Silence." Essays in Criticism 37 (1987): 269-80. 
Starkman, M.K. "The Militant Miltonist: Or, the Retreat from Humanism." ELH 26 
(1959): 209-28. 
Steadman, John M. "The Idea of Satan as the Hero of Paradise Lost." Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society 120 (1976): 253-94. 
203 
Strachey, Lytton. Elizabeth and Essex: A Tragic History. New York: Harcourt, 1928. 
Styan, J.L. "Psychology in the Study of Drama: The Negative and the Positive." College 
Literature 5 (1978): 77-93. 
Swan, Jesse G. "Author-Functions and the Interpretations of Eve in Paradise Lost." 
Milton Quarterly 26 (1992): 59-69. 
Swift, John N. "Similes of Disguise and the Reader of Paradise Lost." South Atlantic 
Quarterly 79 (1980): 425-35. 
Tennenhouse, Leonard. Power on Display. London, Methuen, 1986. 
Thomas, Brook. The New Historicism and Other Old-Fashioned Topics. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton UP, 199 L 
Tillyard, E.M.W. Milton. London: Chatto and Windus, 1930. 
---. Studies in Milton. London: Chatto and Windus, 1951. 
"Treating Literature as Literature." Chronicle of Higher Education 6 October 1995: A21-
22. 
Ure, Peter. Introduction. Richard II. By William Shakespeare. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 
1961. xiii-lxxxiii. 
Valbuena, Olga Lucia. "Milton's 'Divorsive' Interpretation and the Gendered Reader." 
Milton Studies 27 (1991): 115-37. 
Waldock, A.J.A. Paradise Lost and Its Critics. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1947. 
Webber, Joan Malory. "The Politics of Poetry: Feminism and Paradise Lost." Milton 
Studies 14 (1980): 3-24. 
Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: U 
of California P, 1956. 
Werblosky, R.J. Zwi. Lucifer and Prometheus: A Study of Milton's Satan. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952. 
204 
White, Hayden. Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1978. 
Williams, Arnold. "Conservative Critics of Milton." Sewanee Review 49 ( 1941 ): 90-106. 
Williams, Gwyn. "Correspondence." Review of English Studies 21 (1945 ): 14 7. 
Wittreich, Joseph. Feminist Milton. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1987. 
The Romantics on Milton: Formal Essays and Critical Asides. Cleveland, OH: P of 
Case Western Reserve U, 1970. 
Wollstonecraft, Mary. A Vindication of the Rights of Women. The Works of Mary 
Wollstonecraft. Vol. 5 Ed. Janet Todd and Marily Butler. New York: New York 
UP, 1989. 7 Vols. 
Woodhouse, A.S.P. "The Historical Criticism of Milton." PMLA 66 (1951 ): 1033-44. 
Woolf, Virginia. A Room of One's Own. New York: Harcourt, 1929. 
Worthen, W.B. "Deeper Meaning and Theatrical Technique: The Rhetoric of Performance 
Criticism." Shakespeare Quarterly40 (1989): 441-55. 
VITA 
Shawn Douglas Crawford 
Candidate for the Degree of 
. Doctor of Philosophy 
Thesis: GLORIOUS HERETICS: LITERARY CRITICISM, HERESY, AND 
COMMUNITY 
Major Field: English 
Biographical: 
Education: Graduated :from El Dorado High School, El Dorado, Kansas in May 
1984; received Bachelor of Arts degree in English and History from 
Southwest Baptist University, Bolivar, Missouri in May 1988; received 
Master of Arts degree in English from Oklahoma State University, 
Stillwater, Oklahoma in December 1991. Completed the requirements for 
the Doctor of Philosophy degree with a major in English at Oklahoma State 
University in July 1996. 
Experience: Employed by Southern Baptist Convention summers; employed by 
Oklahoma State University, Department of English as a Teaching Assistant 
and Teaching Associate; Oklahoma State University, Department of 
English, 1989 to 1994. Employed by Southwest Baptist University, 
Department of English as an Assistant Professor; Southwest Baptist 
University, Department ofEnglish, 1994 to present. 
Professional Memberships: National Council of Teachers of English, Modem 
Language Association. 
